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Interpreting Emerging Finance Capitalism in Turkey

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Interpreting Emerging Finance Capitalism in Turkey

Turkey has been touted as one of the great ‘emerging market’ success stories. As the advanced capitalisms like the US and UK sunk into the Great Recession, Turkey pulled out of crisis earning the moniker of a key ‘growth market’ in 2011 by Jim O’Neill, the chair of Goldman Sachs Asset Management who originated the term ‘BRIC’. Over the last decade Turkey’s GDP per capita has skyrocketed from about $8500 to about $14 000 as annual growth stayed in the range of 6-8 per cent. Yet such broad indicators often obscure underlying and growing inequality of income and power among social classes. The OECD ranks Turkey dead last in its social justice indicator. Inequality has increased faster in Turkey than in almost all other OECD member states. Turkey also has the lowest employment rate among member states at 44.3 per cent. While GDP growth appears rosy the average Turk made 21 per cent less on average in 2009 than in 2005.[1] By contrast the banks in Turkey have made record profits year after year, averaging more than double that in most other OECD countries. The balance of power between labour and capital has never been more imbalanced in favour of finance.

The analytical thread linking these seemingly disparate facts is that Turkish leadership and domestic elites remain firmly committed to a neoliberal and finance-led strategy of development. The neoliberal element is premised on the defeat and on-going repression of organized labour’s capacity to resist market-oriented structural adjustment alongside the intensification of profit and labour productivity imperatives since the 1980s. The finance-led element involves Turkish state and government elites developing new institutional capacity to absorb, socialize, and manage the accumulation of risks of foreign and domestic financial capital at times of crisis.[2] This solidified in the post-2001 banking crisis and recovery period under the ruling AKP as emerging finance capitalism (EFC).[3]In States, Banks and Crisis: Emerging Finance Capitalism in Mexico and Turkey I define EFC as “the fusion of the interests of domestic and foreign financial capital in the state apparatus as the institutionalized priorities and overarching social logic guiding the actions of state managers and government elites, often to the detriment of labour.” EFC as the current phase of capital accumulation is distinctive but not distinct from the three decades of finance-led neoliberal transformation processes leading up to it. I want to focus here on the book’s historical materialist analytical framework, which I frame argument around four premises: (1) states as social relations; (2) banks as social relations; (3) crises as constitutive of EFC; and (4) labour is vital to the nature of EFC. I’ll explore these premises in turn with illustrative examples drawn from Turkey.

 

Premise one: States are social relations

That states are class-based social relations is a historically grounded on analytical premise of political Marxist thought, particularly Poulantzian. This way of thinking also sees each phase of capitalism as crystallized in the form of given states. Seeing the Turkish state in these terms is important for the overall interpretation of EFC because it allows for non-deterministic analysis insofar as the form of state results from historically specific collective social and class struggles undertaken within the wider context of capitalist world market and associated competitive imperatives. The state is neither a timeless black box of competing individuals, as in liberal thought, nor simply the executive committee of the bourgeoisie, as in more orthodox Marxian accounts. Rather there is an understanding of struggle-induced change built into the notion of ‘state’ that varies historically according to different institutionalizations of power. This too opens the way for conceptualizing alternatives to EFC without the resorting to the trope of ‘smashing’ of the state.

What are some examples of the institutionalization of EFC in the Turkish state? The opening of the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) in 1983 following the 1982 Kastelli financial crisis demonstrated a new commitment to protecting financial stability in Turkey. Through the 1980s neoliberal restructuring relied on currency depreciation, export subsidies, and wage suppression but this proved insufficient to ensure growth by 1988. Elites responded by pushing financial liberalization as a means of ensuring continued market-oriented restructuring, which led to capital account liberalization in 1989. This sparked a period of bank centralization and concentration along with heightened financial stability that soon culminated in the 1994 financial crisis and IMF-crafted stabilization package. Instability persisted which the 1999 Disinflation Program was meant to resolve. One aspect involved creating the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK) in June 1999. As is well known, the 1999 Program worsened matters and the BDDK took on the role of crisis manager by 2000-01 under the Banking Sector Restructuring Program. The 2001 crisis was significant insofar as it led to Central Bank independence, a proliferation of cross border financial supervisory agreements, the increasing centralization of domestic financial authority around the Treasury, and the massive build up foreign reserves to ward off foreign capital fears. The AKP has privileged state financial capacity since then often couched in terms of European Union harmonization.

The details are of course more extensive. However the point is that far from the neoliberal idealizations and discourses of a minimal state the post 1980s turn to market-oriented capital accumulation in Turkey was constituted by a process of state restructuring to bolster state financial capacity building. Given the rich tradition of critical state analysis in Turkey, this is not necessarily a controversial premise.

Premise two: Banks, too, are social relations

Unlike in Marxian state theory the premise that banks, too, are social relations is something relatively novel to Marxian research on banking and development (if not necessarily alien to historical materialist thought). Yet so too does this premise involve unpacking banks’ historically specific institutionalized operations relative to the wider phase of development in Turkey. This occurs on at least two levels of conceptualization. At the level of Turkey’s banking system and domestic market, this first means thinking about the material foundations of the banks and the credit system as based on drawing together many people’s money savings for use by a few in order to overcome the barriers that individual private property poses for capitalist production.[4] That is, there is an essentially social and class foundation to banking operations rooted in the exploitative processes of capital accumulation. At the level of Turkey’s banking institutions, this then means also seeing how the banks are social relations at the institutional level. That is, banks too are historically specific institutionalizations of power within given social formations. This conceptualization applies to all banks regardless of ownership categories (be it foreign, domestic, state, or mixed ownership). Posing banking institutions as historically constituted by social relations challenges mainstream empiricist understandings that dominate the literature on banks. Far from presupposing a bank’s operations as determined by ownership, this premise demands an investigation of the banks’ practices and procedures of the banks. Most Marxian accounts unfortunately mirror liberal a priori interpretations of bank ownership. Yet there is something more genuinely historical materialist to an analytical practice of historicizing the banks in Turkey.

Thinking of banks as institutionalized social relations of class power (embedded in wider capitalist social relations of production) allows you to think quite differently about Turkey’s developmental history and the role of banks therein. I find that perhaps the most interesting and unique example of this rethinking involves the Turkish state-owned banks. The Turkish state banks were key agents of Turkey’s post-war capitalist industrialization strategies. The Turkish government configured the banks’ operations to help overcome barriers to national capital formation and accumulation via central government supported ‘duty losses’. In this period the state banks coexisted alongside large private domestic and some foreign banks in Turkey, but they had a distinctive developmental operational logic not subordinated to profit maximization. The transition to neoliberalism in Turkey began to change matters. Under the unstable and increasingly indebted governments of Çiller, Yılmaz, and Erbakan during the mid- to late-1990s the post-war developmental duty losses evolved into distinctively neoliberal duty losses. That is, by the time the 2001 banking crisis struck these governments had hidden away $20 billion in the state banks in cheap credits. During the same period state authorities had forced a number of failed private banks into the state-owned banks. Both measures helped ensure continuity in Turkey unstable neoliberal transformation and in doing so, paradoxically, helped to politically protect the state banks from IMF privatization demands.

The subsequent 2001 banking crisis and 2001 Banking Sector Restructuring Program provided an opportunity for neoliberal advocates to push through with severe market-oriented reforms to commercialize the state banks’ operations by institutionalizing profit and labour productivity imperatives. One result, for example, is that Ziraat Bank has become Turkey’s most profitable bank since 2003 and even the 9th most profitable bank in the world in 2010 (of course, within a context of collapsed global banking profits).[5]Ziraat’s post-war developmental mission, however, has made its way into the dustbin of Turkey’s developmental strategies. The point to be drawn from this brief example is that banks, including state banks, are historical social relations and can be institutionally restructured given political will. Not only does this allow a richer historical account but so too does this conceptualization leave open radical possibilities for alternatives to EFC. Progressive and worker-oriented forms of saving and credit institutions are required for any break in neoliberalism to occur. In Turkey today Vakıflar Bank and Halk Bank remain predominantly state-owned while Ziraat Bank, the largest, remains fully state-owned. Together they constitute about 30 per cent of all banking assets. Here more than perhaps in any other emerging capitalism the banks’ future is yet open to an alternative trajectory should organized labour and political will organize around it.

Premise three: Crises are constitutive of emerging finance capitalism

That moment of crisis matter, in ways not dissimilar to historical institutionalist critical junctures, is a standard Marxian premise. This point need only be made in brief. At issue is the idea that crises are internal to capitalist social relations of production and competition insofar as crises constitute an internal disruption. As such, crises provide an opening for change without determining the nature of such change should it occur. The nature of change, while impacted by economic and social circumstances, is shaped by prevailing political factors, social forces, and class struggles. In Turkey, far from slowing or reversing finance-led neoliberalism, the processes of crisis and recovery has been captured (meaning predominantly shaped) by advocates of market-oriented capitalism since the 1980s. This occurred quite nakedly in 2001 under the technocratic leadership of Kemal Derviş. Discussed below, the state-led rescue was premised upon the bulk of Turkish society socializing the accumulated financial risks gone bad through the state apparatus.

It is important to say that the resolution of financial crises have never been merely technical, politically neutral, or classless. Rather, Turkey’s crisis resolution processes have systematically reinforced and strengthened the power and position of financial capital in the Turkish state and society. As suggested at the outset, this has involved restructuring the state and building institutional capacity to manage recurrent financial crisis. This comes at a social cost that is borne disproportionately by the majority of Turkish society that did not cause the crises.

Premise four: Labour is vital to emerging finance capitalism

Like the banks above, integrating labour into an analysis of finance and development in emerging capitalism is something distinct. Yet the question of labour could not be more significant to the rise of neoliberalism and the consolidation of EFC in Turkey. This builds on a basic Marxian premise that labour is vital to the material reproduction of capitalism – and by extension finance capitalism – in Turkey. Labour and workers are, nonetheless, generally ignored in analyses of banking, finance, and development – be it Marxian or otherwise. My particular interpretation draws on Hilferding and, again, works across two interrelated analytical levels, that of society and the banking institutions. In what follows I highlight three ways in which labour and workers are vital to understanding emerging finance capitalism in Turkey.

The first point is foundational. Namely, it is important to point out, as Hilferding does, that labour creates value in production from which financial capital earns interest. Again, this is a well-established Marxian premise rooted in a labour theory of value. The flip side of this interpretation is the somewhat obvious yet significant fact that finance produces nothing but appropriates value from the wealth-creating labouring classes.

The second and more unique point is that labour is directly implicated in financial crisis resolution. This is an area where I have been doing more research of late and where further research is required. The key is that workers’ labour in general provides the base income tax revenue upon which the state apparatus can socialize or draw in financial risks at times of crisis. For example, Turkey’s 2001 banking crisis and state-led rescue is understood as an important turning point in Turkey subsequent growth and resilience to the current Great Recession. Yet Turkey’s success as a ‘growth market’ depended primarily on state and government elites socializing $47.2 billion or just over 30 per cent of 2002 GDP in financial risks gone bad. That Turkish taxpayers shoulder the costs of financial crisis and resolution is not disputed regardless of one’s analytical traditions. Neither is socialization much theorized, subjected to an understanding of power relations, nor used to interpret the current phase of development. The socialized costs are instead taken as an unfortunate if necessary fact.

How Turkish state and government elites transfer the costs of crisis onto Turkish taxpayers reveals the essential role played by labour. The basic mechanism involves creating fictitious capital: that is, ‘promises to pay’ made up of capitalized claims on future state revenue. How is fictitious capital created in practice and on what material basis? The institutional capacity of any state apparatus to reproduce itself and for state authorities to act depends on revenue generation, which authorities can do in three ways. First, creating new state-owned enterprises or increase SOE (State-Owned Enterprise) productivity to produce surpluses can generate revenue. As we know under neoliberalism and particularly under AKP rule SOEs have typically been sold off for one-time revenues with no new SOEs being created. Many SOEs have been ‘commercialized, however, with Ziraat Bank restructuring as the prime example of driving up profits by ratcheting down on labour costs to drive up productivity gains. Second, raising or introducing new taxes can also generate revenue. In neoliberal Turkey this has involved introducing and increasing value-added tax (VAT) and personal income tax receipts while reducing corporate taxes and practically eliminating import and export taxes to favour domestic and foreign corporate interests. Third, issuing official debt by borrowing against future tax revenues also generates present revenue of sorts. Austerity has become a key strategy by which authorities can increase the amount of accessible present fictitious capital revenues (debt). Increasing domestic worker productivity is another. Both imply greater creditworthiness to the financial capitalists purchasing the state debt bonds.

There is also a third way in which labour is vital to an understanding of EFC: the intensification of bank workers’ labour. With the rise of neoliberalism and especially following the 2001 crisis state elites and bank management have systematically driven down labour costs in the banks. This has also entailed a very disciplinary element. The 2001 Banking sector Restructuring Program involved laying off 50 000 of 168 000 bank workers in Turkey. About 34 000 of these were state bank workers. Those workers who remained in the state banks were forced to accept new contractual conditions that removed many state worker protections. Despite resurgent bank profitability levels, not until 2010 did staff numbers surpass their 1999 levels. The significance of this is reflected in the falling level of staff costs as percentage of the banks’ balance sheet. In 1993 staff costs equalled 3.36 per cent of the balance sheet and in 1999 2.65 per cent. By 2003 this had fallen to 1.75 per cent and to 1.35 per cent by 2009 (about half their pre-crisis level). How significant are staff costs monetary terms? Extremely. For the Turkish banks listed on the İSE (Istanbul Stock Exchange) in 2010 staff costs (at only about 1.35 per cent) came to over TL10.6 billion. This sum equates to over half of the banks’ total after-tax profits of TL20.5 billion. The collapse in staff costs must be understood in the wider context of the Turkish government’s attack on organized labour since the 1980s and with the more recent trend towards outsourcing in the banking sector that was sanctioned by new rules in the 2005 Banking Law and 2006 Regulations. Bank labour, as even the 2003 McKinsey Report Turkey: Making the Productivity and Growth Breakthrough asserts, is a key aspect of bank profitability strategies.

Let me reiterate. First, labour in Turkey is the material basis of socialization of financial risks at the level of society and, second, labour is also vital to bank profitability via the intensification of labour in banks. Given the centrality of labour to the material reproduction of banking and finance in Turkey follows that organized bank labour is a potential source of powerful social mobilization against EFC should they be politically mobilized.

Thinking about alternatives to EFC

Each Marxian premise for interpreting the current phase of EFC is presented in such a way that it integrates some general structural features of EFC in light of the historical specificity in Turkey such that the possibilities for change remain open to individual and collective agency. That is, I suggest the analytical framework discussed exposes the social relations of power underpinning EFC in Turkey while providing the analytical foundations for understanding alternatives to EFC, particularly in the key sector of banking. This change can be to the benefit of the working majority and poor but this demands collective political mobilization organized and institutionalized in their own behalf. In the concluding chapter of States, Banks and Crisis I build on the above analytical framework to argue that any substantive alternative to EFC cannot simply modify the form of capitalism in Turkey (that is, for example, to simply better regulate the banks and mounting inequality). Rather, the way in which Turkish society reproduces itself and the central role of banks therein must be institutionalized along with radically different and democratized social economic premises that break with the structural inequalities and exploitative practices of EFC. The central point made is that the banking system and financing of development must be subordinated to collective ownership and developmental goals rather than commercialized profit imperatives.

I suggest there are three necessary, but not sufficient, conditions to break with EFC vis-à-vis banking in Turkey. First, any substantive change involves capturing political power and restructuring the state financial apparatus. This entails dismantling the institutional and material foundations of emerging finance capitalism, on the one hand, and constitutionally recognizing collective property and worker-owner rights. This process of democratizing finance implies the politicization of the financial apparatus in ways that would, for example, prevent current practices like the socialization of private financial risks at times of crisis.

Second, breaking with EFC also involves dispossessing financial capital of their institutions, amassed concentrations of property and wealth, and their overwhelming social power in Turkish society. As Hilferding understood a century ago, these actions require society making the political demand to take control of the banks. This is necessary because financial capital has proven itself irresponsible with society’s collective resources being incapable of promoting anything like equitable social developmental objectives. We should be clear that this does not just mean the nationalization of private banks or maintaining state ownership of Halk, Vakıf, and Ziraat Bank but something different and more fundamentally democratic.

This leads to the third condition, namely that public policy must aim to subordinate the banks’ operations in Turkey to the demands of a democratized social economy. National developmental policy needs to facilitate domestic monetary and financial autonomy along collectively determined social priorities. In this framework Turkish society itself collectively assumes responsibility for being democratic, participatory, and protagonist in the allocation of their collective monetary resources. As an integral part of this change the banks themselves will need to be reconfigured as semi-autonomous worker collectives within this collective paradigm. Organized bank labour unions must play a central part in this.

How could Turkey fare on these points? There is substantial capacity, indeed, possibility for change in Turkey but also significant barriers. There exists the material and institutional basis to initiate and begin experimenting with social democratized banking insofar as Turkey has large state-owned banks. These embody real spatial potential insofar as their branches and networks stretch throughout the country serving a unifying force for creating a new space of developmentally oriented and democratically subordinated financing for development. There are also important ideational and cultural factors that lend legitimacy to the project since the state banks have long existed and been discursively framed as integral to Turkish national development for decades. Yet while there is material, institutional, spatial, and discursive potential there presently lacks coordinated political mobilization and will in the leading political parties, all of which remain wedded to a more or less market-oriented strategy of development that involves a greater role for private banks.

Crisis, even the current global crisis, may provide an opening for changes in the political commitments to emerging finance capitalism, particularly the more global instability persists and domestic problems mount. Even the OECD will begin to explore the possible benefits of state-owned banks in an upcoming report on ‘new models of development’. Yet crisis alone is insufficient to substantively counter the structural power of EFC in Turkey and to push back against what will almost certainly be waves upon waves of permanent working class austerity measures. Rather, progressive political and social forces need to organize and mobilize around achieving social ownership and democratized control in the arena of banking and finance.

Dr. Thomas Marois, SOAS, University of London

View this article and/or download it as a PDF file 

Please cite this article as follows:

Marois, Thomas (May, 2012), “Interpreting Emerging Finance Capitalism in Turkey”, Vol. I, Issue 3,  pp.6-13,  Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London: ResearchTurkey (http://researchturkey.org/p=802)

[1] OECD (2011), Social Justice in the OECD – How Do the Member States Compare? Sustainable Governance Indicators 2011, Paris; OECD (2011), Society at a Glance – OECD Social Indicators, available at www.oecd.org/els/social/indicators/SAG; OECD Stat.

[2] Marois, Thomas (2011), ‘Emerging market bank rescues in an era of finance-led neoliberalism: A comparison of Mexico and Turkey.’ Review of International Political Economy, 18 (2). pp. 168-196.

[3] The remainder of this article is drawn from my book published in 2012 titled States, Banks and Crisis: Emerging Finance Capitalism in Mexico and Turkey, Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. The book is in the process of being translated and published in Turkish by Notebene Publishing (http://www.notabeneyayinlari.com).

[4] Hilferding, Rudolf (2006 [1910]), Finance Capital: A Study in the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development, ed. with an introduction by Tom Bottomore, trans. Morris Watnick and Sam Gordon, London: Routledge

[5] Alexander, Philip, ‘EM banks most profitable – but vulnerable on deposit bases’ 04 July 2011, The Banker, downloaded 04 July 2011. Of course, this is equally a reflection of massive losses among the global banking giants.

Technological Structure of the Foreign Trade between Turkey and the EU

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Technological Structure of the Foreign Trade
between Turkey and the EU

Introduction

While Turkey was getting articulated to the world economy at the sectors the technological content of which was low within the frame of the model “export-oriented growth” in the early 1980’s, the policies implemented in the ensuring years remained limited at converting the technological level of the production and export, and consequently the technological level of the EU oriented export of Turkey developed basically based on the low and medium technologies. This essay aiming to investigate the technological structure of the foreign trade performed between Turkey and EU has been fictionalized under three parts. While the place of EU at the foreign trade of Turkey is examined in the first part, the topic of the second part is constituted by the technological structure of the foreign trade between Turkey and the EU, and the findings of the study are included in the third and final part.

1. The Place of EU in the Foreign Trade of Turkey

When Table 1 indicating the place of the EU at the foreign trade of Turkey is examined, according to both the parameters of export and import, it is seen that the relative importance of the EU at the foreign trade of Turkey started to get eroded considerably after 1996 when the customs union came into force. In 1996, it is understood that the import rate of EU-27  countries which is 55.7 % within the import of Turkey got considerably eroded in due course, and regressed to the rate 37 % in 2012, and that the export share Turkey carried out to EU-27  countries in the same period decreased from the rate 54.1 % to the rate 38.8 %. Due to the increasing export performed to the EU countries by Turkey more regularly than the import, at the commerce carried out with the EU, the rate of the export to meet the import increased from the rate 51.7 % to the rate 67.7 % in the period 1996 – 2012. In other words, while the export performed to EU-27 countries between 1996 – 2012 is increasing annually at the rate averagely 11.2 %, import has increased annually at the rate averagely 10.3 %, and consequently, the import coverage ratio of export has gone up considerably. When it is examined as the absolute values, while the export of Turkey performed to EU-27 countries was 12,563 million dollars in 1996 when the Customs Union entered in force, when it was 2012, it increased at the ratio of 372 %, and went up from 12,563 million dollars to 59,241 million dollars. Besides, import increased at the ratio 260 % in the same period, and went up from 24,321 million dollars to 87,446 million dollars.

When the development of the foreign trade carried out between Turkey and EU-27 countries is evaluated in general, it is understood that the increases which have occurred recently at the total import of Turkey haven’t been caused by the import performed from European Union, and that it has been caused by the countries outside the EU especially by the Asian countries (Eşiyok, 2012: 79). In other words, Customs Union prevents Turkey to use the rights of sovereignty over the customs, and it causes the Asian countries to cover the internal market of Turkey with the cheap cost goods and the increasing foreign trade deficits.

Table 1: The Place of EU in the Foreign Trade of Turkey<br />Source: It is constituted according to TÜİK data base.
Table 1: The Place of EU in the Foreign Trade of Turkey
Source: It is constituted according to TÜİK data base.

2.  Technological Structure of Foreign Trade

As it is known, the countries taking part in the centre of the EU are the ones which have the most developed technology of the world as of their structure of production, and it is seen that the countries constituting the core of the EU have carried out important progresses at technology as the result of industrial revolution they performed, and that they have constituted the biggest technological power together with USA and Japan. In this sense, revealing the technological level of the export performed to the EU countries by Turkey is extremely important in terms of indicating the quality of the international trade between Turkey and EU. The foreign trade theory professes that the rates of foreign trade in the mid and long period will develop as opposed to the first goods (Prebish, 1950; Singer, 1950), and the countries having this structure of production and export will have “Immiserizing Growth” as time passes ( Bhagwati, 1958:201-205 ).

2.1.    Technological Structure of the Export    

When Table 2 indicating the technological level of the export that Turkey has performed to EU is examined, it is seen that the export performed by Turkey to EU countries has developed basically based on the low profiled “low-mid technologies”, and the “high technology” export share has been limited. Accordingly, in 2012, the export share of the “low” and “high” technology included sectors representing the two ends has occurred as follows. Low technology (36.0 %), and high technology (4.8 %).

Table 2 : Sectoral Export Share in Accordance with Technological Level (%) (ISIC, Rev.3)<br />Source: Our own calculations based on OECD classification and TÜİK data base.
Table 2 : Sectoral Export Share in Accordance with Technological Level (%) (ISIC, Rev.3)
Source: Our own calculations based on OECD classification and TÜİK data base.

I understood that Turkey’s two traditional sectors (sectors of textile and wearing apparel) exist first before the leading sectors at the export of Turkey to European Union, and the total export share of these two sectors which was 25.9 % in 2008 has increased with time and gone up to the ratio 27.8%. Another traditional sector distinguishing beside the two traditional sectors including low technology is the sector of food products and beverages. The export share of the mentioned sector which was 3.9 % in 2008 increased with time and went up to 4.8 % in 2012.

Another basic category distinguishing at the export of Turkey to EU countries is the category consisting of the “low-mid technology” sectors. It is seen at the export performed by turkey to EU-27 countries that the export share of the low-mid technologies which was 24.1 % in 2008 was eroded with time and decreased to the ratio 22.6 % in 2012. The most basic sector within the low-mid technology export is constituted by the metal industry, and it is seen that the export share of the mentioned sector which was 7.9 % in 2008 decreased to the rate 6.8 % in 2012. Counter to the sectors including “low technology”, it is seen that there isn’t export concentration in the “low-mid technology” category, and that the export shares distribute amongst the sectors relatively as balanced.

It is determined at the export performed to European Union that the export share of the mid-high technology included sectors which was 38% in 2008 was eroded relatively with time and occurred at the ratio 36.6% in 2012. In this category, the basic sector is the sector of motor land vehicle, trailer and semitrailer, and it is determined that the export share of the mentioned sector which was 24.2% in 2008 remained still at a high level like 2.2 % in 2012, although it was eroded with time. Another important sector existing in this group is the sector manufacturing machine and equipment which isn’t classified anywhere else. The export share of the mentioned sector which had been 7.8 % in 2008 increased 1.1 point, and went up to 8.9 % in 2012. In other words, in the “mid-high technology” category, it has been determined that the export of Turkey to EU-27 countries has occurred basically at two sectors and mainly at the sector manufacturing motor land vehicle, trailer and semi-trailer. Amongst the sectors existing in this group, another sector which has the export share over 1 % is the sector of main chemical substances, and the export share of any other sector isn’t over 1%.

As a result, it is understood that the most basic categories at the export carried out by Turkey to EU-27 countries are constituted by the low, mid-high, and low-mid technology included sectors, and the export share of the high technology included sectors existing as leading one the technology content of which is the highest remained at the marginal level with 4.8 % as of 2012. Within the total export, being the export share of the low technology included sectors 36 % as of 2012, and the export share of the high technology included sectors 4.8 % indicates that the export structure of Turkey carried out to EU-27 countries basically consists of the low and mid-profiled sectors, and the foreign trade between these two structures has considerably differed qualitatively.

2.2    Technological Structure of Import

When Table 3 showing the sectoral import shares that Turkey has performed in EU-27 countries is examined in accordance with the technological level of Turkey, it is seen that the low technology included import share performed from EU-27 countries is about 10 %, and the two most basic importing sectors consist of the sector of food products and beverage and the sector of paper and paper products. In the import that Turkey has performed from EU-27 countries, it is seen that the import share of the sector of textile products which is one of the traditional sectors occurred at the level 1.6 % in 2012.

Table 3 : Sectoral Import Shares According To Their Technological Level ( % ) (ISIC Rev.3)<br />Source: Our own calculations through OECD classifications and TÜİK data base.
Table 3 : Sectoral Import Shares According To Their Technological Level ( % ) (ISIC Rev.3)
Source: Our own calculations through OECD classifications and TÜİK data base.

When the import shares of the low-mid technology including sectors are examined, it is seen that the import share of the mentioned sector group after 2012 occurred about 1/4, and the biggest support to the import performed in this group was given by the sectors of coking coal and refined petroleum products together with the main metal industry. The total import share of these two sectors as of 2012 has occurred at a relative high rate like 18.4 %.

It is seen that more than 50 % of the import Turkey performed from the EU-27 countries comprised of the sectors including the mid-high technology. It is understood that the two basic importer sectors are the sectors manufacturing motor land vehicle, trailer and semi-trailer and the sectors of machine and equipment which aren’t classified anywhere else. At the collocation of export share that Turkey have performed to EU-27 countries, the most basic leading one of the sectors is the sector manufacturing motor land vehicles and semi-trailer (as of 2012, the export share of the mentioned sector occurred at the ratio 20.2 %) (if it is considered that the mentioned sector is also importer considerably at the same time ), and it should especially be pointed out that the support of the sector to the foreign trade balance has remained limited.

At the import that Turkey carries out from EU-27 countries, the low technology included sectors and the high technology included sectors exist amongst the categories the export share of which is the smallest. As of 2012, the import share of the high technology included sectors that Turkey carries out from EU-27 countries is 10.6 %, and it is seen that the biggest support is the one performed by the sector of the chemical and herbal products which are used at pharmacy and medicine for this import, and that the mentioned sector is followed by the sector of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks with the import share 2.6 %.

2.3. Technological Structure of Foreign Trade Balance

According to the technology level, Table 4 that indicates the foreign trade balance (the sectors of net exporter and net importer) between Turkey and EU-27 countries is examined, it is seen that Turkey is the net exporter only at the low technology included sectors against EU but the net importer at the other three categories. The mid-high technology category is the leading one amongst the sectors in which Turkey is the net importer against the EU, and it is determined that the net import value of the mentioned sector group which had been 15,2 billion dollars in 2008 increased with time, and went up to 22,8 billion dollars  in 2012. While Turkey had been the net exporter in 2008 with 13,2 billion amongst the low technology included sectors, the value of net export value decreased to 12,1 billion dollars when it was 2012.

Table 4 : Foreign Trade Balance between Turkey and EU According to technological Level (Billion $)<br />Source: Our own calculations.
Table 4 : Foreign Trade Balance between Turkey and EU According to technological Level (Billion $)
Source: Our own calculations.

Consequently, the relation of foreign trade between Turkey and EU looks like the foreign trade relation between a typical metropolitan-environment country, and while Turkey is the net importer at the sectors the technology content of which is high (at the sectors being dependant on abroad), it seems it is the net exporter at the low technology included sectors in which the local production support is high.

3.  Conclusion

When the technological profile of the foreign trade between Turkey and EU is investigated, it is understood that the most basic category at the export performed by Turkey to EU countries is constituted by the “low” and mid-low” technology included sectors. According to the findings of 2012, while the exports share of the low technologies occurred at the ratio 36.0 %, and the export share of the mid-low technologies was determined at the ratio 36.6 %.  On the other hand, it is seen that the high technology export share of Turkey has remained limited with 4.8 %.  When the technological profile of the import that Turkey performed from EU countries, it is understood that it has developed based basically on the mid-high technologies, and the import share of the mentioned category occurred at a high level like 53.8 % as of 2012. Contrary to the export carried out to EU, the share of the low technologies at import is considered extremely low, and it is seen that it constituted the smallest category in 2012 with the import share 10.1 %.  No doubt, this result is an outgrowth of the foreign trade profile of a developing economy like Turkey that has mainly specialized at the low and mid technology included sectors and the EU countries that have the production structure based on high technology.

The export increase of Turkey to the EU countries in the following years will be considerably concerned with the developments it will provide at technology. In other words, it seems that Turkey’s being the net exporter at the relatively high sector with the technology content through it has had foreign trade deficit depends on the transformations that production industry will perform at the structure of production. Besides, it is clear that a transformation from the sectors providing low added value to the sectors providing high added value depends on only a new approach which puts the technology policies on an industrialization strategy that will get prepared and on the centre of this strategy.

B. Ali Eşiyok, Senior Economist, Development Bank of Turkey

Please cite this publication as follows:
Eşiyok, B. Ali (August, 2013), “Technological Structure of the Foreign Trade  between Turkey and the EU”, Vol. II, Issue 6, pp.54-60, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, Research Turkey. (http://researchturkey.org/dev/?p=3980)

References

Bhagwati, Jagdish; (1958), “Immiserizing Growth: A Geometrical Note”, Review of Economic Studies, June , s. 201-205.
Eşiyok,  B.Ali; (2012), “Türkiye Ekonomisinde Cari Açık Sorunu ve Nedenleri”, Finans Politik & Ekonomik Yorumlar, Sayı: 569, s.63-86.
OECD (2011), ISIC Rev.3 Technology Intensity Definition, OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Economic Analysis and Statistic Division.
Perebisch, Raul; (1950), “The Economic Development of Latin American and Its Principal Problems” (Lake Success, NY: United Nations, Depertmant of Economic Affairs), Reprinted in Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 7(1962), p:1-22.
Singer, Hans W; (1950), “The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries”, The American Economic Review, Volume 40, pp.473-485.
www.tuik.gov.tr

The Edges of Civilizations: Turkey and India in the 21st Century

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Two of the world’s multicultural nations, Turkey and India, are emerging from the stupor of their first decades. Reassessing domestic dogmas and old strategic doctrines, New Delhi and Ankara are repositioning themselves as leaders of the 21stcentury world in remarkably similar ways.

At the end of 2008, Levent Bilman, the Turkish Ambassador to India addressed a small audience at a New Delhi think tank. As a diplomat ought, Ambassador Bilman recounted the values and interests his home and host countries shared: Central Asian stability, global trade, counter-terrorism, and democracy key among them. One common trait I was surprised he missed, however, was how both countries straddle cultures, each having deep roots in multiple civilizations.

Turkey is of course the geographic and cultural bridge between Europe and Asia, between Christianity and Islam, and arguably between tradition and modernity. India, at the center of the Indian Ocean – which, as journalist Robert Kaplan writes, is the “nexus of world power and conflict in the coming years” – sits astride the Dharmic, Islamic, Western, and Confucian worlds, unites thousands of languages and cultures within a single nation, and faces its own challenges reconciling the contemporary with the customary.

In an age of globalization, the ability to communicate, trade, and connect across cultures is perhaps the key source of success. Turkey and India, more than most, are ideally poised to take advantage of this new era. Yet it is taking time for both countries to realize the destiny inherent in their identities. Though left with the historical legacies of the many empires that called Anatolia and the subcontinent home, Turkey and India have struggled to define themselves in the modern era.

Turks built a nation on the mantle of Ataturk, a Europhile and ardent nationalist who sought to turn the lives of Turkish citizens on their heads in the name of progress. India’s charismatic founding fathers – Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru set an equally high bar for their successors, a Tryst with Destiny, as Nehru put it on the eve of India’s independence from Britain. The way these aspirations would unfurl, however, left much to be desired.

Authoritarianism and military control continue to mar the Turkish nation, while hierarchy and poor governance have kept India mired in poverty and corruption. India strengthened its democracy but accepted a ‘failing’ state apparatus. Turkey, on the other hand, sacrificed democracy for a strong state.

And yet the consequences have been remarkably similar: The political, cultural and entrepreneurial aspirations of the Turkish and Indian people were stifled, respectively, by a draconian “deep state” and an economy that was closed to the world. The national narratives of a ‘terrorized’ Ankara and the oppressed Kurds could be substituted nearly verbatim for those of New Delhi and the Kashmiris (with Syria and Pakistan playing “the foreign hand”). For generations, the polities of both countries accepted these realities as the unavoidable costs of ambitious national experiments.

Further afield, New Delhi set out to controlSouth Asia through its own “Monroe Doctrine,” a strategic orientation that boxed India into the subcontinent and raised tensions amongst its regional neighbors – the consequences of which we are still seeing in the ‘Af-Pak’ region. Similarly, Turkey long remained on the edge of NATO’s security umbrella in an effort to become the frontline of Europe, causing friction with its neighbors and essentially shunning the Middle Eastern and Central Asian components of its heritage.

Yet today, both countries have begun to question the dogmas that defined their national development through the twentieth century. In addition to throwing off the bureaucratic socialism that had long entrenched social and economic hierarchies, India’s citizens have risen up demanding an end to the endemic corruption that has robbed the country of rupees and opportunities. Even the downtrodden are more able than at any time in India’s history to take their destinies into their own hands. The slow revocation of the atrocious Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which gave India’s army a free hand in Kashmir, and an opening of dialogue have the potential to write a new future for the troubled region.

In Turkey, governments and civilians alike are demanding a new order. No longer are people content to follow the Army’s every dictate, to stay out of the streets when journalists are jailed for challenging official versions of events, or to be denied the ability to practice the religions and speak the languages they wish. Prime Minister’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s efforts to reach out to the Kurds, though progressing in fits and starts, promise to turn the page on a particularly dark portion of Turkish history. Though much remains to be done, it is difficult to deny the changes underway in both countries.

The revolutions in Delhi and Ankara’s global worldviews follow remarkably similar lines. After decades of trying to dominate the subcontinent, India is increasingly looking beyond South Asia for its strategic needs, developing trade, energy, political, and military ties with countries along the Indian Ocean rim and beyond. Likewise, Turkey is seeking what Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu calls “strategic depth,” by harnessing the assets that its geography and history have given it, and extending the edges of Ankara’s sphere of influence.

Davutoğlu’s policy of “zero problems with neighbors” is remarkably similar to Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral’s foreign policy doctrine that sought conciliation with the other countries of South Asia. Turkey is finally using its multi-civilizational legacy to bridge conflicting parties from Bosnia to Syria, Israel, and Iraq. As India faces similar challenges in reconciling its interests with the US and Iran, for example – it must learn to use its own “unity in diversity” to its advantage.

Of course, comparisons cannot be taken too far, considering the differences in Turkey and India’s colonial histories, geographies, and cultures. But what is most important is, as I was told by an American official in Istanbul – though she just as easily could have been speaking of India – that “people here realize that things are getting better than they used to be.”

In an era when the contours of globalization are meeting tumult in some places and resistance in others, this is perhaps the best sign of whether Turkey and India will meet – or exceed – the dreams of their founders.

Neil Padukone

Please cite this article as follows:

Padukone, Neil (April, 2012), “The Edges of Civilizations: Turkey and India in the 21st Century”, Vol. I, Issue 2,  pp.9-10,  Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London: ResearchTurkey

Mexico and Turkey: Unlikely Similarities in their Geopolitical Situation with Powerful Northern Neighbors

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Mexico and Turkey: Unlikely Similarities in their Geopolitical Situation with Powerful Northern Neighbors Meksika ve Türkiye: Güçlü Kuzey Komşularıyla Jeopolitik Durumlarındaki Beklenmedik Benzerlikler

Mexico and Turkey: Unlikely Similarities in their Geopolitical Situation with Powerful Northern Neighbors

At first glance, one might think that Mexico and Turkey do not have anything in common. They are both in different regions of the world, speak different languages, and have different religions. On the contrary, there are many similarities between Mexico and Turkey. This article will examine some of the biggest similarities between the two countries and try to draw at the fact that Mexico and Turkey, despite being half the world away, have very much in common.

Economy and Population

Both countries lie to the south of the two strongest regions of the world, the United States and Europe. They both have strong economical ties with their northern neighbors and because of these ties are fast becoming growing regional powers. Mexico is the world’s 14th biggest economy and Turkey is just 3 places behind Mexico at 17th place (UN 2004). Both countries have natural population growth, whereas Europe and the US have ageing populations with below replacement level birthrates. Despite this, the US maintains growth due to the fact that it is a country of immigration. The table below illustrates the similar population situation for both countries and their Northern Neighbors.

Data compiled from Eurostat and the UN Population to 2300 report.
Data compiled from Eurostat and the UN Population to 2300 report.

Mexico is poised to become a major power in the future with its growing economy (3.9% growth in 2011) and large population. Turkey is also experiencing extreme economical growth 8.5% in 2011 (OECD 2013). The GDP for both countries is almost equal: 15,000 USD for Turkey and 15,300 USD for Mexico. However, the most staggering difference is the fact that 51.3% of Mexico’s population lives in poverty, whereas only 16.9% of the population in Turkey lives below the poverty line (CIA World Fact Book 2010). Turkey’s role as bridge between the east and west is and will still be important. Mexico may also become a so-called bridge between the north and south and the leader for the rest of Latin America, while it is on the border with the United States, effectively bridging North and South America. Historically, both Mexico and Turkey are the successor states to former grand empires; the Ottoman and the short lived Mexican Empire of 1821-23, which then became the first republic of the United Mexican States (1823-1864) (Green 1987). At its height, the United Mexican States was an enormous country. From the border of, what is today Costa Rica, to having a substantial piece of land of what is the United States today. The map to the left better illustrates how the Mexican Empire looked in 1821 (University of Texas 2013).

Emerging Regional Powers: Unintentional Land Reclamation of their Former Empires?

Turkey

In Turkey’s expansion as a new regional power, many have started to label it as a rehashing of the Ottoman Empire, under the new title of Neo-Ottomanism. Neo-Ottomanism is, in a basic sense, the re-engagement with nations that were formally part of the Ottoman Empire; for sometimes dubious reasons.  The skeptics in Georgia (using Georgia for demonstrative purposes; as they are a direct neighbor and at one time used to be a part of the former Ottoman Empire) use this as an argument against Turkey’s policy in Georgia. Georgia considers that Turkey’s foreign policy, in general, alludes to Neo-Ottomanism. After years of negations with the European Union, Turkey has started to drift away from the idea of being a member, and it is pursuing its own policy with neighboring countries. With or without the EU, Turkey will pursue its own regional developments. The advent of the Neo-Ottomanism came to the forefront after the appointment of Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, in 2009. He began to create Turkish zones of influence in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. These zones are originally areas that were part of the Ottoman Empire, and still have some ties to modern day Turkey.  Instead of playing the role of reactionary, Turkey has assumed the role visionary, in order to prevent crises in the aforementioned areas, as well as to develop and cultivate them. In referring to the former possessions of the Ottoman Empire, Davutoğlu states, that Turkey has a “responsibility to help stability towards the countries and peoples of the regions which once had links with Turkey…Beyond representing the 70 million people of Turkey, we have a historic debt to those lands where there are Turks or which was related to our land in the past. We have to repay this debt in the best way” (Trifkovic 2012). This sounds like a nice policy directed at the former possessions of the Ottoman Empire.

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “Zero Problems with Neighbors” has been a great attempt to normalize relations with neighbors. However, it still has yet to achieve this with more than one country, namely Georgia, where there have been recent “allegations that President Mikheil Saakashvili’s [former] ruling United National Movement Party is allowing ‘Turkish expansionism’ that threatens Georgian culture and Georgian jobs. And even the country’s sovereignty itself” (Corso 2012). This has been because of the ease of movement between the two countries, since only national identity cards are needed to cross the border. Thus, more and more Turkish nationals are appearing in Georgia.

These achievements in the international sphere have given the AK party positive results in terms of popularity among voters. On the other hand, poor domestic policies, such as the lack of the freedom of speech and the ability to openly criticize the Turkish government[1], and the leanings towards Islam, shed a negative light on the party both domestically (from the opposition) and from the international community. This coupled with its achievements begin to give the party the look of resembling neo-Ottoman tendencies. Re-establishing ties with Turkic countries and shift towards the Middle East further contribute to this neo-Ottoman sentiment.

As mentioned previously, the bordering countries only stand to benefit greatly from the accession of Turkey to the EU, bringing an EU border to many countries doorsteps that also are seeking EU membership one day. Not allowing Turkey membership in the EU could lead to Turkey pursuing its own devices in the former Ottoman lands, and may have strong, long, lasting effects on the developing countries of the Caucasus, as well as in the Balkans and the in the Middle East. With the current AK party in power there is fear that with all the development that the AK party produced in Turkey, Islamization under the guise of development, and implemented though Neo-Ottomanism could be the road that Turkey is starting to travel down.

Mexico

Mexico on the other hand does not carry such a strong historical memory as the Ottoman Empire did within its former territories, as the enemy at the time was Spain and not Mexico. Despite the fact that Mexico was a colony unto itself for Spain, this is what brought the now independent states of Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua into line with the Mexican Empire to fight of Spanish domination. Mexico is not interested in being a leader for the region, at the present moment. Mexico still has to deal with its own internal problems before it can focus on being a regional power (Friedman 2012). On top of that, Mexicans immigrate to the US rather than the countries of Central America because of the opportunity to better themselves and live a better life. The immigration issue is one of the United States biggest issues, because of a porous border with Mexico and the destabilized borderland run mostly by drug cartels. Akin to the Mexicans going north, we also see the Turks doing the same thing. They usually do not go south or to former Ottoman countries.

The growing minority of Mexicans living in the United States is creating many issues; economically and culturally. It has lead to the creation of the “Other” in the US as the Turks have become the “Other” in many Western European countries. However, in the US, what replaces Islamophobia, that is associated with the Turks living in Europe is the fear of growing Hispanic gangs in the US.

It cannot be said that neither Mexico nor Turkey is intentionally trying to reclaim parts of their former empires but it just simply the irony of geopolitics and history that Mexicans are returning to the lands that they once inhabited by the process of a slow demographic shift. This is in a similar fashion to what is happening to Europe and other countries of the former Ottoman Empire.

Geopolitics and “Gateways”

The term “gateway” is a doubled edged sword for the country with such a title. Breaking down the word it becomes clearer: “way” is a road to get somewhere and “gate” is a barrier. Essentially the road is only opened to those deemed fit to pass. Turkey borders the Middle East and some unstable countries, namely Syria at the moment, as Mexico also borders impoverished, unstable countries in Central America, namely Guatemala—still reeling from the long civil war—Mexico is seen as the “gateway to America” and Turkey is the “Gateway to Europe” for people seeking a better life in the EU or the US, these countries usually act as a transit country. This makes the final destination country or countries wary of the “gatekeepers”, in this instance Mexico and Turkey.

As mentioned earlier, borderlands are an important issue for both countries. However, the situation is reversed. In Turkey, the volatile borderlands are to the east, away from Europe, whereas in Mexico the volatile borderlands are the borders with the United States itself. What make Mexico’s borderlands dangerous are the drug cartels, a problem that does not affect Turkey. This is a major problem between the US and Mexico. The US has permeable southern borders with Mexico, because of the lawlessness and the rule of the cartels in these regions. George Friedman, director and founder for Stratfor, describes the peril of the US-Mexican border:

The American position is to demand that the Mexicans deploy forces to suppress the [drug] trade. But neither side has sufficient force to control the border, and the demand is more one of gestures than significant actions or threats. The Mexicans have already weakened their military by trying to come to grips with the problem, but they are not going to break their military by trying to control a region that broke them in the past. The United States is not going to provide a force sufficient to control the border, since the cost would be staggering. Each will thus live with the violence (Friedman 2012).

Proliferation of People and Culture in the Northern Neighbors

In today’s modern world, it is much easier to move around, traveling to other countries is not so much of a problem, provided one has the paperwork in order. An interesting phenomenon that is being seen today is the fact that both Mexico and Turkey are taking back their lost territories and in some cases adding to it from the glory days of their empires. However, not in the traditional sense; there is no war being fought for California, New Mexico or Texas. Instead, with the massive influx of Mexicans coming to settle in these borderland areas, coupled with a higher birthrate (Batalova 2008) and time on their side, the US is now seeing the rise in Mexican and Latina Americans in these former swaths of land from the Mexican Empire (Batalova 2008). The culture is changing and Spanish is being a de facto language in some areas of these regions.

Fighting for land could be becoming a method of the past. It is simply easier to move to another country and start a minority of people there and grow and grow. Time is on the side of the growing minority inhabited regions of the world, because it is a slow growth and by the time a problem emerges with the host country, the minority group has been there so long that the host country can really not do anything about it. Many of the minority people are third or fourth generation and most likely citizens of that country now. The government cannot just deport its own citizens to a country, where they have never even lived.

Perhaps, it is more prevalent and defined in the US than in Europe, but the same thing is happening there too. Since the Gästarbeiter programs of the 1950s and 60s Western Europe, most notably Germany, has seen a dramatic rise in its Turkish population. Again, due to higher birthrates and looking for a better way of life many Turks are now living in former lands of the Ottoman Empire and in many cases farther afield. Coupled with the Turkish government’s policies in the near abroad, there are more Turks going to Bosnia and Georgia. Bosnia has seen a boom in investment from Turkey in recent years (Schleifer 2011).

On a final cultural note, both the US and Europe enjoy the flavorful cuisine that has been brought up from the south. The döner is to Europe as the taco is to North America. The food coming from the south has been a celebrated event, which brought some spice into the local cuisines. Another common factor that benefits both Mexico and Turkey are the beaches and the weather. Both countries are tourist destinations for people from the north. Mexico and Turkey are glad to receive the tourists and any dollars or Euros they leave behind. Ironically though, with so much to offer and both countries modernizing and becoming better and better, the people in the north are still afraid of the Turks and the Mexicans. They bring “strange” culture and different traditions. Furthermore, Islam worries some and organized crime and drugs worry others.

 Eric R. Eissler, Research Assistant, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey)

Please cite this publication as follows:

Eissler, Eric (September, 2013), “Mexico and Turkey: Unlikely Similarities in their Geopolitical Situation with Powerful Northern Neighbors”, Vol. II, Issue 7, pp.6-13, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, Research Turkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=4051)

Bibliography

Batalova, Jeanne. US in focus: Mexican Immigrants in the United States. Migration Policy Institute. April 2008.  http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=679 Retrieved: 20 November 2012.

CIA World Factbook 2010, Mexico: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html, Turkey: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html Retrieved: 24 March 2013.

Corso, Molly. Georgia: Anti-Turkish Sentiments Grow as Election Date Nears. Eurasianet.org. 19 September 2012. http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65933 Retrieved: 24 November 2012.

Friedman, George. Mexico’s Strategy. Global Political Weekly. Stratfor. 21 August 2012. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mexicos-strategy Retrieved: 14 November 2012. Mexico’s Strategy is republished with permission of Stratfor.”

Eurostat news release 110/2011 28 July 2011 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-28072011-AP/EN/3-28072011-AP-EN.PDF Retrieved:  10 November 2012

Green, Stanley C. The Mexican Republic: The First Decade (1823-1833). Pittsburgh, Pa, University of Pittsburgh Press. Digital Research Library. 1987.  http://digital.library.pitt.edu/cgi-bin/t/text/text-idx?c=pittpress;cc=pittpress;view=toc;idno=31735057894424 Retrieved: 20 November 2012.

OECD Country Statistical Profile: Mexico and Turkey 2013. Turkey: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-profile-turkey_20752288-table-tur Mexico: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/country-statistical-profile-mexico_20752288-table-mex Retrieved: 24 March 2013.

Schleifer, Yigal. Turkey’s Balkan Express Rolls On. Eurasianet.org. 14 March 2011. http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63065 Retrived: 24 November 2012.

Trifkovic, Srdja. Turkey as a Regional Power: Neo-Ottomanism in Action. Research Institute for European and American Studies. 8 January 2012. http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/greek-studies-gr/1672-turkey-as-a-regional-power-neo-ottomanism-in-action.html Retrieved: 11.02.12

United Nations: Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Population division. World Population to 2300. 47 & 49. http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/WorldPop2300final.pdfRetrieved: 10 November 2012

University of Texas Library. New Spain: Viceroyalty. http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/atlas_mexico/new_spain_viceroyalty.jpg Retrieved: 24 March 2013.


[1] Defamation is a criminal offence under Turkish law. Article 125 of the TCC provides that defamation is punishable by either a prison sentence or a fine. There are many on-going cases and convictions under this provision. Insults against the Turkish nation are still criminalized under Article 301 of the TCC. Other provisions of the TCC16, the Anti-Terror Law and the Press Law are also used to restrict freedom of expression. EU Progress Report 2010.:20. http://www.ihb.gov.tr/dosyagoster.ashx?id=179 Retrieved: 24 April 2012.

Moving Goalposts: Democratisation and EU Membership for Turkey

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Moving Goalposts: Democratisation and EU Membership for Turkey

 Introduction

Over a decade ago, when the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi [Justice and Development Party]) came to power in Turkey, hopes were high in many quarters that this was the dawn of a “new” Turkey.[1] While the AKP had Islamist roots and was distrusted by many in the secular establishment, its leaders boasted that AKP stood for  “conservative democracy,” including a commitment to universal values of freedom.[2]  In the early 2000s, the AKP was also arguably the most pro-European Union (EU) of all Turkish political parties, with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proclaiming that Turkey would continue with reforms to meet EU criteria and aimed to make Europe’s values “Ankara’s values.”[3]

Much has happened in the past decade, but writing in 2013 it is more difficult to be sanguine about both Turkish democracy and, especially, the country’s EU bid. This is not to say that Turkey has not made considerable progress. It has, and in some ways the country has come further than was imaginable in the 1990s prior to the rise of the AKP and imposition of EU conditionality. However, new challenges and problems have emerged, making the goals of consolidating a liberal democracy and joining the EU as elusive as ever. This brief commentary will suggest that has far as Turkey has come, the “goalposts” for both democracy and the EU have moved, so that, relative to the objectives of those supporting democratic freedoms and Europeanization, progress has been rather modest. Put somewhat differently, Turkish EU membership was (in 2002) and is (today) a long-term and uncertain prospect and, particularly in the past couple of years, Turkey has taken steps back on the path toward democracy.

Positive Developments under the AKP

It would unfair, however, to portray developments under the AKP in a wholly negative light. In the words of İhsan Dağı, the AKP embraced the language of democracy and human rights as “discursive shield,” and mobilized popular support and worked with various groups in Turkish society to bolster its democratic legitimacy.[4] This was not, however, merely rhetoric. Particularly during its first term (2002-2007), the AKP accelerated reforms began under the previous government, passing constitutional reforms and EU harmonization packages that covered issues such as freedom of expression and assembly, minority (e.g. Kurdish) rights, and the prerogatives of the military. Turkish civil society became more active. The AKP government did face significant opposition, but the party—and Turkey itself—avoided a major crisis in 2008 when the Constitutional Court refused to ban it, as had been done with some of its Islamic-oriented predecessors. Constitutional reforms as well as the Ergenekon and Balyoz court cases have weakened the power of the “deep state” and removed the threat of a military coup. The AKP was re-elected in 2007 and 2011, gaining more votes each time and thereby re-enforcing its democratic credentials. Among the party’s objectives after winning the 2011 was adoption of an entirely new constitution, one that it promised would create an “advanced democracy.”

As for relations with the EU, the early 2000s were the “golden age” of Turkish-EU relations, as the EU employed conditionality—holding out the prospect of eventual membership—to encourage domestic political reform. For its part, the AKP committed itself to adopting reforms in order to open accession talks. According to Ziya Öniş, if previously one witnessed a “vicious circle of delayed reforms and slow progress toward full membership”, EU pressure helped foster a “virtuous circle” conducive to wide-ranging reform. These reforms were, in his view, “inconceivable in the absence of powerful incentives and pressures from the EU.”[5] Guenther Verheugen, then the EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement, praised the AKP government, asserting that “the passage of reforms through [the Turkish] parliament shows the strong determination of the Turkish government to get in shape for EU membership.”[6] By 2005, Turkey had made sufficient progress to allow accession talks to begin. Writing at that time, İhsan Dağı opined that the AKP had “played a historically important role in consolidating democracy in Turkey and in integrating Turkey into the EU.”[7]

The Loss of Reform Momentum

In some respects, 2005 can be considered an apogee both for Turkish-EU relations and domestic political reform. Since then, progress on both fronts has been meager.[8] With respect to the EU, the inability to solve the division of Cyprus, as well as the emergence of governments in Germany and France that were against Turkey’s EU bid resulted in the suspension of talks on most accession chapters. Public opinion in many European countries is decidedly against Turkey’s membership bid, and internal EU problems have also dampened enthusiasm for expansion. As for Turkey, the perception that Europe is treating Turkey unfairly and wants the EU to remain a “Christian club” has resulted in less public support for the country’s EU bid. At the same time, the country’s growing economy and ambitions in the Middle East have made the EU a less central component of Turkish foreign policy. The EU was a marginal issue in 2011 elections. Adoption of a “Positive Agenda” between the EU and Turkey in 2012 has yet to eliminate the EU’s visa regime, which is viewed as humiliating by Turks. While it is true that no one wants to “pull the plug” on possible Turkish membership, this can hardly be construed as grounds for optimism.[9] Each side expects little from the other. The positive energy that characterized relations a decade ago is long gone. This was exemplified in September 2013 by Turkey’s chief negotiator with the EU, Egemen Bağış, who asserted that because of opposition with Europe, Turkey will never join the EU.[10]

At the same time, not coincidentally, Turkey’s domestic reform impetus has slowed, and, by some measures, the country seems to be moving backwards. One of main problems has been frequent invocation of anti-terrorism laws to clampdown on dissent. The results, which are rather well known, include imprisonment of journalists, academics, and, in particular, Kurdish activists. According to the 2013 Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, Turkey ranks 154th out of 179 countries in the survey, lower than Russia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, and Zimbabwe. This is a significant change from its 2005 ranking, when it was 98th out of 167 countries. [11]  The Ergenekon trials against alleged coup plotters in the military and state bureaucracy have also been criticized, with some calling them “showtrials” because of questionable use of evidence and the impression that the trials are used to squash any form of dissent. In short, they cast “a shadow of doubt over the AKP’s intentions to expand democracy.”[12] Freedom House, in its 2013 report, downgraded Turkey on its civil liberties score, primarily out of concern about freedom of expression and rule of law, so that it now ranks the same as it did in 2003.[13] Womens’ rights, a major issue of social and political liberalization, remain problematic. For example, in the 2012 Global Gender Gap Index prepared by the World Economic Forum, Turkey ranks 124 out of 135 countries, lower than Algeria, Jordan, and Cameroon, and its raw score shows little progress since 2005.[14]   Lastly, the EU’s own progress reports have become increasingly critical of Turkey, on all the issues cited above as well as numerous others: rules on political parties, promotion of minority languages, trade union rights, allegations of torture, corruption, discrimination against homosexuals, and bans on Internet sites. Fırat Cengiz and Lars Hoffmann coded EU Progress Reports throughout the 2000s and argue that since 2005 the norm has been for the EU to cite “limited progress” with respect to democratic reforms,  whereas from 2001-2004 the EU often acknowledged “some” or even “good” progress.[15] The EU’s report on enlargement strategy in 2011 observed that despite “substantial” overall progress in the past decade, the EU and Turkey needed to “work to launch a new virtuous circle” with a “fresh and positive agenda.”[16]

The Turkish government, for its part, however, has been less and less receptive to outside criticism. For example, Prime Minister Erdoğan, who had earlier suggested he was fully committed to advancing “European values,”  responded to a European Parliament report on arrested journalists by stating, “Their duty is to prepare the report, and ours is to go our own way.”[17]  All of these reports and concerns, of course, pre-date the 2013 Gezi Park protests, which were on the one hand a manifestation of a more confident Turkish civil society but on the other an event that was met by a harsh crackdown by authorities, some of whom, in rhetoric reminiscent of Vladimir Putin, blamed the events on the foreign media and the Jewish diaspora. As for the new constitution, this project, for the time being, seems stymied because of profound distrust among Turkish political parties.

Assessing the AKP Years

As this discussion suggests, one cannot make a black/white judgment about Turkey under the AKP. There has been discernible progress. However, it is still of a “step forward, step back” variety, making it uncertain just how secure any of the reforms are. Part of the problem about drawing conclusions, however, is that the criteria of what is enough to be “democratic” or worthy of EU membership is uncertain and, I would contend, has changed over the years.

Consider, for example, the question of democracy. Turkey has free and fair elections. Voters choose among multiple parties. Based upon voting results, the government reflects the will of the people. There are lively print and electronic media. There is greater public space for religion. Civil society is more engaged in a variety of issues than before the AKP came to power. Kurdish identity is now recognized, there is an important Kurdish presence in parliament, and since the 2011 elections the AKP seems more committed than any previous government in finding a political solution to the long and bloody Kurdish conflict. The judiciary is now more accountable to elected branches of government. One prominent historical threat to Turkish democracy—the military—has been neutralized. Electoral democracy is secure.

However, both for many in Turkey and for outside observers, electoral democracy is not enough. Both the European norm and the expectation created in the early 2000s was that Turkey should move toward a liberal democracy, one that would prioritize individual rights and diminish the power of the state. Turkish democracy, however, can hardly be described as liberal. Journalists or activists who cross the government risk their jobs, if not arrest. Newspapers critical of the government may become special targets of the tax police. Self-censorship is becoming more and more commonplace. Protests have been shut down with force. The judicial process has become overly politicized. The political environment is exceptionally polarized, and the government, armed with its parliamentary majority, has shown little interest in engaging with its political rivals or those in civil society that have competing agendas.

I would contend that the problem is less the AKP’s alleged embrace of political Islam—although there are many in Turkey who fear the AKP’s intentions on this front—than unchecked power by what is becoming, like the PRI in Mexico or Unity in Russia, a hegemonic political power that de-legitimizes the opposition.   Indeed, to the extent that the AKP remains popular and views itself as the only and true repository of democracy and Turkish nationalism,[18] it is able to justify its exclusionary policies. To date, it has—to its credit—shown more flexibility on the Kurdish issue[19]—but, as Ziya Öniş notes, the “new Turkey” of the AKP has given little leeway for secularists or religious minorities such as Alevis to express their identity and advance their agendas. He concludes that neither the “old, Kemalist” Turkey nor Turkey under the AKP “represent genuine examples of political pluralism with mutual respect for diversity and genuine co-existence within the same polity by contrasting elements of Turkish society.”[20]

This issue —and the concerns about freedoms of expression and association— were made more manifest during the Gezi protests, which Amnesty International, in a scathing report, labeled a “brutal denial” of the right to peacefully assemble.[21] The government was roundly condemned for police brutality, which resulted in five deaths, and thousands of injuries. Thousands more were detained. Police attacked makeshift medical facilities that were treating the injured protesters. The government levied fines against television stations that aired critical views of the protests, and journalists who covered the events have also been fired or forced to resign. The response of many government officials—labeling the protesters as “hooligans” and calling social media a public menace—was hardly an example of the liberal values that Erdoğan said he sought to embrace.

However, this situation may suit the government just fine. The net effect is that in many ways the AKP has adopted the same statist and nationalist line as its erstwhile opponents. No longer the outsider party, it “occupies all social and political space,” capable of “perpetuating its political power and legitimacy.”[22] Indeed, insofar as the AKP controls the state machinery, has demonstrated a willingness and ability to cow dissent, and presides over an economy that continues to grow (and thus can provide resources for patronage), it is hard to envision a serious challenger at the ballot box to its continued rule.

Put somewhat differently, Erdoğan may have been right in claiming that he spoke for the Turkish majority in cracking down on Gezi, but this is a very majoritarian and, I would suggest, narrow and dangerous view of democracy. The government should not be able to do whatever it wants, and it should not instinctually de-legitimize opposing viewpoints. These are, however, often its modus vivendi. The undisguised effort to change the constitution to give more power to the presidency—which Erdoğan is confident of winning—and concomitant efforts to limit the ability of the constitutional commission to public comment or scrutiny is but one area of concern. The net result, according to one assessment, is that Turkey lacks a genuine constitutional process so that “a meaningful debate on the country’s long-standing problems with the potential of achieving consensus seems highly unrealistic.”[23] While a grand bargain may yet be struck to draft a new constitution, given the actions of the AKP in the past two-three years, there is good reason to doubt that this document, particularly if it centralizes executive authority, will significantly further the cause of political liberalization.

As for the EU, there has always been concern its true desire to add Turkey[24] and unclear or shifting goalposts for eventual membership, e.g. what precisely Turkey must do to join, will it be held to the same criteria as other new member-states, will “permanent safeguard clauses” leave Turks with a second-class status, will Turkey be offered a “special relationship” in lieu of full membership. Beken Saatçioğlu has suggested that even when the EU opened accession talks, it was clear several member states questioned both the material costs of Turkish membership and Turkey’s European identity.[25] In this regard, the opening of  accession talks merely signaled that Turkey met the basic requirements to begin the process, but it would be, as the EU itself emphasized, an open-ended process, in which, unlike in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, there was no guarantee of membership even if Turkey met the EU’s criteria.  My own anecdotal impression that EU Progress Reports add more and more to Turkey’s “to-do” list each year and that the EU seems to want to micromanage Turkish politics and society, drawing attention to issues of “low politics” such as civil service reform, legal aid for the poor, child care, and state auditing procedures. At minimum, two things are clear. First, joining the EU is not going to be as simple as one might have thought. Second, despite the numerous reforms made since 2000, it is hard to ascertain how much further—it terms of both time and legislative and constitutional action—Turkey has to go. Given the long list of items with which the EU has tasked Turkey (as well as the EU’s own internal problems), it remains doubtful Turkey is closer to EU membership in 2013 than it was, say, in 2005.

What is clear, however, is that the EU is having less and less influence on Turkey while Turkey itself is less and less focused on the EU. For example, Turkey froze its relations with the EU in the second half of 2012 during the Cypriot EU Presidency, and in 2013 Erdoğan floated the idea of Turkey joining with Russia, China, and the non-democratic Central Asian states in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. “Europeanization”—the adoption of European standards and practices in various policy arenas—may occur in some fields, but it has taken on the form of “we will do what we want when we want to.”[26] The crackdown on the Gezi Park protesters is also sure to have costs vis-à-vis Europe, making Turkey look violent and unstable and calling into question the government’s commitment to liberal democratic principles. Whether and how the Turkish government can undo this damage and put both domestic political reform and accession talks back on track will be significant challenges.

Post Script 2013: Is the Democratization Package a Cause for New Hope?

At the end of September 2013, the AKP announced its long-awaited democratization package, perhaps the most significant development in terms of political reform since the late 2000s. The document made several proposals, touching on the electoral system, rights for Kurdish-language medium instruction in private schools, restoring Kurdish names to villages and provinces, greater freedom to wear the headscarf for public employees, laws to protect personal data, elimination of the required pledge of Turkishness in the schools, and some measures to enhance freedom of assembly. However, the measures did not address the Alevi question, establish Kurdish education in state schools or the anti-terror laws,  and they did not come with a pledge to release the thousands detained under anti-terror laws. As a consequence, many were disappointed with the package, and some, particularly in the political opposition, expressed doubts about the government’s sincerity.[27]

One can argue, of course, that these measures, incomplete though they may be, are nonetheless a good start and better than nothing. Furthermore, the government has pledged that more proposals, including a package on the Alevi issue, will be forthcoming. Given the AKP’s majority in parliament, it seems likely that much of the package will be passed, perhaps quite quickly. Moreover, on questions such as education in Kurdish, the Rubicon, so to speak, has been crossed. In other words, it is difficult to imagine Turkey moving backwards on such issues, which, of course, were inconceivable even a decade ago. Thus, writing in 2013, one can be, perhaps, guardedly optimistic with respect to reforms in Turkey, although, of course, memories of Gezi are still very fresh.

Can this jumpstart Turkish-EU relations? While the democratization package was well-received in Brussels and there are signs that the EU may open negotiations on regional policy with Turkey, the enthusiasm for initiatives from Erdoğan, due in large part to Gezi, is muted both in Turkey and in Europe, and, more importantly, the past link between political reform in Turkey and its EU bid is broken. Substantial progress on unfreezing accession chapters, for example, hinges more on the Cyprus question than political liberalization in Turkey. Removal of visas for Turks is more a technical question, conditioned by Turkish immigration and asylum policy. In other words, the EU can perhaps direct encouraging words at Turkey, but whether this translates into something tangible is somewhat doubtful.

Dr. Paul J. Kubicek, Director of Center for International Studies at Oakland University, Member of the Advisory Board of Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey)

Please cite this publication as follows:

Kubicek, Paul J.  (November, 2013), “Moving Goalposts: Democratisation and EU Membership for Turkey”,  Vol. II, Issue 9, pp.1-8, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, Research Turkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=4375)

References

[1]  See for example M. Hakan Yavuz, ed. The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006).

[2]  For example see Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “Conservative Democracy and the Globalization of Freedom,”in : M. Hakan Yavuz, ed. The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press), 2006: 333-340.

[3] R. T. Erdoğan, ‘Why the EU Needs Turkey’, Speech at Oxford University, 28 May 2004, available at  http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/docs/Erdogan1.pdf, accessed 8 January 2013.

[4] İhsan Dağı, “The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics, and Human Rights Discourse in the Search for Security and Legitimacy,” in M. Hakan Yavuz, ed. The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press), 2006: 89.

[5] Ziya Öniş, “Turkey-EU Relations: Beyond the Current Stalemate,” Insight Turkey10(4), 2008: 39.

[6] The Turkey Update. ‘Reforming for Europe’. 4 August 2003, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/tu030804.pdf

[7]  Dağı, in: M. Hakan Yavuz, ed. The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press), 2006: 104.

[8]  A review of much of this period can be found in Paul Kubicek, “Political Conditionality and the EU’s Cultivation of Democracy in Turkey,” Democratization, 18:4, August 2011: 910-931.

[9] For an attempt at a more optimistic assessment, see  Joost Lagendijk, “Turkey and the European Union: 2014 and Beyond,” Insight Turkey 15(2), Spring 2013: 48-49.

[11] Reporters Without Borders, “Press Freedom Index 2013,” available at http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html, accessed 7 September 2013.

[12] A. Çınar, ‘The Justice and Development Party: Turkey’s Experience with Islam, Democracy, Liberalism, and Secularism’, International Review of Middle East Studies43(3), 2011: 540.

[13] Freedom in the World 2013 Country Report, at www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/Turkey

[14] Global Gender Gap Index 2012, available at http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2012

[15] Fırat Cengiz and Alrs Hoffmann, “Rethinking Conditionality: Turkey’s EU Accession and the Kurdish Question,” Journal of Common Market Studies 51(3) 2013: 416-432.

[16] European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges, 2011-2012,” COM (2011) 666 final, 12 October 2011: 18-19.

[17] Sabah, “Erdoğan Criticizes EP Report on Press Freedom”, 11 March 2011, available at http://tinyurl.com/afvll3e, accessed 8 January 2013.

[18] Menderes Çınar, “The Electoral Success of the AKP: Cause for Hope and Despair,”  Insight Turkey 13(4) 2011:  107-127.

[19]  One might suggest that it has done so primarily to win support from Kurdish MPs for the AKP’s constitutional project. Indeed, prior to 2011 elections, there was little discernible “Kurdish” agenda from the AKP.

[20] Ziya Öniş, “Sharing Power: Turkey’s Democratization Challenge in the Age of AKP Hegemony,” Insight Turkey 15(2), 2013: 108.

[22] İhsan Dağı, “Emergence of the ‘new AK Party’,” Today’s Zaman, 22 July 2012.

[23] Fırat Cengiz, “Epilogue: The future of democratic reform in Turkey: Constitutional ‘moment’ or constitutional process?”, in Cengiz and Lars Hoffmann, eds. Turkey and the European Union: Facing New Challenges and Opportunities (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 218.

[24] This was encapsulated in 2001 by The Economist’s caricature of Brussels’s view of possible Turkish membership, “Good grief, do we have to?” The Economist, ‘The Door Creaks Open,’ 17 November 2001: 47.

[25] Beken Saatçioğlu, “The EU’s ‘Rhetorical Entrapment’ in Enlargement Reconsidered: Why Hasn’t It Worked For Turkey?” Insight Turkey 14(3) 2012: 159-176.

[26] Amanda Paul, “Turkey’s EU Journey: What Next?” Insight Turkey 14(3) 2012: 30.

The Role of Member States in EU Enlargement Policy: The Eastern Enlargement and Turkey’s Accession Process

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The Role of Member States in EU Enlargement Policy: The Eastern Enlargement and Turkey's Accession Process

The Role of Member States in EU Enlargement Policy: The Eastern Enlargement and Turkey’s Accession Process

 Introduction

The European Union’s (EU) Eastern enlargement [1] was the most challenging enlargement for the EU, both in terms of the number of countries involved and the political, social and economic differences between EU member states and the new members. For the first time in the EU’s history it accepted ten candidate countries at the same time in May 2004 with the accession of eight Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), Cyprus and Malta. On 1 January 2007, Bulgaria and Romania became EU members, followed on 1 July 2013 by Croatia, which had started its accession negotiations with the EU on the same day as Turkey, on 3 October 2005. Turkey, meanwhile, had only been able to provisionally close one chapter of the EU acquis.

Although fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria has been a precondition for membership since 1993, it is not the principal driving force for enlargement, as utilitarian factors and identity politics have had more influence on the EU’s enlargement policies (Sjursen, 2002: 508).

When Turkey was differentiated from the CEECs at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997, the Turkish government reacted strongly by freezing political relations with the EU. In contrast, when the EU granted Turkey official candidate status after the Helsinki Summit in 1999, it stimulated a Europeanization process in Turkey in several policy fields, with crucial reforms being implemented in human rights and minority rights. However, Turkey’s “Europeanness” is still being questioned by several EU political figures (Müftüler Baç and McLaren, 2003: 18). Debates, especially in Germany and France, about offering merely a “privileged partnership” with Turkey, short of full membership, have raised doubts about the EU’s openness and fairness towards Turkey, which has increased the level of Euroscepticism in Turkey.

As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002: 504) argue, EU enlargement can be analysed from various perspectives, such as the policies of candidate countries regarding the EU, the EU’s own enlargement policies, and the policies of member states regarding enlargement. The EU’s policies for the Eastern enlargement differed from those applied to Turkey’s accession process. Drawing on both rationalist and constructivist approaches, this article therefore tries to compare the EU’s policies, particularly those of Germany and France as the main actors in European integration, towards the accession processes of the CEECs and Turkey. 

Theoretical Framework for the EU’s Enlargement Policy

A major scholarly debate has taken place between rationalist and constructivist theorists on how to analyse international institutions in international relations. These different theoretical frameworks assume different logics of action: a rationalist “logic of consequentiality” versus a constructivist “logic of appropriateness”. The rationalist explanation of enlargement has two aspects: firstly, the role of applicant and member state enlargement preferences; secondly, organizational enlargement decisions at the macro level (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002: 508-512). The CEEC’s desire to join the EU can be explained through both rationalist and constructivist approaches. In constructivist terms, they wished to join the EU to “return to Europe” be considered as part of the “European family”. In rationalist terms, they wished to join the EU to benefit from market access, attract more foreign direct investment and become part of the EU’s decision-making mechanisms (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002: 519-520).

From a rationalist perspective, the interests of member states are crucial for EU enlargement policies. As Müftüler Baç and McLaren put it, “member states with clients would like to see these clients come in”. For example, Germany appeared to take Poland as its client (Müftüler Baç and McLaren, 2003: 20-21), whereas, Turkey has not established a “patron-client relationship” with any member state (Mühlenhoff, 2009: 16). The enlargement preferences of member states and applicant states are influenced by the expected costs and benefits of enlargement. Those member states which expect net losses from enlargement may not prevent enlargement if their bargaining power is strong enough to obtain compensation from the winners (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002: 508-512). Thus, enlargement is possible if losers are compensated through side payments, and if various concessions are given by the winners, so long as their cost is less than the winners’ benefits from enlargement. Losers may also not oppose enlargement if the winners can threaten them with exclusion, so long as the cost of exclusion to the loser is more than the cost of enlargement (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 54).

However, although rationalist approaches can explain the EU’s enlargement process up to the point where Europe agreements were signed with CEECs, they cannot explain why the process was able to continue and result in the membership of CEECs (Sedelmeier, 2001: 20). The association with CEECs enabled the potential winners to intensify their economic relations with those countries; meanwhile, it protected the potential losers from the costs of budget competition. In addition, association allowed the EU to protect the sectors, particularly those vulnerable to competition. This means EU enlargement policy towards CEECs cannot be explained only on a rationalist basis. Rather, it requires explanation with the help of a constructivist approach. This takes the EU to be the organization representing a liberal community of European states, and analyses its decision to start negotiations with CEECs as motivated by the wish to include those countries sharing its liberal values and norms (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 47-56). That is, according to a constructivist approach, EU enlargement policy has been influenced by ideational and cultural factors, with one of the most influential being whether the member and candidate states share a common identity and values or not. While, the EU’s supranational institutions like the European Commission may have preferences influenced by organizational norms, member state governments may be influenced by a combination of national and European identities (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002: 513-515).

Actors may justify their interests on the basis of legitimacy and shame those who do not act similarly. Schimmelfennig (2001: 48-73) uses the concept of “rhetorical action”, which refers to the “strategic use of norm-based arguments”. EU member states could not openly oppose or threaten enlargement towards CEECs. In other words, although the “rhetorical action” of the enlargement’s supporters, or “drivers”, could not change the opposition of the “brakemen”, it was able to prevent them from openly opposing the enlargement, leaving them “rhetorically entrapped”. That is, from a constructivist perspective, those actors with an interest in enlargement were able to use normative arguments to push other more sceptical member states towards accepting CEEC accession. 

Policies of Member States towards the Eastern Enlargement

Although the Commission and the European Parliament (EP) are involved, the enlargement process is mainly intergovernmental, with all member states trying to protect their national interests. Each member state can veto the opening of negotiations with a candidate country, the opening and closing of each chapter, and the closure of negotiations (İçener, et al., 2010: 211).

The preferences of member states can be explained on the basis of primarily rationalist and secondly constructivist approaches. The main goals of the Eastern enlargement were stabilising Central and Eastern Europe and expand the zone of peace and prosperity in the post-Cold war era. In addition to these utilitarian concerns, similarities in culture and identity influenced the preferences of member states. Geographical proximity created economic opportunities through trade and investment, and reductions in the costs of communication and transport. Those countries highly involved in CEEC economies stood to gain most from their membership; thus, they supported membership more. As Schimmelfennig (2001: 50-52) argues, the enlargement preferences of the member states were influenced by their geographical position, with those bordering the CEECs becoming “drivers” of the enlargement. As Sjursen (2002: 497) notes, the economic costs of Eastern enlargement were more than the gains in both the short and medium term. Member states that would gain the most from the Eastern enlargement were those that were net contributors to the EU budget, while current beneficiaries from the budget would gain little. 

The membership prospects of a candidate country become much stronger if it has a strong alliance with member states, and even more so if this alliance includes some of the stronger member states, such as Germany and France, or if there are no opponents to that country’s accession (İçener, et al, 2010: 213). As Öniş (2004: 508-509) argues, the support for the membership by a strong member state or a set of countries has a crucial influence in the accession of a candidate country. In addition, Germany and France have been the “motor of European integration”, which means that they are the driving force for integration. They have the largest populations in the EU, while Germany is the biggest contributor to the EU budget (Mühlenhoff, 2009: 1). Germany played a crucial role in the Eastern enlargement. In contrast, although the UK and Spain have supported Turkey’s membership, they do not have the same political and economic influence in the EU that France and Germany have.

Schimmelfennig (2001: 54) argues that the “drivers” of Eastern Enlargement were Germany, the UK and Denmark, who committed the EU early and firmly to Eastern enlargement; they were the primary actors in the EU’s preparation for this process. Germany favoured early enlargement towards its closest neighbours, Poland, Hungary and the CzechRepublic, both for economic and security reasons. The main security reason was that, after the reunification of Germany, instability in its neighbours was undesirable. The main economic reason was traditional economic links between Germany and its neighbours in Central Europe. On the other hand, France has no land frontier with the Central European states and fewer economic links with those countries. Consequently, France and the other Mediterranean member states were sceptical about the Eastern enlargement as it might reduce their influence within the EU and shift the EU’s centre of gravity towards Germany (Bache, et al., 2011: 543). Several member states may also have appeared less supportive of enlargement in order to gain side payments from those member states that are in favour of enlargement (I. Barnes and P. Barnes, 2010: 422). Italy was sceptical that the Eastern enlargement might shift the EU’s attention to the East and away from the Mediterranean, particularly in terms of funding. The Benelux countries were more neutral because they did not have much to lose or gain from the process. Greece, meanwhile, focused on gaining accession for Cyprus (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 53); threatening other member states by saying it would veto the enlargement unless Cyprus was included. Cyprus was duly included in the Eastern enlargement in 2004, even though the Annan Plan, prepared at the initiative of the United Nations (UN) to solve the Cyprus issue, had been rejected by Greek Cypriots, meaning that the Cyprus issue could not be resolved before it joined the EU.

The UK’s support for Eastern enlargement was influenced by its desire for more intergovernmental structure in the EU (Sjursen, 2002: 498). Southern EU member states, particularly France, Greece and Italy, supported Bulgaria and Romania’s accession (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 51), which was also supported as a reward them for their support for NATO’s operation in Kosovo (Bache, et al, 2011: 546). France was the main supporter of Romania because it needed an ally to balance the growing influence of Central Europe within the EU and maintain control over Germany’s increasing political power. Therefore, despite its economic underdevelopment and democratic deficiencies, Romania was included among the candidates at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997 (Müftüler Baç and McLaren, 2003: 22). The Nordic countries supported the inclusion of the Baltic States, mainly because of geographical and historical ties (Bache, et al., 2011: 545), though also for economic reasons.

The EU’s Eastern enlargement carried high costs for less developed members specialized in the same economic fields as CEECs, such as agriculture and textiles. Economically, CEECs would become structural net recipients from EU membership. In particular, the Eastern enlargement affected the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the structural policies, which are the main items in the EU budget. Thus, the enlargement carried very significant costs that would negatively affect the main beneficiaries of the EU budget, namely Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal (Schimmelfennig, 2001: 52-56). Nevertheless, these countries did not veto the enlargement. This suggests that, so long as the most influential countries, like France and Germany, are in favour of a country’s accession, they can usually convince the other member states to follow their lead.

Policies of EU Member States towards Turkey’s Membership

The EU has perceived Turkey as eligible for membership since its application in 1987. However, as Diez (2010) points out, the EU’s commitment to reunification with CEECs implied a commitment to membership, while there is only a commitment to negotiatemembership with Turkey, rather than a promise of membership. [2]

Turkey’s main integration challenges are that it is “too big, too poor, too populous and too different” (Tsoukalis, 2006; cited in İçener, et al, 2010: 215). The EU-Turkey Negotiating Framework, adopted by the European Council in October 2005, states that, in accordance with the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, “the Union’s capacity to absorb Turkey, while maintaining the momentum of European integration is an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and Turkey” (Clause 3, 2005). It also emphasized that accession negotiations with Turkey are an “open-ended process, the outcome of which can not be guaranteed” (Clause 2, 2005). It warned that “long transition periods, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses, clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures, may be considered. The Commission will include these, as appropriate, in its proposals in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture” (Clause 12, 2005).

According to the European Stability Initiative report (2010: 1) on Turkey-EU relations, they have a “special relationship” based on an open-ended accession process. Although it is not part of the accession criteria, the Cyprus issue has been one of the main challenges hindering Turkey’s membership. In July 2005, Turkey signed the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, which would extend the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU to the new member states, including Cyprus. However, Turkey did not open its ports to Greek Cypriots as required, because the EU had not fulfilled its promises towards the Turkish Cypriot side after they accepted the Annan Plan referendum in 2004, which aimed to reunify the island. In June 2006, the former Commissioner for EU Enlargement even warned of a possible “train crash” with Turkey because of the Cyprus issue. Only one chapter  (Science and Research) has been provisionally closed in the negotiations between Turkey and the EU. In addition, because Turkey did not ratify the Additional Protocol, the EU Council froze the opening of eight chapters in December 2006, and it was decided that no chapter would be provisionally closed until Turkey fully applied the Additional Protocol. Later, the French government blocked an additional four chapters because former French President Sarkozy was against Turkey’s full membership. In December 2009, Cyprus blocked six more chapters (European Stability Initiative, 2010: 5-9). Diez (2010: 168-171) argues that alternative models of relations between Turkey and the EU can be discussed if both sides agree that “membership is not achievable”. He emphasizes that the stalling of membership negotiations because of the Cyprus issue is unfair to Turkey because the Greek Cypriot part of the island was accepted as an EU member state without waiting to solve the Cyprus issue.

Supporters of Turkey’s membership usually emphasize its necessity and importance in strategic and utilitarian terms. They argue that Turkey’s membership will have a positive influence on Europe’s energy security, its fight against terrorism, its defence capabilities and its cooperation with NATO. Especially after September 11, they have also promoted Turkey’s accession in terms of its potential influence in the Middle East and its position as a “bridge” between the West and the Islamic world. On the other hand, some opponents of Turkey’s membership to the EU also use security considerations, but as a negative factor, emphasizing the risks that may emerge from the new neighbours, particularly Iran, Iraq and Syria, that the EU would gain if Turkey became a member state (İçener, et al, 2010: 212).

Changes in governments and other domestic political developments in several member states, particularly the stronger ones, have had a crucial influence on policies towards Turkey’s membership. For example, Greece, which had resisted Turkey’s candidacy at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997, was no longer against it at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. There were several reasons behind this change, such as Greece’s own need for budgetary cuts, especially in defence spending, in order to participate in the Eurozone. Since Turkey is a priority for Greek defence expenditure, a rapprochement with Turkey would allow defence spending in Greece to be reduced (Müftüler Baç and McLaren, 2003: 23). Rapprochement was also accelerated by the mutual support offered after major earthquakes in both countries.

Another factor influencing member state policies towards candidate countries is the different visions about “Europe’s finality”. For example, the British sees the EU primarily as a single market, while also favouring cooperation in several policy fields, such as foreign and security policy. Thus, Turkey’s membership is not perceived as a challenge to the British vision of the EU. In contrast, in Germany and France, visions of Europe’s finality differ across political orientations. Conservatives are usually more sceptical about Turkey’s membership, compared to the Socialists, the Greens and the Liberals, because they perceive it as a challenge to European identity and deepening of the EU (Bache, et al., 2011: 547-548).

The first Chancellor of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, from the CDU (Christian Democratic Union), supported Turkey’s EC membership. CDU member Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission, stated that Turkey was an integral part of Europe, while former German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel supported signing the Customs Union in 1995 (Mühlenhoff, 2009: 16). Under the CDU’s Helmut Kohl, Germany turned against Turkey’s candidacy, although this changed again at the Helsinki Summit as a Social Democrat/Green coalition was in power with Gerhard Schröder as Chancellor. In 1999, Germany played a crucial role in gaining official candidate status for Turkey (Müftüler Baç and McLaren, 2003: 20-23).

More recently, since October 2009, the CDU has been in power under Chancellor Merkel, in coalition with the FDP (Liberal Party) and CSU (Christian Social Party). The CDU party program stated that Turkey has to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria to gain membership, although the EU’s “absorption capacity” [3] will also have to be taken into consideration. The program also stated that the CDU is in favour of “privileged partnership” (2007:101 cited in Mühlenhoff, 2009: 4). However, Germany acted on the principle of “pacta sunt servanda”, so Merkel has not blocked negotiations between Turkey and the EU, unlike France. The FDP’s position, which emphasises potential economic benefits from Turkey’s accession,  is more positive than that of the CDU and CSU, although it is less supportive than the SPD. Nevertheless, the coalition agreement stated that “the negotiations between Turkey and the EU should be an ‘open-ended’ process” (cited in Mühlenhoff, 2009: 1-5). Although all negotiations are open-ended, emphasizing this in the coalition agreement reflects scepticism about Turkey’s membership prospects (Mühlenhoff, 2009: 3).  In the recent elections in September 2013 in Germany, Merkel won the elections again and currently going on negotiations with the SPD or the Greens to form a coalition government. Thus, there will be no crucial changes in the policies of Germany towards Turkey’s accession to the EU.

In France, perceptions about Turkey’s membership have varied. The presidential elections in 2007 brought Nicolas Sarkozy to power, who is the leader of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP). He had previously expressed his opposition to Turkey’s membership in his book “Testimony” [4]: “I oppose the views regarding the entry of Turkey to the EU. I fully understand the strategic expectations. However, these expectations can be fulfilled through a strategic partnership agreement … accession of a country, 98% of whose  land is outside the European continent, who will be the most populous country of the Union in the coming 20 years and, moreover, whose culture carries several main aspects of Islam into the EU, will create an overall transformation within the EU, thus will weaken the original idea of the founding fathers of the EU … eventually leading to a chaos” (cited in Lagro, 2008: 72). In the 2012 elections, François Hollande from the Socialists came to power, being seen as relatively more favourable towards Turkey. Although this may help Turkey’s accession process, France has not yet lifted its block on the chapters.

Opposition to Turkey’s membership is also seen in Netherlands, Luxembourg and Denmark (Lagro, 2008: 77), while supporters of membership include the UK, Spain, Italy and Portugal, who believe that it would strengthen the Mediterranean’s position relative to other regions in the EU. Sweden, Finland and Ireland support Turkey too for political and strategic reasons, believing that the EU has to fulfil its previously stated commitments if it is to maintain its international credibility, a view that is shared by Belgium, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. The three Baltic republics and Poland favour Turkey’s membership because they support further enlargement generally, since they have an interest in the accession of other countries in their neighbourhood to shelter them against Russia (Kramer, 2006: 4-5; cited in Öner, 2011: 393).

According to the Copenhagen School’s constructivist explanation, for securitisation of a “speech act” by a security actor, which constructs an issue as a threat to the survival of certain things is not enough; in addition, there a certain audience is required that accepts the construction of that issue as a threat (Buzan, et. al., 1998: 23). On the basis of the CopenhagenSchool’s constructivist explanation, Macmillan argues that Turkey membership bid has been securitised by the French and German right-wing through speech acts. Specifically, the discourses of recent leaders in France and Germany have constructed it as a threat to societal security, meaning European society as a whole. Public opinion in EU member states is also highly sceptical about Turkey’s membership, which means there is an audience for its securitisation by political actors. This has led to the suggestion of a “privileged partnership” for Turkey by leaders in France and Germany. Such a suggestion exemplifies the “extraordinary measures” considered necessary for the securitisation of an issue. That is, there has been an attempt to move Turkey’s membership bid out of normal politics so that it becomes securitised (Macmillan, 2010: 447-458) by politicians in several member states. One example of securitisation through a “speech act” is a statement by Valery Giscard d’Estaing, former French president and head of the European Convention, which prepared the Constitutional Treaty. In an interview with Le Monde he stated that “Turkey’s capital is not in Europe, 95 percent of its population lives outside Europe, it is not a European country”. For him, Turkish accession would mean “the end of the Europe” (Le Monde, 2002). The securitisation of Turkey’s accession has negatively influenced the perceptions of the public opinion in these member states. 

Conclusion

The analysis presented here demonstrates that rationalist explanations are not enough to understand differences in EU policies towards its Eastern enlargement and Turkey’s accession. First, the EU felt a responsibility to support CEECs’ democratization and economic development in the post-Cold War era (Sedelmeier, 2001: 16-17). As Sjursen (2002: 506-508) argues, Eastern Europe was considered as the “kidnapped West”, based on artificial  borders between Eastern and Western Europe. Thus, “kinship-based duty” was one of the factors contributing to EU support for Eastern enlargement. Second, EU policy towards CEECs was not only related to the interests of EU actors. It also relates to the EU’s identity (Sedelmeier, 2001: 18-19). That is, the EU emphasized its common cultural heritage with CEECs in the post-Cold War era and their belonging to a common “European family” (Sjursen, 2002: 491-513), while Turkey’s place within this family has been questioned.

Turkey has received less material support from the EU compared to the CEECs, while ambiguous signals from EU elites about its membership prospects have also strengthened the position of Euro-sceptics in Turkey, which has hindered the efforts of reforming elements in the country (Öniş, 2004: 485-495).

A clear indicator of EU discrimination for many Turkish people is the lack of visa-free travel in Europe for Turkish passport holders, in contrast to Eastern Europeans, who first gained visa-free travel in the early 1990s (Bulgarians in April 2001 and Romanians in January 2002) even before their countries’ accession to the EU (Çakır, 2010: 38). Citizens from most Western Balkan countries have also enjoyed visa-free travel since 2009. Given these developments, visa liberalisation for Turkey would provide evidence for Turkish citizens that the EU remains committed to Turkey’s full membership (European Stability Initiative, 2010: 1).

In conclusion, both rationalist and constructivist factors have influenced EU enlargement policy (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002: 524). As Schimmelfennig (2001: 76) argues, while rationalism can explain most preferences of actors, it cannot explain their enlargement decisions. Therefore, whereas association with CEECs can be explained in rationalist terms, their accession in a relatively short period, despite having only recently moved to a democratic and free market economic system can best be explained in constructivist terms. Regarding Turkey, supporters of its membership usually emphasize rationalist arguments, such as its geostrategic importance. On the other hand, those against its membership emphasize differences in culture and identity that require explanation in constructivist terms. The enlargement policies of individual member states have influenced the EU’s enlargement policies. In particular, the policies of France and Germany have played a crucial role, although this may change to a certain extent depending on changes in governments in Germany and the President in France. The role of public opinion has also affected the enlargement process too by influencing member state policies towards different candidate countries.

In rationalist terms, the on-going negotiations with Turkey have continued because neither side wants to lose the other due to mutual interests in terms of the economy, geopolitical factors and security. It is also in accordance with the commitments of the EU and the principle of “pacta sunt servanda”. However, a constructivist perspective is needed to explain the slow momentum of the negotiation process because of doubts about the compatibility of Turkey’s culture and identity with the EU’s. The final result of this process depends on the interests and political will of member states, especially Germany and France, but also on political and economic stability in Turkey, the momentum of the reform process in Turkey. Finally, it also depends on the EU solving its internal problems, particularly its economic crisis, and on changing international circumstances.

Selcen Öner, Assistant Professor, Department of EU Relations, Bahçeşehir University

Please cite this publication as follows:

Öner, Selcen  (October, 2013), The Role of Member States in EU Enlargement Policy: The Eastern Enlargement and Turkey’s Accession Process”, Vol. II, Issue 8, pp.63-71, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, Research Turkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=4331)

ENDNOTES

[1] The enlargements in 2004 and 2007 are usually referred to as the “Eastern enlargement”.

[2] Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement states that “as soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community” (1963).

[3] At the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, the concept of “absorption capacity” was introduced for the first time, when it was stated that “the EU’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries” (Council of the EU, 1993, point 7 A, iii).

[4] For further detail, see Nicolas, Sarkozy, Testimony: France, Europe and the World in the 21st Century, Hampshire: Harriman House Publishing, 2007.

REFERENCES

Bache, Ian; Stephen George and Simon Bulmer, Politics in the EU, New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2011.

Barnes, Ian and Pamela Barnes, “Enlargement” in Michelle Cini, Nieves Perez-Solorzano Borragan, European Union Politics, 3rd Edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Buzan, Barry, et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub., 1998.

Çakır, Armağan Emre, “Political Dimension : Always in the List of ‘Also-Rans’: Turkey’s Rivals in EU-Turkey Relations” in Armağan Emre Çakır (ed.) Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations: A Sisyphean Story, New York: Routledge, 2010.

d’Estaing, Valery Giscard, Le Monde, November 8, 2002.

Diez, Thomas, “Ethical Dimension: Promises, Obligations, Impatience and Delay: Reflections on the Ethical Aspects of Turkey-EU Relations” in Armağan Emre Çakır (ed.) Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations: A Sisyphean Story, New York: Routledge, 2010.

“A Very Special Relationship: Why Turkey’s EU Accession Process will Continue”, European Stability Initiative, Berlin-İstanbul, 11 November 2010.

EU-Turkey Negotiating Framework, 3 October 2005, retrieved on 18 March 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf

İçener, Erhan, et al., “Continuity and Change in the EU’s Approach to Enlargement: Turkey and Central and Eastern Europe Compared”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol.10, No.2, June 2010.

Lagro, Esra, “Why is President Sarkozy Actually Against Turkish Accession to the EU? Facts and Challenges”, Perceptions, Spring-Summer 2008.

Macmillan, Catherine, “Privileged Partnership, Open Ended Accession Negotiations and the Securitisation of Turkey’s EU Accession Process”, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol.18, No.4, December 2010.

Müftüler Baç, Meltem and Lauren McLaren, “Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the EU: Impacts on Turkey”, European Integration, Vol.25, 2003.

Mühlenhoff, Hanna L., “Turkish-German Relations Under the New Coalition Government in Germany”, 2009, retrieved on 8 April 2011, http://www.ikv.org.tr/images/upload/data/files/muhlenhoffgermanyturkey.pdf

Öner, Selcen, Turkey and the European Union: The Question of European Identity, Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Pub., 2011.

Öniş, Ziya, “Diverse but Converging Paths to EU Membership: Poland and Turkey in Comparative Perspective”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.18, No.3, 2004.

Schimmelfennig, Frank, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the EU”, Internatıonal Organization, Vol.55, No.1, Winter 2001.

Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses and The State of Research”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.9, No.4, August 2002.

Sedelmeier, Ulrich, “EU Eastern Enlargement in Comparative Perspective”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.8, No.4, 2001.

Sjursen, Helene, “Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy”,  Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2002.

How can EU Overcome its Structural Problems? An Effective Model

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How can EU Overcome its Structural Problems? An Effective Model

How can EU Overcome its Structural Problems? An Effective Model

Abstract

European Union can be defined as a running and operative machine/mechanism in the world politics. This sentence is highly assertive starting point as the EU has been facing relatively major structural problems. However, it has been taking serious steps in order to overcome the problems which have already became structural obstacles. The direction of these steps will determine the direction of the EU in the future. Thus, the proposals for the resolution of these structural obstacles should focus on the increase of the efficiency of current gears of the mechanism rather than externalization of these units by considering them non-functional. Politicization on three dimensions (policy, politics, polity dimensions) smooth the way of politicization of the individuals by spreading the potential of political dispute/contention to all levels of the society. Therefore, activation of the individuals that can produce ideas in policy dimension, can defend their thoughts in politics dimension and can legitimize the decisions taken in polity dimension will make the movement between these three dimensions constant (the details of this movement can be found in the article) and this movement constitutes a key for resolution of the structural problems of EU.

Introduction

European Union can be defined as a functioning and operative machine/mechanism when its half century long history is considered. The evaluation of its gears, cycles or instruments (regardless of how they are named) of this machine/mechanism in terms of productivity and operability is more rational than dissolution/termination of these units by considering them non-functional. The exclusion of one of its gears from the machine or changing it with another can subvert the functions of the whole structure. All mechanisms can halt their functionalities due to being exposed to several internal and external changes. Under these conditions, the solution should be structured by the logic of reparation on the analysis of the inconsistencies in the current mechanism in order to increase the existent operability of the system.

Within this framework, reasons of structural problems of the EU can be found in its institutional mechanism or lack of harmony between its member states. At this point, lack of harmony between states can be traced to the existent economic gap between states named as Triple A that give loans and states abbreviated as PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain) that are debtors. On the other hand, it is asserted that the structural problems of the EU is derived from application fallacies in common policy areas ( eg. EMU). Even if these findings concerning structural problems of the EU are correct, suggestions to change the structural tools of the current system (creation of Senate..etc.) cannot provide sufficient and suitable solutions. During the EU integration process, member states adopt supranational policies by defining common policy areas and delegate their authority on these areas. Therefore, EU mechanism is formed by reciprocal operation of the EU institutions and member states on these common policy areas. As the necessity of broad reform plans have emerged throughout its 50 years of experience, overbalance or insufficiency of gears of the mechanism (institutions, members, common policy areas) can easily be questioned. However, when European Union is evaluated in terms of accomplishment of its aims, it presents itself as a successful, unique example when compared with other international organizations regardless of its being democratic or having a democratic deficit problem; being egalitarian or producing unequal representation challenges; or being legitimate in the eye of its citizens or not.

As indicated initially, the question is what kind of mechanism that the EU have instead of how it is perceived or evaluated. Therefore, the European Union can tackle with and then overcome its structural problems by preserving its current mechanism in its integration process through fostering political contention in three dimensions: policy dimension, politics dimension and polity dimension. This solution is the change that converts EU’s apolitic mechanism by internalizing political dispute in these three dimensions.

From Limited Democracy to Democracy Deficit

After the end of the Second World War, the limited “democratic” regimes whose authorized powers and governing structure were kept out of democratic control were established in order to control populist movements (such as turning the regime into dictatorship) in European countries. Basing on the experiences of interwar years, the political elites established political structure that is supported by strong institutional mechanisms such as constitutional courts.1 This strong institutional structure brought certain limitations to public sovereignty on politics. The project of EU has developed with this approach.2 Supranational institutions within the EU have been isolated from democratic control in order to eliminate the nationalist conflicts among its member states. It has been strongly believed that the “union” could be created by establishing a supranational legal community3 and therefore economic and political integration could be achieved by establishing common legal principles.4 According to another author, in order to strengthen the competitiveness among different economic, political and social regimes, democracy has been promoted not as one of the basic values but as an instrument to promote freedom, justice and good government.5 Consequently, two main principles which ensure democratic legitimacy: accountability and representation have been subordinated in the EU. This entrenched perception that marked the EU integration process and the nascent EU law have neither constructed institutions in line with the accountability principle nor they have encouraged civil participation to European Politics. It would be more convenient to examine the EU’s democracy deficit concept from this perspective.

The challenge of democracy deficit in the EU became more obvious with the current EU crisis that can be basically defined as transfer of the authority on monetary policy to supranational bodies by the member states while preserving their certain competences on fiscal policies. Member states are urgently expected to take significant precautions and measures by their civil society in order to overcome the crisis but they are restricted according to EU law. Today, the supporters of the “strong union” in member states are squeezed between taking necessary measures and obeying the EU law.6 On the other hand, during the latest crisis in the EU, a huge gap has emerged between the implementations of the European decision making mechanisms and will of the European people.7 This situation reminds us the quote of Dahrendorf after the fall of Berlin wall: The constitution can be created in 6 months; economic recovery can be achieved in 6 years; but the spread of the idea of democratic freedom can take 60 years. Therefore, it is not and -shouldn’t-8 be surprising that today, after almost 60 years, European elites have turned their back to the people.9 A civil society that has become more conscious on preserving their rights and liberties cannot be ignored anymore with elitist approaches. Therefore, building a strong bridge between public sovereignty and political implementations of the elites10 becomes primary precaution in order not to face with the same problems. The relations between economic and political tendency that the EU adopts in the world politics, main strategic steps of EU on resolving current problems and European public opinion concerning this direction display the gap between politics and policy dimensions. 

Politicization on Three Dimensions

Today, serious political dispute is strongly required in Europe on several policy areas – such as liberalization of service sector, sustainable energy acquisition, climate change, immigration from or migration to Europe, external relations with USA, neighbors, developing countries and growing powers of Asia. 11 The decisions taken after serious political dispute should create political winners and losers. If this platform of the discussion is achieved in the public level; the economic, political and social success of the EU will thrive in the future. This platform of discussion between supporters of the political ideologies should be promoted at all levels among all interest groups (peoples, NGOs, economic communities and sectors). Therefore, any discussion platform which is mobilized on policy dimension will activate the negotiations on politics dimension. This will shrink the gap between policy and politics dimension and policy implementations will be accountable and legitimate.. In parallel with this activation, institutional formations will become outputs of these discussions, current institutions will be politicized during the transit phase to the polity dimension and the mechanism with three dimensions will start its perpetual/continuous? movement (As shown in Image I.). The aforementioned politicization aims at people themselves? therefore it doesn’t have any importance if the public has national or supranational values. The lack of European society or deficiency of lack of developed public space in Europe cannot be obstacles for politicization of the people.

t is possible to counter the perception that the decisions taken behind closed doors are external enforcements, ‘as witnessed in Germany’s solutions offered during the Euro crisis 12’. This perception can be prevented by politicization on three dimensions. Auer who characterizes the protests following the Euro crisis as the Europe Spring which warns that European social movements that have marched in protest for the new social state notion will overwhelm the neoliberal Europe that has already lost its legitimacy.13 Therefore, the structural problems of Europe can be solved by promotion of the economic and political discussion platforms at all levels.

In order to exemplify and make the model of politicization on three dimensions concrete, the following example would be beneficial. In the policy area of restricting public expenditures as a result of liberalization or in the policy area of providing additional rights to ethnic minorities, people can be organized under Cooperation Units- that will be established in the near future- and can submit their political agendas to the European institutions. By doing so, they will activate the gears in policy dimension first and then the gears of politics dimension. As a result of this activation, the prevailing group will implement their proposals via European institutions as follows: EU institutions have the potential of establishing political coalitions since 1980s and 1990s.14 With the help of this potential the agenda created by people can be converted into legislative actions in the European Commission and Parliament and the gears in polity dimension will be activated. Therefore, European peoples are divided or integrated in policy development process and national borders are surpassed 15 through proceeding in policy dimension. This supranational political structure not only makes the EU more powerful but also contributes to the emergence of European society.

Conclusion

The concept of “confrontation- cum- legitimization” is used by Pélebay et al. in order to explain that legitimacy can be obtained through promotion of the confrontation not through suppression of the disagreements.16 In other worlds, the concept reveals that the authority can be considered legitimate if it liberalizes the expression of political opinions in the society. The belief that political disagreements and disputes may bring instability makes the society apolitical. When people integrate politics in their daily life, they also can have a say in EU affairs because as Micheal Freeden remarks, the aim is not to agree on what the concept of European means for the whole but the objective should be to understand what the project of Europe express for each individual/ political actor.17 In order for European individuals to know what the project of Europe means for them, they should examine the EU integration process, the phases that EU has experienced and functions of the EU with ideological and political point of view. The EU has brought its mechanism into the present after overcoming different crisis by adapting several changes in several periods. The recent problems of the EU can be resolved by the integration of the concept of confrontation cum legitimization in aforementioned three dimensions. Thus, individuals, political actors and institutions can incorporate their disagreements and differences as an input for the system and can speed up the gears of the mechanism.

As a final remark, in order to prevent a possible criticism that can be easily directed to this study, it is better to underline that the implementation of this proposal requires an explanation step by step in detail in each European institution. This detailed clarification is neither the subject nor the aim of this article.

Bilge Filiz, Research Assistant, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey)

Please cite this publication as follows:

Filiz, Bilge (April, 2014), “How can EU Overcome its Structural Problems? An Effective Model”, Vol. III, Issue 4, pp.44-50, Centre for Policy Analysis and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey), London, ResearchTurkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=5951)

References

Auer,S.(2013). The End of European Dream? What Future for Europe’s constrained democracy? Eurozine. http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2013-02-22-auer-en.html

Dahrendorf (2001). Lacroix,J & Nicolaidis, K. (2010) European Stories: An Introduction European Stories Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts. Oxford University Press. ISBN:978-0-19-959462-7

Garton Ash. (2004) in Liebert, U. (2010) Contentious European Democracy. Lacroix,J & Nicolaidis, K. (edt) European Stories Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts. Oxford University Press. ISBN:978-0-19-959462-7

Hix, S. (2008). What’s Wrong with European Union and How to Fix it? Polity PressISBN: 978-07456-4204-8

Lacroix,J & Nicolaidis, K. (edt) European Stories Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts. Oxford University Press. ISBN:978-0-19-959462-7

Liebert, U. (2010) Contentious European Democracy. Lacroix,J & Nicolaidis, K. (edt) European Stories Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts. Oxford University Press. ISBN:978-0-19-959462-7

Offe, C. (2013). Europe in Trap. Eurozine. http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2013-02-06-offe-en.html

Pélebay,J & Niclodaidis,K & Lacroix, J. (2010). Conclusion Echoes and Polyphony. In Praise of Europe’s Narrative Diversity. European Stories Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts. Oxford University Press. ISBN:978-0-19-959462-7

Zielonka, J. (2013). European Foreign Policy and the Euro-crisis. European University Institute. Robert Schuman Centre for Advances Studies 2013/13

http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/26339/RSCAS_2013_23.pdf?sequence=1

Footnotes

1 Auer,S.(2013). The End of European Dream? What Future for Europe’s constrained democracy? Eurozine.http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2013-02-22-auer-en.html

2 Age s.7

3 Hix, S. (2008). What’s Wrong with European Union and How to Fix it? Polity Press ISBN: 978-07456-4204-8

4 Liebert, U. (2010) Contentious European Democracy. Lacroix,J & Nicolaidis, K. (edt) European Stories Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts. Oxford University Press. ISBN:978-0-19-959462-7

5 Garton Ash. (2004). Ibid s. 63.

6 Offe, C. (2013). Europe in Trap. Eurozine. http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2013-02-06-offe-en.html

7 Ibid

8 Added by the author

9 Ibid

10 Offe, C. (2013). Ibid

11 Hix, S. (2008). Ibid

12 Offe, C. (2013). Ibid.

13 Auer,S.(2013). Ibid.

14 Hix, S. (2008). Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16Pélebay,J & Niclodaidis,K & Lacroix, J. (2010). Conclusion Echoes and Polyphony. In Praise of Europe’s Narrative Diversity. European Stories Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts. Oxford University Press. ISBN:978-0-19-959462-7

17Ibid.

 

Re-Assesing the Impact of the Europeanization on Civil Society of Turkey

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Reassessing the Impact of the Europeanisation on Civil Society of Turkey

Re-Assessing the Impact of the Europeanisation on Civil Society of Turkey

Background

Europeanization literature has recently incorporated studies of pre-accession effects on candidate countries, and several scholars brought significant contributions to conceptualizing mechanisms of the EU impact beyond the member states (Goetz 2005; Grabbe 2001; Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2005). However their model predominantly favors intergovernmental aspects and explains the compliance of governments in target states to the European model induced for EU membership. These observations are valid for Turkey, which is an acceding state to the EU. The agenda of EU-Turkey relations has been occupied with Turkey’s macro-political deficiencies in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria (Diez et al 2005) and the analysis predominantly remained at the institutional level.

This paper takes the analysis further and discusses the EU’s impact upon political level and civil society of Turkey particularly, in the ongoing but handicapped accession process. The application of the EU acquis conditionality makes it possible to transform the relation of civil society to state; the EU funding support capacity- building of civil society and the multilevel nature of EU polity extends political outlets for civil society (Kutter and Trappman 2010; Börzel 2010a; Knodt 2001; Börzel/Buzogány 2010b; Börzel/Buzogány; 2010c).  Thus, such changes empower civil society of accession states and potentially allow their participation in policy adoption and implementation processes.

The EU acquis and formal mechanisms of Europeanization have changed the political environment of Turkey. Along with the scholarly accounts confirming the EU’s transformative impact upon state- civil society configuration (Keyman / Icduygu 2003; Kubicek 2005; Diez et al 2005) in Turkey, civil society organizations (CSOs) themselves have acknowledged the positive impact of the EU on the civil society environment. The CIVICUS Civil Society Index Country Report for Turkey (2006, 2011) included a section to assessing the impact of the EU’s impact on NGO law and regulations, capacity of CSOs and civil society-state relations added as indicators. The results confirm that CSOs generally acknowledges the positive impact of the EU on these different dimensions. Moreover, in quantitative terms the civil society in Turkey was grown substantially with the EU anchor. The statistics of Interior Ministry on the number of associations indicate that there are 97,686 active associations in 2013; this number was 60,931 in 2000, moreover, the number of volunteers reached over 8 million in 2012, compared with only 4 million in 2004[1].

The following sections will scrutinize mechanisms of EU policy towards civil society of Turkey in accession process and their consequences under three dimensions: political – institutional infrastructure, capacity building and horizontal linkages. Moreover, this paper also briefly discusses the direction of the EU’s policy agenda for Turkish civil society in the foreseeable future.

Political – institutional infrastructure

EU policy towards accession states mainly includes EU conditionality with respect to enlargement. The EU membership of a candidate state is conditional on them fully meeting the Copenhagen criteria (democratic conditionality) and adopting the EU acquis (acquis conditionality). (Schimmelfennig / Sedelmeier 2004). Accession states find themselves in the ‘no-exit’ position when they agree to comply with the conditionality of EU membership. First, the EU decides on the extent of the misfit (the deviation of national regulations from the EU regulations). With wide range of tools, the EU determines the favorable political setting for the national government to reach for EU membership and eventually the ongoing EU-led adjustment process has a transformative impact on the domestic political settings. In direct forms, there has been direct intervention of the EU on the political environment of Turkish civil society via conditionality, with an impact on the  organization  of  the  politics  and  daily  routines  of  policy formulation  by   imposing  treaty  revision  and  formal  intergovernmental  agreement  affecting  the formal  organization  of  politics.

The EU political conditionality has enforced the Turkish state to improve the enabling political environment in favour of civil society. The EU placed the demand on the Turkish government to meet the minimum requirements for civil society development, with progress assessed through the situation of civil society context particularly in respect of the Copenhagen criteria. The most significant impetus in EU- Turkey relations has been experienced following Turkey was granted EU candidacy in 1999. Between 2000 and 2005, when the reform process was at its peak point, substantial changes were realized involving the legal foundations regulating state and society relations through a series of reforms, and by 2004, the law of associations had been updated and liberalized substantially (Göksel / Güneş 2005; Kubicek 2011). On the other hand, by 2008, amendments made to the Law on Associations and Foundations furthered the freedom of associations and enabling environment of civil society. For instance, these new provisions eased the foundations’ workings regarding their establishment and funding of activities.  Despite improvements in legal structure, EU progress report 2013  cites examples of a restrictive interpretation of legislation vis-à-vis civil society in Turkey including excessive fining,  limiting the right to publish press statement, requiring advance notification of demonstrations and disruption of demonstrations and disproportionate use of force by the police against demonstrators.

The EU had also repeatedly addressed the need for strengthening state- civil society cooperation in the governance of the accession process (The EU Progress Report, 2008; 2010). A study conducted by TÜSEV (2011) also confirms that state-civil society relations do not work smoothly, with current problems not relating to the existence of the law but rather their implementation. The report advocates the visible incompatibility between the strong state tradition in Turkey and the participatory decision-making mechanism envisaged by the EU integration process. The EU Progress Report 2013 states civil society participation in policy making cycle on ad hoc basis since there are no participatory mechanism defined in the legislation that allow permanent and structured consultations with CSOs.

Recently, the EC has accepted the guiding principles for EC Support of the Development of Civil Society in Turkey for the 2011- 2015 after an open consultation process from 5 April to 30 May 2010 with 12 meetings across Turkey and electronic consultation with Turkish Civil Society and Turkish public authorities[2].This policy paper has a multi-annual strategic approach by explicitly determining objectives, possible EC actions and indicators for assessment[3]. Especially, specific motivation of this document clearly indicates that civil society participation in stages of policy making will have possible implications on the accession process. Several sources confirm that the absence of the formal institutional mechanisms for mediating relations with civil society and government hinders the civil society participation in accession process of Turkey[4]. EU funded project Technical Assistance for Civil Society organizations (TACSO) with their scheduled activities hinting that the EU is placing extra significance on the preparation of a code of conduct regulating civil society and state relations in Turkey[5].

Capacity- Building

The EU intends to build the capacity of civil society by providing financial aid, training and technical assistance, and opening up their possibilities to engage in the ongoing rule adoption and implementation process of acceding states. The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) supports Turkey’s efforts to meet the Copenhagen criteria, with special attention placed on the political criteria and particularly strengthening institutional capacity and investment related to the adoption of the acquis. The beneficiaries of EU‘s financial assistance not only include the public sector or Turkish government, but also such programs addressing the needs of non-state actors, including business interest groups, trade unions, small and medium sized enterprises (SME), associations, foundations and non-profit organizations. To illustrate, The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) has focused on Turkey and supported CSOs through micro and macro-projects; between 2002 and 2012, over 100 micro and macro projects were implemented with an annual budget of over 2 million Euros [6].

The ‘Civil Society Facility’ (CSF) came into force in 2008, including civil society in decision-making processes through their financial support. The CSF holds the clear objective of enhancing participatory democracy in Turkey by improving civil society–state dialogue, enhancing their capacity to contribute effectively to public sector reforms, and increasing the access of CSOs to financial resources[7].This initiative relies on the 2008 -2009 Enlargement Strategy, which clearly associates the success of the accession process with the involvement of civil society in policy dialogue and consultations. It argued that the engagement of civil society in the pre-accession process increases the quality of the accession process and enhances public support for the ongoing reform processes. The CSF recently released 1.75 million Euros in 2013 for Turkish civil society to with an objective to contribute to the strengthening of capacities of existing or new national, regional, local and/or thematic platforms and networks of (CSOs) to give citizens a voice and influence public sector reform processes through their activities. In 2013, another comprehensive project entitled ‘Strengthening Civil Society Development and Civil Society-Public Sector Cooperation in Turkey’ has started with an aim to betterment of enabling environment of civil society and empowerment of capacity of civil society in Turkey. As an example, on the of the sub-projects support the establishment of a mutually accepted code of conduct regulate the civil society organizations and public authorities. Prominent organizations work in civil society development field including Third Sector Foundation (TÜSEV), Civil Society Development Centre (STGM) and YADA Foundation are implementers of this project[8].  Moreover, The EU launched  a project entitled  ‘Balkan Civil Society Acquis – Monitoring Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development Project’ in 2012 to strengthen integration and participation of CSOs of Western Balkan countries, including Turkey, in EU policy and accession processes at European and country level[9].The project has an objective to create a monitoring mechanism for tracking of development of civil society, to facilitate the inclusion of related matters in the EU Progress Report and to support the participation of CSOs in the decision making processes at the national and EU level[10].

Horizontal linkages

Third, by its nature, the EU itself is a multilevel political entity, offering multiple access points for non-state actors. Besides  the  institutional  arenas  at  the  EU  level,  non-state  actors  also  find  new political realms at the transnational level via memberships of networks and platforms operating at the EU level (Sudbery 2010). In the case of the accession states, the EU directly initiates formation of horizontal linkages among CSOs to foster Europeanization. For instance, The EC adopted Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and candidate countries in 2005, immediately after the accession negotiations started with Turkey. In Turkish case, the EC highlighted that the accession process of Turkey is challenging both for the country itself and the EU, given that Turkey’s accession would be different than previous cases based upon ‘Turkey’s population, size, geographical location, economic, security and military potential, as well as cultural and religious characteristics.’[11].

The EC proposed civil society dialogue as the third pillar of the EU[12] to address the cultural and socio-economic gap which endangers the smooth accession of Turkey. Sustainable dialogue between the societies of the candidate countries and in the EU member States, as well as with the EU institutions is being supported by grant programmes to complement the ongoing accession process. As a continuation of the previous civil society dialogue projects, Civil Society Dialogue III grant programme have been launched in 2013 and offers funds under thematic fields of political criteria grants and media grants[13]. Political Grant of the programme acknowledges the significant role played by CSOs in accession process in terms of minimizing the differences between national and European legislation and implementation practices. Funding schemes target furthering contacts and mutual exchanges of information and experiences between civil society actors in the EU Member States and Turkey on issues related to political criterion. The priority areas are determined as human rights, anti-discrimination, democracy and rule of law. Similarly, media grant of the programme aims to support a sustainable dialogue between the media organizations in Turkey and the EU member states. Grant projects to be supported will enable collaborations between media sector in Turkey and with their European counterparts and contribute increasing awareness about the Turkey-EU relations in the public. As one of the three component of the Civil Society Facility, People 2 People (P2P) programme promotes exchanges of CSOs in the candidate and potential candidate countries with their counterparts based in EU countries and with the EU institutions to expand their knowledge in the EU and the accession process[14]. In the tentative calendar of P2P, 21 activities were determined. These activities include but not limited to initiatives related to “Fostering Civil Society in the Candidate and Potential Candidate countries” and bringing “New approach in EU Accession Negotiations”[15].

Conclusion

This paper examined the ways in which the EU Accession process transforms the operating arenas of environments of the civil society in Turkey. From the very beginning, the EU aims to promote participatory mechanisms to include has civil society into accession processes in order to safeguard the healthy accession and implementation of the rules after possible accession. Civil society is considered as the safety net or pressure group facilitating the reform process at the domestic level. Moreover, civil society has been supported to establish sustainable relations to their counterparts in European states in order to change negative perceptions on Turkish accession endangering smooth accession process.

Reform packages to meet EU acquis that have been passed by the government have considerably liberalized the associational structure. It is widely acknowledged that the EU accession process has had a direct impact on changes in the law of associations and charities. Yet, the freedom of associations and autonomy of CSOs have been partially attained due to severe deficiencies in the implementation. The EU has specifically addressed the lack of consultation mechanisms and law regulates state society interaction in Turkey in recent years. It appears that future efforts will also further address strengthening participatory mechanisms. Aftermath 2008, with adoption of Civil Society Facility, the EU took more systemized approach to overcome problems blocking civil society participation in governing the accession process.  Especially adoption of the guiding principles for EC Support of the Development of Civil Society in Turkey for the 2011- 2015 and launch of EU-funded projects hint that regardless the slowed down accession process, the EU increasingly addresses the significance of input of civil society to accession processes. Lastly, it is evident that this is not peculiar to the case of Turkish accession, but relevant for other accession states and prospective EU candidate countries.

Dr. Sezin Dereci, Local Policy and Advocacy Coordinator, Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TÜSEV)

Please cite this publication as follows:

Dereci, Sezin (November, 2013), “Reassessing the Impact of the Europeanisation on Civil Society of Turkey”, Vol. II, Issue 9, pp.36-41, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, Research Turkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=4511)

Bibliography 

Börzel, T. A. (2010a). “Why you don’t always get what you want: EU Enlargement and Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe.” Acta Politica 45: 1-10.

Börzel, T. A./ A. Buzogány (2010b). “Governing EU accession in transition countries: The role of non-state actors.” Acta Politica 45(1): 158-182.

Börzel, T. A./ A. Buzogány (2010c). “Environmental organisations and the Europeanisation of public policy in Central and Eastern Europe: the case of biodiversity governance.” Environmental Politics 19(5): 708-735.

Diez, T., Agnantopoulos, A., & Kaliber, A. (2005). File: Turkey, Europeanization and civil society: introduction. South European Society and Politics10(1), 1-15.

European Commission’s Progress Report on Turkey, SEC(2008) 2699, Brussels.

European Commission’s Progress Report on Turkey, SEC(2010) 1327, Brussels.

European Commission’s Progress Report on Turkey, SWD(2013) 417, Brussels.

Goetz, K. H. (2005). “The New Member States and the EU: Responding to Europe.” In The Member States of the European Union, edited by Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne, 254-284. New York: Oxford University Press.

Göksel, D. N./ R. B. Güneş. (2005). “The Role of NGOs in the European Integration Process: The Turkish Experience.” South European Society and Politics 10 (1): 57-72.

Grabbe, H. (2001). “How does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity.” Journal of European Public Policy 8 (6): 1013-1031.

Keyman, E. F./A.İçduygu (2003). “Globalization, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries and Discourses.” Citizenship Studies (2): 219.

Knodt, M. (2001). “Regions in Multilevel Governance Arrangements: Leadership Versus Partnership.” In Participatory Governance. Political and Societal Implications, edited by J. R. Grote and B. Gbikpi, 177-196: Leske + Budrich.

Kubicek, P. (2011). Political conditionality and European Union’s cultivation of democracy in Turkey. Democratization18(4), 910-931.

Kubicek, P. (2005). The European Union and grassroots democratization in Turkey. Turkish Studies6(3), 361-377.

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Schimmelfennig, F./ U. Sedelmeier (2004). “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 11 (4): 661-679.

Schimmelfennig, F./ U. Sedelmeier (2005). The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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Footnotes

[1] Foundations Directorate. Official Statistics, in:

http://www.dernekler.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=52&Itemid=12&lang=tr

[2] EU Delegation to Turkey website. Information on EU and civil society, in:  http://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/eu-and-civil-society.html

[3] European Commission’s Guiding Principles for EC Support of the Development of Civil Society in Turkey 2011-2015, Brussels.

[4] This report offers the conceptual framework for the enabling civil society environment and provides  data from nine countries.

[5] Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations, The Civil Society Environment in the Western Balkans and Turkey report, in:

http://www.tacso.org/documents/reports/?id=1754

[6] Europeaid, EIDHR Turkey  Programme, in:

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/documents/eidhr_2008_projects_in_turkey_en.pdf

[7] EU enlargement, Civil Society Facility 2011-2012 (9) Country Fiche: Turkey.

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/ipa/2012/pf_9_csf-tr.pdf

[8] EU Delegation to Turkey website.Information on EU and civil society, in:  http://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/eu-and-civil-society.html

[9] Third Sector Foundation of Turkey  (TUSEV) Website, in: http://www.tusev.org.tr/en/civil-society-law-reform/monitoring-enabling-environment-for-civil-society-development-project

[10] Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV) is the implementing partner of the Monitoring Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development Project coordinated by Balkan Civil Society Development Network (BCSDN). This project assesses the quality of the enabling environment for civil society development in Turkey through reviewing the legal framework and its application in practice under sub-three areas : (1) Basic Legal Guarantees of Freedoms; (2) Framework for CSOs’ Financial Viability and Sustainability; (3) Government – CSO Relationship.

[11] European Commission’s Staff Working Document issues arising from Turkey’s membership perspective, SEC(2004) 1202, October 6, 2004, 4-6.

[12] EU’s three-pillar policy vis-à-vis Turkey: ―the first pillar focused on reinforcing the political reform process in Turkey, the second pillar consisted of conducting negotiations under a revised methodological approach and the third pillar was about a EU-Turkey dialogue.

[13] Third cycle of Civil Society Dialogue Project will allocate over € 9 million for the years 2013-2015.

Civil Society Dialogue Project, Civil Society Dialogue,

in: http://www.csdproject.net/CivilSocietyDialogue/AbouttheProgramme.aspx#LiveAccordionContent4712-la[14] The People 2 People Programme (P2P), in: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/taiex/p2p/index_en.htm

[15] P2P 2013 Calendar, in: http://www.tacso.org/doc/p2p_calendar20130909.pdf

 

The Status and Future of Evaluation in Turkish Educational Decision Making: An Introduction

0

Evaluation Series – I

The Status and Future of Evaluation in

Turkish Educational Decision Making: An Introduction 

Introduction

In 2012, The Republic of Turkey’s Ministry of National Education (MoNE) launched the “School Milk Project” in cooperation with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Livestock. The aim of this project was to support students’ engagement and learning in school by improving their nutritional habits.  A few months after the project started, hundreds of students had been admitted into hospitals because of spoiled milk and food poisoning. Major newspapers and network news in Turkey covered these cases, and the incidents were considered a public disgrace, all the more humbling because Turkey was considered to be on the road to European Union (EU) membership. This incident revived the longstanding debate about decision-making and implementation of government programs and policies in Turkey. Lurking behind this debate were three common questions: Did the government do the right thing in designing this project? Did they implement it correctly? What could they have done better?

These questions are linked to a broader debate about the role and utility of evaluation (or lack thereof) in decision making by Turkish educational officials. Evaluation is simply to assess the process and outcome(s) of a public policy, program, and/or project according to a set of criteria and standards. In a broader sense, evaluation helps decision makers in public realm answer the following questions: What works and/or what does not work for whom and under what circumstances? Scholars suggest that evaluations play a strategic role in the decision-making process by generating a continuous flow of solid information about the merit, shortcomings, and outcomes of public programs and policies, contributing to their effectiveness and betterment (Weiss, 1998; Patton, 2012; Mark & Henry, 2004; Fitzpatrick, Sanders, & Worthen, 2004).  In spite of evaluation’s apparent resonance with improved governmental decisions, Turkey has lagged behind countries with comparable levels of development (e.g., Brazil, Korea) in establishing evaluative praxis as an integral part of educational decision-making.  The available evidence suggests that formal policy evaluations are rare in Turkey (Education Reform Initiative, 2009; Russon & Russon, 2000).  As a country that aims to cope with competitive pressure within the EU and the knowledge economy in the world, Turkey may frequently lose the opportunity to use evaluation to improve educational policies and programs as a result.  To this end, Turkish scholars have increased their calls for home evaluations of national programs and policies grounded in Turkey’s social, economic, and cultural context (Aydagul, 2008).

This article is the first of a series of research briefs and papers to be published via ResearchTurkey that will help illuminate the current status of evaluation as a field and practice in Turkish governmental life and civil society. The purpose of the current article is to shed light on the status and potential future of evaluation specifically in the educational decision-making context.  The article provides a preliminary, descriptive context for the topic by borrowing from the evaluation literature developed in the global Northern context. Major definitions, terms, and concepts will also be introduced throughout the article to provide guidance in understanding the field and practice of evaluation and its application into decision-making domains in Turkey.  Although it focuses on the educational context, there is no obvious reason why the results could not demarcate the utility of evaluation in other decision domains (i.e., health, transportation, employment, development, etc.).

The Field and Practice of Evaluation: Theoretical Background

Inferences about the role and utility of evaluation in Turkish educational context will be much stronger when backed up by some deeper thinking about the definition, purposes, and uses of evaluation as a field of practice. Thus, this section aims to underline the significance of evaluation in decision-making contexts, or more broadly, seeks to answer why we should bother. 

Western evaluation scholars and practitioners alike have provided many definitions and discussed several purposes for evaluation (e.g., King & Stevahn, 2012; Patton, 2012; Stufflebeam & Shinkfield, 2007; Rossi, Lipsey, & Freeman, 2004).  The most widely used definition of evaluation is “the systematic process of determining the merit, worth, or value of something” (Scriven, 1991, p. 139).  Many practitioners in low and middle income countries favor Carol Weiss’ definition of program/policy evaluation (see UNDP, 2011), a distinguished U.S. policy and evaluation scholar who passed away recently: “the systematic assessment of the operation and/or outcomes of a program or policy, compared to a set of explicit or implicit standards as a means of contributing to the improvement of the program or policy” (Weiss, 1998, p. 4).  Here, it is vital to distinguish program evaluation from other social science research.  Weiss (1998) provided a comprehensive comparison of these two inquiry traditions.  For our purposes—evaluation for educational decision-making—her insight about the utility and client is more immediately relevant.  Weiss (1998) posits that evaluations are conducted with use in mind for a specific client (i.e., policy makers, managers, staff, etc.) who has decisions to make.  In sum, evaluations—unlike other social science research—are intended to be used by policy or program communities who need information to base their decisions.

Notwithstanding several definitions, existing literature demonstrates the growing interest in using evaluation as a decision-making instrument for designing, implementing, and improving organizational goals at the local, national, and international levels (Fitzpatrick, Sanders, & Worthen, 2004).  Western researchers have long argued that evaluations are influential forces to improve public services, programs, and policies (Segone, 2008; Mark, Henry, & Julnes, 2000; Scriven, 1991).  They agree that evaluations contribute to institutional learning and effectiveness of decisions such that evaluation processes and findings may create changes in thinking about programs’ and policies’ design, implementation, logic, and desired outcomes, and ultimately shifts in action by building a knowledge base (Weiss, 1998; Preskill, 2008; Patton, 2012).  Fitzpatrick et al. (2004) summarized the significance of evaluations in decision making as follows:

Evaluation serves to identify strengths and weaknesses, highlight the good, and expose the faulty, but it cannot singlehandedly correct problems, for that is the role of management and other stakeholders, using evaluation findings as one tool that will help them in that process. (p. 27)

Patton (2012), an evaluation pioneer both in the global Southern and Northern contexts, summarizes the purposes of program evaluation into six categorizes (see Table 1), and argues that evaluation’s purpose and use are defined by the intended users’ information needs, and priorities.

Table 1. Primary purposes of evaluation

Purpose of Evaluation Focus Primary Users of Evaluation Results
Summative, Judgment To determine the overall value of the program or policy Funders and policy-makers
Formative improvement, Learning To improve the program or policy Program administrators and staff
Accountability To demonstrate the efficient use of resources Executive, legislative authority
Monitoring To provide data for program management Program managers
Developmental To adapt the program or policy in complex environments Social innovators
Knowledge Generation To identify patterns of effectiveness Program designers

Source: Adapted from Patton (2012, pp. 129-132)

In sum, this utilitarian view of evaluation assumes that evaluations can provide useful information for decision makers that help guide program design, implementation, and improvement, which is why evaluations can be appealing to managers, administrators, or even policymakers (Fitzpatrick, Sanders, & Worthen, 2004).  

Uses of Evaluation for Decision-Making

The agreed-upon, prevalent uses of evaluation noted in the literature are three-tiered (Johnson et al., 2009). First, instrumental use refers to using evaluation findings for immediate decision making to modify, expand, or terminate the evaluation object (product, program, policy or personnel) (Mark & Henry, 2004; Johnson et al., 2009).  This use assumes a rational decision-making process where policymakers have access and desire for scientific evidence to use for their decision (Almeida & Bascolo, 2006).  Second, conceptual use refers to indirect use of evaluation findings that illuminate policy problems and solutions in a new way and change our understanding.  Carol Weiss (1998) calls this enlightenment whereby the evaluation findings build knowledge and become a part of the policy discourse over time. This view assumes that evaluation information affects policy decisions in more subtle and indirect ways over time, becoming a part of discursive dialogue, hence the “new common wisdom” in policy arena (Weiss, Graham, & Birkeland, 2005, p. 13). Third, symbolic use refers to using evaluation findings to justify the existing practices, persuade others about certain positions or delay action in political arenas (Almeida & Bascolo, 2006).

Among these three major uses of evaluation, many scholars and practitioners have questioned the instrumental use of evaluation findings and processes for decision making, claiming that there are many sources of evidence available to decision makers; thus, it is unrealistic for evaluations to purport direct influence on decisions (Weiss, 1998; Chelimsky, 2006).  These scholars mainly question the direct use of scientific, sociological knowledge in the political arena, arguing that knowledge utilization does not take a form of immediate, direct application, but rather a longer and indirect transformation through various mechanisms (Balthasar & Rieder, 2000).  

The debate about the instrumental use of evaluation information is indeed linked to a larger discussion regarding evidence-based decision-making.  Changes in public administration culture in Western democracies over the last century have highlighted effectiveness and efficiency as common denominators in providing public services (Clarke, 2008).  This shift triggered wide adoptions of results-based management and accountability mechanisms to demonstrate value for money and ultimately stipulated rigorous, scientific evaluations to produce credible, empirical evidence to be used for decision-making (Donaldson, 2008).  Proponents of evidence-based policy and practice assumed that scientific evaluation evidence–presumably obtained from randomized control trials or quasi-experimental designs–will have a direct impact on the design and implementation of programs and policies, contributing to their betterment (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).

Nevertheless, scholars often highlighted the limitations of direct use of evaluation evidence for decision making due the political context.  For example, Weiss (1998) submits that evaluations may not have a direct effect on policy decisions due to various reasons.  First and foremost, the scholar posits that evaluation evidence competes against many other sources of information available to policy makers. Evaluation is not the primary source of evidence in policy arena (Weiss & Bucuvalas, 1980; Chelimsky, 2006).  The following poem summarizes the realist approach of Weiss and her colleagues (Weiss, Graham, & Birkeland, 2005) to use of evaluations for decision-making:

Evaluation is fallible

Evaluation is but one source of evidence

Evidence is but one input into policy

Policy is but one influence on practice

Practice is but one influence on outcomes. (pp. 12-13)

Second and more importantly, Weiss argues that there is no single decision maker who easily welcomes evaluative evidence without reservations and makes decisions without any conflict. To Weiss (1987), the policy decision-making context is indeed unstable, involving many decision makers who have different opinions, conflicting interests, and opposing needs that make it harder for evaluative evidence to directly inform decisions.  Cook (1997) also explicated this point years ago:

The politician’s prime goal is to be reelected rather than to respect technical evidence; that personal and party political ideology often entail that evidence is used in markedly selective ways; and that politicians experience a greater need to be a part of budget allocation rather than of program review. (pp. 40-41)

These studies point to a prevalent argument in the evaluation literature; that is, evaluations take place in political contexts (Weiss, 1998; Mark, Henry, & Julnes, 2000; Greene, 2006; Datta, 2011).  Weiss (1987) submits that programs that evaluations are concerned about are the very byproducts of politics, and evaluations make political statements about the value of these programs and determine their fate.

Although Western scholars have come to a consensus a long time ago that regular evaluative activities improve public policies – and many developing countries have already caught up with this notion (i.e., South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda, etc.), the political nature of knowledge creation and use in governmental arena poses setbacks for evaluation’s smooth evolution not only in Turkish context but elsewhere. Perhaps, Carol Weiss’ realist approach to uses of evaluation in decision domains is much more aligned with Turkish political landscape splintered with many fault lines. Specifically, Turkey’s educational context – often a contested ground consisting of various players with differing opinions, personal whims, and interests – could better accommodate the enlightenment use of evaluations as a means to gradually improve educational policies. While the efforts to bridge the gap between scientific information – largely obtained from social science research and evaluations in public arena – and public policy constitute a multi-million dollar enterprise worldwide, it would be naïve to hope that Turkish educational officials regularly conduct evaluations and use their results directly for their decisions while these actors are bombarded with multiple of sources of information to influence their policy decisions – a major one being the dominant political agenda.

Evaluation in Turkish Educational Context

Nevertheless, geographically located in the Middle East and institutionally closer to the global North, Turkey provides a unique case for exploring the value of evaluation in decision-making contexts. While the global North and the global South have inherited distinct features of evaluation in line with their distinct cultures of governmental decision-making, Turkey may be the testing ground for illuminating future directions of the field of evaluation in middle income country contexts.

Given evaluation’s significance, a concerted effort by many global Northern institutions and evaluators to build evaluation systems and practice in developing countries contributed to the expansion of the field of evaluation in contexts outside of global North. Numerous sessions, workshops, and conferences have been organized to build evaluation capacity in developing country governments, and many national evaluation organizations and associations have been established (Mertens & Russon, 2000).  EvalPartners, an international evaluation partnership initiative to strengthen civil society evaluation capacities to influence public policy based on evidence, attempted to map existing Voluntary Organizations for Professional Evaluation (VOPEs) around the world and found some information on a total of 158 VOPEs, out of which 135 are at national level, while 23 are at regional and international levels (e-mail communication, Segone, January 2013).  Some LMICs have established government-wide evaluation systems to improve their public programs and policies (e.g., Brazil, Korea, Mexico, etc.) (see UNDP, 2011).  Most recently, an emerging interest in developing evaluation as a profession in developing countries beyond development assistance has evolved (Carden, 2010).  As a result, the field of evaluation in the twenty-first century is characterized by its international and cross-cultural expansion (Patton, 2010).

In the most thorough study to date on evaluation cultures across twenty-one countries, Furubo, Rist and Sandahl (2002) recognized that evaluation approaches and models were disseminated from the larger aid organizations and added, “Latecomers have adopted these ideas, perhaps to show that they also subscribe to the modern and rational public management school of thought.  But the conclusion here is that adherence to these ideas in most cases has been mainly lip service” (p. 17).  There is a growing body of research investigating the ways to increase country ownership of evaluation processes and findings, but relatively little attention has been given to an equally important topic: how can Northern-based evaluation capacity building activities become a part of national decision making beyond development assistance? Capacity building does not guarantee that evaluation will become a routine part of daily decision-making processes (Sanders, 2002).  While Bamberger (1991) calls the donor imposition in the field of evaluation “cultural imperialism” (p. 337), Picciotto (2007) describes it as “business-as-usual” whereby resources to enhance evaluation capacity at the country level remain embedded in donor agencies; thus, donors’ imposition for one-sided accountability continues (p. 512).

This brief account of evaluation history in low and middle-income countries is informative for Turkish case as well. Historically, international donors’ evaluations of educational development programs have largely informed and influenced the evolution of evaluation systems (or lack thereof) in Turkey whereby the country mostly measured its performance on educational programs against donors’ needs based on donor criteria (e.g., USAID, 2001; OECD, 2005; World Bank, 2011; UNDP, 2011).  This poses a challenge for the evolution of evaluation systems and practice in Turkey because as some scholars argue that the dominance of northern-based institutions’ values and priorities might disable learning from evaluation for in-country decision-making (Hay, 2010; Conlin & Stirrat, 2008). Indeed, evaluations of donor-led educational programs might have led Turkey to utilize program evaluation that checks and monitors (audit review) rather than evaluation that seeks and improves programs and policies (formative inquiry) (see Wadsworth, 2001; Gasper, 2000).

Nevertheless, the nature of Turkey’s involvement with Northern-based aid institutions is changing due to Turkey’s increasing economic and political power in its region. Turkey has been a member of Organization for Co-operation in Economy and Development (OECD) since 1961; associated with the European Economic Community (EEC) since 1963; a Europen Union candidate since 2005; ranked among the 20 largest economies of the world in 2012 (CIA Factbook, 2012); and ranked at the 38th place in the 2012 World Competitiveness Scoreboard. The country plays a pre-eminent role in its politically volatile region (Ozturk, 2002).  In addition, once an only aid recipient, Turkey is now an emerging donor. “In 2010, Turkish net ODA (Official Development Assistance) reached USD 967 million, an increase of 24.8% over 2009 in real terms” (Atwood, 2012, para.5).  Thus, the calls for improving national educational policies and programs to compete in the global knowledge economy have rightfully increased.

Indeed, the historical development of evaluation culture in Korea and Brazil suggests the potential for utilizing program evaluation as a decision-making tool in Turkey to provide useful information about programs’ effectiveness in improving education outcomes.  With the launch of “Government for People” in 1998 as a response to severe economic crisis in Asia, Korea has developed government-wide evaluation systems to create and implement national reform packages based on national needs and priorities (Lee, 2002).  Despite the insufficient number of evaluators, Korea is today conducting several major evaluations, ranging from evaluations of ministries’ major programs and policies to meta-evaluations of each institution’s policy making and evaluation capacity (Furubo, Rist, & Sandahl, 2002).  Similarly, the evaluation field in Brazil has grown dramatically in recent years with 453 post-graduate evaluation courses and a 90% increase in publicity on government evaluations, fostering better programming and budgeting (UNDP, 2011).  Although the association between increased evaluation activities and better development outcomes is not empirically documented, anecdotal evidence suggests a positive relationship (Segone, 2008, 2009).  Turkey’s Ninth National Development Plan (2007 – 2013) also praised social and economic developments taking place in Korea and Brazil and argued that their influence in international decisions will considerably increase in the coming decades (Ministry of Development, 2006).

In contrast to Korea and Brazil, little is known about the implementation and impact of many educational policies, programs, and projects in Turkey, although the continuous improvement of educational practices in Turkey is of the utmost importance to the country’s long-term aspirations (Education Reform Initiative, 2009; Erguder, 2013).  The Ninth Development Plan (2007–2013) envisions Turkey as an information society that will assume a more competitive, global role and complete her coherence with the European Union (Ministry of Development, 2006).  The Plan underlined quality education services as prerequisite to realizing the country’s vision; hence, there was an increased public investment in education to 21.9% in 2012 (compared to 14% in the base year of 2006).  Although the Plan stipulates monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of all government services, it does not clarify how M&E information will be obtained and used, limiting our understanding of the role of evaluation in decision-making.  In the absence of evaluative information, MoNe’s internal research studies constitute one source of information for educational decision-making. Turkish scholars, however, consider these research activities inadequate because they have been unsystematic to have an impact on decision-making (Aydagul, 2008).

Indeed, there is a recent, emergent interest within civil society and MoNE in strengthening the connection between evaluation and decision making although little is known about the overall value of evaluation.  First and foremost, the salience of the lack of knowledge about the impact and shortcomings of educational policies and programs motivated the Istanbul Policy Center at Sabanci University, one of the leading research universities in Turkey, to launch the Education Reform Initiative (hereafter ERI) in 2003.  ERI aims to improve educational decision making and cultivate a new policy-making culture in the country through research, advocacy, and training (see http://erg.sabanciuniv.edu/en/educationreforminitiative).  This initiative is based on the premise that “it is of critical importance that decisions are based on data and evaluation, and on a transparent and participatory interaction among the state, civil society organizations and citizens” (Education Reform Initiative, 2009, p. 6).  Thus, this initiative aims to facilitate a participatory, democratic public dialogue about educational policies and programs by bringing together representatives from civil society organizations, academia, schools, and public and private organizations.  The reform stipulates the importance of informed, evidence-based decision-making, best practices, and creative and transparent solutions for alleviating pressing educational problems.  The Reform hopes to influence decision makers’ priorities and practices in order to help Turkey achieve its long-term global aspirations by providing quality education for all (Educational Reform Initiative, 2010, 2011).  Yet the impact of this initiative in informing governmental decision-making is unknown to this date.

Another leading actor in bridging the gap between evaluative information and education policy is SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research) – a nonprofit, nonpartisan think-tank organization located in Ankara, Turkey. Unlike ERI, SETA covers a broad range of public policy issues from international security to energy, one of which concerns education. Similar to ERI, the Foundation too aims to produce accurate knowledge through research activities to better inform policy makers and the public at large (see http://setav.org/en). SETA seeks to adhere to both international standards of equity, rule of law, and justice, as well as national context and cultural contours underlying the Turkish political arena. The Foundation’s comprehensive report on National Education System in Turkey (Gur & Celik, 2009) outlines the most pressing educational issues in the country and provides potential policy solutions. Similar to ERI, despite widespread dissemination of their research findings, SETA’s influence on educational decisions is yet to be tested.

Parallel to ERI and SETA, a policy window of opportunity has opened within the Turkish government to utilize program evaluation as a decision-making tool in educational programming and decision-making.  In light of EU laws and regulations and in response to increasing calls for effective public administration, the Turkish National Grand Assembly enacted the Public Financial Management and Control Law (PFMC) No. 5018 in 2003 and required every public institution—ministries and public universities—to prepare and implement a strategic plan to improve administrative performance (Ministry of Finance, 2006).  This increased emphasis on accountability in government attempts to link performance measurement to budgeting decisions.  As a result, MoNE created a strategic plan as a tool to design, implement, and improve its institutional goals, principles, policies, and programs.  The Ministry’s first and only strategic plan introduced monitoring and evaluation as a must to improve organizational learning and strengthen accountability (Turk, Yalcin, & Unsal, 2006).  Institutional objective No 17.4 of this strategic plan clearly indicates that the Ministry needs to build institution-wide monitoring and evaluation systems and practice to improve strategic planning and the decision-making process (MoNE Activity Report, 2012, p. 20).  Since it was a new construct for Turkish public administration, Turk, Yalcin, and Unsal (2006) conducted a survey study with 134 senior officers at the Ministry to understand their perceptions and opinions about the feasibility of strategic planning. Almost half of the study participants indicated that they did not have enough knowledge about the process of strategic planning.  Yet, they believed that strategic planning would improve institutional learning and management, contributing to the betterment of educational policies and programs.  Despite the common belief about the usefulness and value of strategic planning, the Ministry’s Activity Report (2012) revealed that the tools and mechanisms to assess the achievement of educational targets did not go beyond performance-based budgeting.

Following the spirit of PMFC, MoNE has undergone a serious institutional restructuring thanks to a statutory decree No. 652 issued during the era of former Minister Omer Dincer, who is also known as the master mind of this dramatic change. The decree envisioned a less bureaucratic Ministry to enable smoother, faster, and effective policy-making process. The resulting new structure now houses only 17 general directorates – as opposed to 32 previously – whose roles and responsibilities have been clarified to reduce overlap and double dipping in policy process. Within this new structure, MoNE now has Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) units under almost each directorate that originally aims to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of educational activities undertaken by the Ministry. Although the long-term impact of the decree on the fate of educational policies is perceived to be significant (Dincer, Personal communication, October 3, 2013), it is yet unknown if M&E units will aid or abet the evolution of evaluation practice in Turkish governmental life.

In addition to national context, Turkey’s bid for European Union (EU) membership is a significant, external force that informs and shapes educational policies and programs in Turkey since the Helsinki Summit in 2005.  The EU’s educational policies aim at strengthening mutual understanding and cultural ties between the people of Europe; cultivating educated, competitive European citizenry; and encouraging technological innovation and development (Barkcin, 2002).  The Lisbon Treaty (2000) underscores the EU’s overarching goal to become the most competitive player in global knowledge economy and invites all members and candidates to align their educational programs and policies accordingly.  To realize this aim, MoNE received a 3.7 million € Capacity Building Grant in 2006 to embrace new modalities of decision making so that Turkey’s educational system would better harmonize with the EU policies and regulations (European Commission, 2006).  The EU’s Capacity Building Support for the Ministry of National Education (2008-2010) created another opportunity for the Ministry to design and implement better policies and programs based on evaluative information.  The aim of this pre-accession assistance, totaling $4.9million, was to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Turkish education system by developing MoNe’s planning, implementation, and monitoring capacity so that educational policies and programs would be harmonized with the EU priorities.  One of the central objectives of the grant was to strengthen human resources capacity at the educational system.  This was done by a series of training courses and workshops on topics including data collection, analysis and protection, problem solving and decision making, performance management, monitoring and evaluation, and the use and interpretation of statistics in education (European Commission, 2006).  Still, information about if and how the Ministry has taken solid actions to enhance decision-making based on this pre-accession assistance is limited (Education Reform Initiative, 2011).

Additionally, the discourse in some government documents in the last decade (i.e., Government Action Plans, 2008, 2011; National Education Councils, 2006, 2010; National Development Plans, 2000, 2006) related to education also indicates that evaluation has gradually infused the decision making context from various sources with some capacity, yet the perceived utility and role of evaluation in educational programming is undocumented.

First of all, Government Action Plans provide the primary guidance for the design and implementation of all public programs and policies in Turkey.  Today, the need for a well-educated citizenry in Turkey is much more pronounced in policy discussions due to rapid economic growth as reflected in the current government’s agenda.  The most recent ones, namely the 60th and the 61st Government Action Plans (2008, 2011), emphasized the quality of education as a prerequisite to realize national goals, including full EU membership. To actualize this commitment, both plans assigned the biggest number of activities and allocated the highest public spending to MoNE.  The Ministry’s budget allocation from the national budget in 2011 was the highest in its history, totaling almost 35 million TL (approximately 20 million US$), and constituting 3.8% of GDP (Ministry of National Education, 2011).

In light of the Government Action Plans, the Ministry of Development (previously called the State Planning Organization) prepared national development plans to operationalize the overall vision for the public organizations, providing a foundation for their programs and policies for a specified period of time.  The plan was prepared by the participation of many government officials, academics, and experts from public and private sectors; approved by the Grand National Assembly, and supervised by the Ministry of Development.  The plans cover almost all sectors and industries (i.e., economy, transportation, health, education, culture, energy, welfare system, agriculture, and so on), providing “a long-term perspective and unity in objectives not only for the public sector, but also for the society” (Ninth Development Plan, 2006, p. 12).  Both the 8th and the 9th Development Plans attempted to secure and justify Turkey’s place in a rapidly changing, globalized world where the importance of knowledge, competition, efficiency, and effectiveness is underlined.  For example, the Eighth Development Plan (2001-2005) stated:

Countries adapting themselves to the faster change in the world, equipping their individuals with the capabilities required by this new environment, having access to, producing and using information shall have an impact and will be successful in the 21st century. (p. 244)

Both plans consider quality education among the priority areas as a prerequisite to enhance Turkey’s international competition.  To this end, the Ninth Development Plan envisions increasing the share of public investment in education to 21.9% in 2013 from 14% in 2006 (Ministry of Development, 2006).  The documents commonly mention access to and quality of education, vocational and technical schools, and curriculum issues, life-long learning, and administrative/structural issues as target areas and also the top challenges in Turkey.  Consequently, the Ninth Plan sets the educational targets as follows: schooling rate will increase to 50% in pre-school, 100% in primary and secondary school, and 33% in higher education.

To achieve these goals, both plans make some references to program evaluation activities and its cognate terms (i.e., performance measurement, quality assurance, monitoring).  The Eighth Development Plan demands that, “An effective monitoring and evaluation system at project level as well as national level shall be established for a prompt identification of changing conditions and bottlenecks incurred” in order to increase efficiency in public investments (p. 228).  The Ninth Development Plan has an explicit section on monitoring and evaluation activities–presumably the first time in a governmental document in Turkey. Implementation, Monitoring, Evaluation and Coordination section of the Plan (pp. 113-120) envisages informing the public about the progress in development.  This section also aims to harmonize Turkey’s evaluation activities with the EU norms.  Yet, the section does not specify how these evaluation activities will be performed based on what criteria and how the results will be used to improve educational practices.

Moreover, another influential force on educational programs and policies is the National Education Council. According to the MoNE’s by-laws, the National Education Council is the Ministry of National Education’s highest advisory body that informs and shapes the national educational policies and programs in Turkey. This advisory body embraces a national participatory process whereby elected politicians, appointed bureaucrats, academics, civil society organizations, school principals and teachers–sometimes students–gather together to discuss the past, present, and future of education in the country, identify areas of consideration in moving forward, and propose changes and action steps.  The Council does not have the legislative power; decisions are enforced if and when the Board of Education and Discipline under the Ministry check their appropriateness and applicability according to educational laws and regulations, and then present the Education Minister for approval.

The Council’s lack of legislative power ignited debate about inadequate implementation of the decisions taken by civic participation (Deniz, 2001).  Aydin (1996) conducted a survey with the participating members of the 15th National Education Council (1996) with regards to their opinions about the impact of Council decisions on education policies and programs.  A majority of the survey participants indicated that the influence of Council decisions on education policies is limited.  Survey participants noted that the Council’s place in the Ministry’s hierarchy should be strengthened for decisions to have a greater weight.  Yet, the Council has led to significant changes in the Turkish educational system since 1939. For example, the duration of compulsory basic education was raised to 8 years with the Law No: 4306 entered into force in 1997 (Deniz, 2001).

The Council decisions are important venues to explore the discourse around evaluation activities.  A few recommendations during the 16th National Education Council (1999) clearly stated that evaluation systems need to be established and used to improve the quality and the quantity of vocational and technical training based on changing context and needs.  Seven years later, the 17th National Education Council convened in 2006 with the participation of 850 elected and appointed members.  Unlike the 16th Council (1999), recommendations made during the 17th Council covered a variety of issues ranging from special education to testing and examination systems. Several recommendations touched upon the importance of evidence-based practices to improve educational quality and quantity. Additionally, some of the 17th Council’s (2006) recommendations specifically touched upon monitoring and assessment of educational practices.  In one case, the 17th Council recommended establishing accreditation systems to ensure educational quality in educational institutions.  Compared to the 16th and 17th Councils, the references to evidence-based practices, performance monitoring and evaluation were much more limited during the 18th Council (2010). Some recommendations made an explicit case about bringing national context and values to the foreground in improving the national education system in a globalized world.

In conclusion, current policy discourse around international competitiveness and the global knowledge economy highlights the significance of effective policies and programs in cultivating an educated and competitive citizenry in Turkey.  Especially the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of Development, and the National Education Councils all emphasize addressing today’s educational challenges with improved planning, programming, and monitoring.  Although the need for improved decision making has implicitly pointed to the need for evaluation systems in the country, the perceived value of evaluation as a decision-making tool from the primary Turkish stakeholders’ perspectives has not been explored yet.

Despite these recent developments in the Turkish educational decision arena, few studies have explored the value of program evaluation as a decision-making tool in Turkey.  Although there is considerable anecdotal evidence about how some low and middle income countries utilize program evaluation for their governmental decisions, systematic studies of this phenomenon for Turkey are undocumented.  Indeed, during the last two decades, the evaluation community has witnessed a dramatic growth of the field in contexts outside of the global North (Chelimsky & Shadish, 1997).  Many Western evaluation scholars had projected the global expansion of the practice, arguing that evaluations are essential in any society (Patton, 2010; Fitzpatrick, Sanders, & Worthen, 2004).  Some scholars and practitioners probed the meaning and boundaries of evaluation systems and practice in low and middle countries (LMICs) (Carden & Alkin, 2011; Furubo, Rist, & Sandahl, 2002; Russon & Russon, 2000).  Yet evaluation remains as a fairly new construct in many LMICs, including Turkey, which requires further investigation into the perceived utility of program evaluation within the developing country decision-making context from the country stakeholders’ perspective.

Conclusion: Significance of Evaluation for Turkish Educational Decision Making

This article argues that evaluations will significantly contribute to educational policy making in Turkey.  Despite many education reforms Turkey has passed over the past few decades, educational policies and programs have largely fallen short of remedying educational problems. Certainly there are numerous reasons and determinants of why the education reforms and program are not working, but one challenge that prevents Turkey from effectively addressing educational problems is the gap in the base of knowledge about which policies work best to improve educational programs for whom and under what circumstances (see Yasar, 1998; Court & Young, 2004).  This is a significant problem because decisions based on inadequate information about policies’ merit may lead to poor use of social resources (Weiss, 1998).  Because the return on educational investment is economically large (i.e., welfare savings, reduction in poverty rates, increased work-life earnings, less crime) (Yeh, 2009; U.S. Census Bureau, 2002), it is worthwhile to provide decision makers with systematic information as to whether the various educational policies are worth the money they cost, whether they should be continued, and how they can be improved to meet the societal needs (Bamberger, Rugh, & Mabry, 2012).

In addition, this article is the first modest step to expand the knowledge base surrounding the efforts to build evaluation systems and practice in low and middle-income countries to improve national decision-making.  Thus far, only a few studies have addressed the value of evaluation systems and practice in decision-making contexts from the developing country perspective.  As noted by Hay (2010): “Evaluation research, innovation, and leadership should not remain exclusive to northern based institutions. We need to examine how evaluation research is developing and the role southern evaluators and organizations are playing in this process” (p. 226).  Thus, without a clear understanding of how a developing country views the value of program evaluation as a decision-making tool to improve its educational practices, the field lacks future directions about how to contribute to social betterment worldwide. This paper argues that, located between the global North and the global South, Turkey could offer a challenging case to investigate this phenomenon.

More broadly, Turkey seems to follow an expected pattern to evolve national evaluation systems and practice similar to those of other middle-income countries, although it has significantly lagged behind in kicking off the process. After the introduction of evaluation as a decision-making tool by Northern-based and created aid organizations – such that OECD invited Turkey to prepare a Turkish evaluation glossary (see Kocaman & Guven, 2008), the country appears to look for its own niche in the field of evaluation, which begs for an empirical study for refining theoretical and practical alternatives (Cakici, 2014, in preparation). The recent ministerial, governmental, and intergovernmental initiatives discussed earlier suggest that evaluation’s time has come to improve educational policies in Turkey. Yet, there is a gap in our knowledge as to who will conduct national evaluations of policies how and to what end. These questions will further be analyzed in the following papers in ResearchTurkey’s Evaluation Series.

Hanife Çakıcı, Project Assistant, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey)

Please cite this publication as follows:
Çakıcı, Hanife (January, 2014), “The Status and Future of Evaluation in  Turkish Educational Decision Making: An Introduction ”, Vol. III, Issue 1, pp.6-24, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, Research Turkey. (http://researchturkey.org/dev/?p=4636)

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Turkey’s EU bid: Losing Friends and Trouble Ahead

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Turkey’s EU bid: Losing Friends and Trouble Ahead

Turkey’s EU bid: Losing Friends and Trouble Ahead

Introduction: the European Parliament’s
2013 Resolution on Turkey

On March 12th, the European Parliament (EP) adopted its yearly Resolution on Turkey during its monthly plenary session.[i] This non-binding document – which contains the views of the EP concerning Turkey’s EU bid – was passed by an overwhelming majority of 475 votes in favour, while 153 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) voted against and 43 abstained.[ii]

In the Resolution – a response to the European Commission’s 2013 Progress Report on Turkey – the EP reaffirms Turkey’s value as a strategic partner with regard to economy and trade, energy and migration. It particularly welcomes Turkey’s great efforts in harbouring the influx of Syrian refugees, as well as its pro-active role in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its decisions to establish a national Ombudsman office and sign a Readmission Agreement.

Nevertheless, it can be regarded as the most critical, sharpest Resolution up to date. The EP openly started to doubt Turkey’s commitment to democracy and the rule of law and its abilities to adhere to the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ – i.e. the basic political and economic criteria which allow a country to apply for EU membership. In this regard, the EP implicitly expressed its concerns for the viability of Turkey’s EU membership by criticising the developments which have occurred in Turkey over the past months:

  • the “heavy-handed” response by Turkish authorities and resulting loss of life following the Gezi Park protests during June 2013;
  • the “excessively wide” scope of the Ergenekon coup case and related procedural shortcomings;
  • the recent decisions by the Turkish government to intervene directly into an ongoing corruption investigation by making the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) subordinate to the Minister of Justice and sack or replace thousands of police officials following a HSYK-ordered, surprise graft probe into aides of long-standing Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in December 2013;
  • the tightening of Turkey’s Internet Regulation in February 2014, following the appearance of incriminating audio footage on the Internet indicating direct engagement by Erdoğan, his family and aides in corruption and influencing the media. The Internet Regulation gives Turkish authorities the opportunity to block webpages without a prior court order;
  • the “ongoing systematic profiling” of civil servants, the police and security forces by the authorities on the basis of religious, ethnic and political affiliations;
  • the increasing risk of undue intrusion by Turkish authorities into citizen’s lives following  recent statements on the number of children women should have, on mixed-sex student residences and on the selling of alcohol;
  • the limited independence of Turkish media outlets, who frequently engage in self-censorship and according to the leaked audio footage face direct interference by Turkey’s political brass. Consequentially, Turkey currently ranks 154th out of 179 in Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index.[iii]

The content and tone of the Resolution is exemplary for the atmosphere in the European Parliament and perhaps wider political circles in ‘Brussels’. EU policy-makers increasingly seem tired of Turkey’s current political leadership and its seeming inability and/ or unwillingness to reform. For instance, Andrew Duff, a British Liberal MEP – and once staunch supporter of Turkey’s EU bid – tweeted after the debate on the Resolution “Most pessimistic EP debate I can recall about Turkey”, while MEP Alexander Graf Lambsdorff called for a halt in Turkey’s EU accession negotiations “Relations between Turkey and the EU have gotten worse and this process needs to be deferred until Turkey cleans up its act.”[iv] Moreover, European Commissioner for Enlargement Štefan Füle aptly tweeted that the “(…) debate in the EP showed that Turkey is losing its supporters. Reflection and follow-up in Ankara needed to reverse this trend.”[v]

Do the Views of the European Parliament Matter?

Of course, one can rightfully ask: does it actually matter, this Resolution, which signals a loss of support in the European Parliament? After all, the European Parliament only plays a limited role in the EU Enlargement process, exercising its democratic right of oversight by issuing non-binding, own-initiative Resolutions. Moreover, the European Parliament itself is by no means uncontested: it has been struggling with its democratic legitimacy since its conception in 1979.

Yet, the EP’s views clearly do matter. The European Parliament – although recently labelled undemocratic and illegitimate by Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan[vi] – is the only EU Institution relatively open and conducive to Turkish views and stakeholders. The European Parliament traditionally has been a great adversary of Turkey – primarily due to the presence of scores of MEPs sceptical towards Turkey’s EU bid for various reasons – yet simultaneously it has been its greatest friend. The EP namely hosts a Friends of Turkey Intergroup, organises Turkey-related events on a frequent basis while seating various MEPs of Turkish descent. Disregarding it would thus be to shoot in one’s own foot.

At least equally important in this regard is that the views of the EP – although non-binding – influence the EU policy debate on Turkey while simultaneously providing a platform for Brussels’ political top-brass to voice its sentiments, intentions and expectations and relatively uninhibited manner.

What Will Happen at EU Level: Two Scenarios

So what does this mean? What can we expect from ‘Brussels’ in the coming months with regard to Turkey’s EU bid? Without doubt, the current events have marked an end to a period of careful optimism which came into being mid-2013 (following a relatively mild European Commission 2013 Progress Report; the restart of Turkey’s EU negotiation process by opening a chapter on regional policy and; the conclusion of a Readmission Agreement in turn for a roadmap towards EU visa exemption for Turkish citizens). What is clear as well is that, even though Turkey appears to be struggling with the Copenhagen Criteria, the EU will most probably not decide to end Turkey’s EU bid: the costs are simply too high to jeopardise relations with Turkey – a strategic partner in terms of economy and trade, energy, migration and security.

Instead, two possible scenarios exist. The first scenario holds that Turkey EU negotiations will continue. In view of recent events in Turkey, the European Union could decide to open negotiation Chapters 23 and 24 on judiciary and fundamental rights and justice and home affairs respectively. Such a scenario is currently preferred by the European Parliament as well as the European Commission, whom regard intensified negotiations a crucial element to prevent Turkey from drifting from the EU. Additionally, Turkish authorities themselves have consistently called for opening of additional chapters (up to this date, Turkey’s EU bid has been exceptionally slow with thirteen out of 35 negotiation chapters currently opened and only one chapter provisionally finalised).

The second scenario is preferred by various EU Member States. Under such a scenario – which clearly would be reminiscent to three year hiatus in accession negotiations before June 2013 – the EU would decide to freeze Turkey’s EU bid by abstaining from opening additional negotiation chapters. When Commissioner Füle argued to open Chapter 23 and 24, Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Dimitrios Kourkoulas – representing the current EU Presidency and speaking on behalf of the EU Member States – was quick to rebuke. Kourkoulas stated that opening negotiation chapters – which is often regarded as an encouraging gesture of good will – is not an “end itself”, while noting that it should be the Erdoğan Administration that should take the lead in furthering Turkey’s EU bid: “Turkey knows what it must do (…) the pace of negotiations will depend on Turkey’s ability and willingness to go forward and if we are to move then certain reforms will have to be undertaken.”[vii]

Looking Forward: Losing Friends
and Trouble Up-Ahead

Which scenario will turn out to be reality depends on various factors such as the Turkish authorities’ response to the ongoing graft probe and the recent mass-demonstrations following the death of Berkin Elvan – a fifteen year old boy who died after 269 days of coma resulting from an injury sustained by a tear gas canister during last year’s Gezi Park protests. Moreover, election outcomes will shape Turkey-EU dynamics. 2014 is an electoral ‘super year’ for Turkey, with local, national and presidential elections taking place. Despite increasing criticism of corruption, power abuse and nepotism, there are no clear indications that Erdoğan and his Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) will prove unable to consolidate their power. At EU level, elections for the European Parliament will take place in May. Taking into account the disgruntlement that exists with the EU among large parts of the European populace, expectation are that radical-left and right and non-aligned parties will win significantly.[viii] Logically, an increase in power Eurosceptic parties will not do any good to EU enlargement in general, while it might also result in a decrease in the number of ‘Friends of Turkey’ present in the EP.

One thing is crystal clear: either scenario would mean trouble for the Erdoğan Administration. Under the first scenario – although sustaining the impression that Turkey’s EU bid is moving forward – the EU would tighten the screws on the Erdoğan Administration by pressuring it to implement reforms which are in line with EU judicial and democratic standards. In this respect, Chapter 23 and 24 would constitute clear examples of the EU’s transformative power: they would be ‘sticks’ that the EU could use to align Turkey. The second scenario would constitute a return to square one, to the situation that existed prior to June 2013. Given the current volatility of the Turkish economy and the continued importance of the EU for Turkey (the EU is Turkey’s biggest trading and investment partner) this scenario would not be desirable for either party involved, yet the least for Turkey.

The EP’s Resolution – at first instance seemingly unimportant – thus signals that Turkey might be losing its remaining supporters in ‘Brussels’. Moreover, it might also be a prelude for a harsher EU stance on Erdoğan’s Turkey, which undoubtedly will adversely affect Turkey’s EU bid and annul the careful progress made over the past year. Therefore, the Erdoğan Administration should thread carefully, ensuring that Turkey does not lose even more friends on its way towards political consolidation.

Gerben K. Wedekind, Brussels Representative, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (Research Turkey)  

Please cite this publication as follows:

Wedekind, Gerben K. (March, 2014), “Turkey’s EU bid: Losing Friends and Trouble Ahead”, Vol. III, Issue 3, pp.19-23, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London, Research Turkey. (http://researchturkey.org/?p=5541)

End Notes


[i] European Parliament. (2014). TEXTS ADOPTED PART III at the sitting of Wednesday 12 March 2014. Pp. 328-338. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+20140312+SIT-03+DOC+WORD+V0//EN&language=EN. (16 March 2014)

[ii] European Parliament. (2014). Turkey: credible commitment and strong democratic foundations needed, MEPs say. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140307IPR38301/html/Turkey-credible-commitment-and-strong-democratic-foundations-needed-MEPs-say. (16 March 2014)

[iii] Reporters without Borders (2014). 2013 World Press Freedom Index: Dashed Hopes After Spring. Available at: http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html. (16 March 2014)

[iv] EUobserver. (2014). Boy’s death spurs anti-Erdogan feeling in EU parliament. Available at: http://euobserver.com/foreign/123435. (16 March 2014)

[v] Today’s Zaman. (2014). Turkey is losing supporters in EU, Füle says. Available at: http://todayszaman.com/news-341921-turkey-is-losing-supporters-in-eu-fule-says.html (16 March 2014)

[vi] Hurriyet Daily News. (2013). I don’t recognize European Parliament decision, Turkish PM Erdoğan says. Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/i-dont-recognize-european-parliament-decision-turkish-pm-erdogan-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=48730&NewsCatID=338 (16 March 2014)

[vii]EUobserver. (2014). Boy’s death spurs anti-Erdogan feeling in EU parliament. Available at: http://euobserver.com/foreign/123435. (16 March 2014)

[viii] Pollwatch. (2014). What the polls say. Available at: http://www.pollwatch2014.eu/ (16 March 2014)