{"id":7442,"date":"2013-04-14T23:29:21","date_gmt":"2013-04-14T20:29:21","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/?p=7442"},"modified":"2022-06-06T16:00:30","modified_gmt":"2022-06-06T13:00:30","slug":"two-tales-in-post-crisis-adjustment-argentina-and-turkey","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/two-tales-in-post-crisis-adjustment-argentina-and-turkey\/","title":{"rendered":"Kriz Sonras\u0131 Toparlanma S\u00fcrecinin \u0130ki \u00d6yk\u00fcs\u00fc: Arjantin ve T\u00fcrkiye"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><!--:en--><\/p>\n<h2>Kriz Sonras\u0131 Toparlanma S\u00fcrecinin \u0130ki \u00d6yk\u00fcs\u00fc:<br \/>\nArjantin ve T\u00fcrkiye<\/h2>\n<p><b>Giri\u015f<\/b><\/p>\n<p>\u0130ki <i>Latin Amerika tarz\u0131<\/i> ekonomi, Arjantin ve T\u00fcrkiye, yak\u0131n zamana dek benzer bir tarihi payla\u015ft\u0131lar. Bu \u201cbenzerlik\u201d, uzun s\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015f bir ithalat ikameci sanayile\u015fme (\u0130\u0130S) tarihi ile i\u00e7e d\u00f6n\u00fck ve devlet taraf\u0131ndan y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclen kalk\u0131nma yollar\u0131n\u0131 da i\u00e7eriyor. \u0130ki ekonomi de kendi ithalat ikameci sanayile\u015fme s\u00fcre\u00e7lerinde y\u00fcksek b\u00fcy\u00fcme rakamlar\u0131 elde ederken 1970lerde bu yolla elde edilecek b\u00fcy\u00fcmenin s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131na ula\u015ft\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 fark ettiler. (Arjantin bunu T\u00fcrkiye\u2019den belki be\u015f y\u0131l \u00f6nce fark etti.)<\/p>\n<p>Ayr\u0131ca iki \u00fclke de <i>kay\u0131p bir on y\u0131l<\/i> ya\u015fad\u0131lar; Arjantin 1980lerde, T\u00fcrkiye ise 1990larda. \u0130ki \u00fclke i\u00e7in de sonras\u0131ndaki d\u00f6nem canl\u0131 bir reform d\u00f6nemiydi. \u0130ki \u00fclke de IMF \u00f6nc\u00fcl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcndeki d\u00f6viz kuru sabitlenmesi maceras\u0131na dayanan deflasyon program\u0131n\u0131 takip ederken, 2001\u2019de neredeyse birebir benzer finansal krizler ya\u015fad\u0131lar. Azalan gayri safi yurti\u00e7i h\u00e2s\u0131la ve ani d\u00f6viz kuru de\u011fer kayb\u0131 d\u00fczenlemelerinin y\u00fck\u00fc, banka iflaslar\u0131 ve i\u015fsizli\u011fin ciddi \u015fekilde art\u0131\u015f\u0131 iki \u00fclkede de kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131r\u0131labilir boyutlardayd\u0131. Ancak iki \u00fclke de bundan sonra de\u011fi\u015fik toparlanma s\u00fcre\u00e7leri takip ettiler: T\u00fcrkiye IMF\u2019nin g\u00f6zetimi alt\u0131nda kat\u0131 ve al\u0131\u015f\u0131lagelmi\u015f bir toparlanma program\u0131n\u0131 takip ederken, Arjantin iflas etti\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klayarak, g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir yoksulluk kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 ve i\u015f kazand\u0131rma odakl\u0131, ola\u011fand\u0131\u015f\u0131 tabir edilen bir toparlanma s\u00fcrecini tercih etmek suretiyle kendi yolunu \u00e7izdi.<\/p>\n<p>Bu farkl\u0131la\u015fmadan neredeyse on y\u0131l sonras\u0131nda, New York federal b\u00f6lge mahkemesinin Arjantin h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin \u201cakbaba fonu\u201d Elliott Capital Management\u2019a 1,3 milyar dolar \u00f6demesi gerekti\u011fiyle ilgili karar\u0131yla birlikte, Arjantin bir kez daha uluslararas\u0131 bas\u0131nda yer ald\u0131. Kararda ayn\u0131 zamanda \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc \u015fah\u0131slar\u0131n Arjantin\u2019in borcunu yeniden yap\u0131land\u0131rma \u00e7abalar\u0131na yard\u0131m\u0131 yasaklayan bir beyan da yer ald\u0131.<\/p>\n<p><b>Neden \u015fimdi?<\/b><\/p>\n<p>Ghosh and Vernengo<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20150604192235\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/erincyeldanyayina\/Argentina%20Turkey.RT2013_TR.son.docx#_ftn1\">[1]<\/a>, ba\u015fka sebeplerin yan\u0131nda, ana sebebi \u015fu \u015fekilde a\u00e7\u0131kl\u0131yorlar: <i>Arjantin \u00f6rne\u011fi iflastan sonra da bir hayat oldu\u011funu ve kemer s\u0131kma politikalar\u0131n\u0131n krizden \u00e7\u0131kmak i\u00e7in en iyi yol olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6steriyor.<\/i><\/p>\n<p><b>Kriz Sonras\u0131 Makroekonomik Kan\u0131tlar<\/b><\/p>\n<p>2001 krizini takip eden g\u00fcnlerde, Arjantin iflas\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klay\u0131p bor\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6deyemeyece\u011fini belirterek, i\u015f yaratma yanl\u0131s\u0131 ve yoksulluk kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 olan al\u0131\u015f\u0131lmad\u0131k bir kriz sonras\u0131 toparlanma s\u00fcrecini ba\u015flatt\u0131. T\u00fcrkiye ise tam tersine kriz sonras\u0131 d\u00f6nemde neoliberal kemer s\u0131kma politikalar\u0131n\u0131n mant\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 takip etti: y\u00fcksek faiz oranlar\u0131 k\u0131sa s\u00fcreli sermaye giri\u015fini sa\u011flad\u0131, d\u00f6vizin g\u00f6receli \u00e7oklu\u011fu yerel para birimi <i>Lira<\/i>\u2019n\u0131n reel olarak de\u011ferlenmesine sebep oldu. Ucuz d\u00f6viz kuru hem t\u00fcketimde hem de yat\u0131r\u0131m mallar\u0131nda ithalat patlamas\u0131na yol a\u00e7t\u0131. T\u00fcrkiye \u00f6zelinde sonu\u00e7larsa spek\u00fclasyonlar\u0131n sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fcme ortam\u0131nda kamu sekt\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcn daralmas\u0131 ile bunu takiben, acilen kamusal fonlara ihtiya\u00e7 duyan e\u011fitim ve sa\u011fl\u0131k altyap\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n k\u00f6t\u00fcle\u015fmesi oldu. Ayr\u0131ca, yerel sanayi, ithalata ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 artt\u0131rd\u0131k\u00e7a yerel i\u015fsizlik seviyesi \u00fczerinde zararl\u0131 sonu\u00e7lar\u0131 olan sermaye a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131kl\u0131 yabanc\u0131 teknolojilere kendini uyarlamak zorunda kald\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>Kriz sonras\u0131 farkl\u0131la\u015fan makroekonomik g\u00f6stergeler a\u015fa\u011f\u0131daki Tablo1\u2019de yer al\u0131yor. E\u011fer ba\u015fl\u0131klara g\u00f6z atacak olursak:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Krizden sonra iki \u00fclke de 2008 y\u0131l\u0131na dek, Arjantin\u2019in T\u00fcrkiye\u2019yi az farkla ge\u00e7ti\u011fi, h\u0131zl\u0131 bir b\u00fcy\u00fcme d\u00f6nemine girdiler. Ancak, T\u00fcrkiye <i>reel dolar kurunda<\/i> hesaplan\u0131nca <i>ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na<\/i> d\u00fc\u015fen milli gelirde neredeyse \u00fc\u00e7 kat\u0131 art\u0131\u015f sa\u011flad\u0131. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na d\u00fc\u015fen GSY\u0130H\u2019si 2000-2003 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131ndaki 3,548$\u2019dan 2010-2011\u2019de 10,256$\u2019a y\u00fckseldi. Yine de, tablonun son sat\u0131r\u0131na yak\u0131ndan bakmak bu say\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131ndaki gizemi ortadan kald\u0131r\u0131yor: T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin para birimi bu d\u00f6nem i\u00e7inde daha \u00f6nce benzeri g\u00f6r\u00fclmemi\u015f \u015fekilde %50 de\u011fer kazand\u0131. Sat\u0131n alma g\u00fcc\u00fc paritesi \u00fczerinden hesapland\u0131\u011f\u0131nda 2001 y\u0131l\u0131na g\u00f6re T\u00fcrk liras\u0131n\u0131n %53 de\u011fer kazanmas\u0131 T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin GSY\u0130H\u2019sinin dolar kuru \u00fczerinden kazan\u00e7 elde etmesini sa\u011fl\u0131yor. Bu de\u011ferlenmenin hesaplarda d\u00fczeltilmesi ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na d\u00fc\u015fen GSY\u0130H\u2019yi 5,000$ d\u00fczeyine geri indiriyor.<\/li>\n<li>\u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda yat\u0131r\u0131m performans\u0131 belirgin \u015fekilde farkl\u0131la\u015ft\u0131: Arjantin yat\u0131r\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n GSMH\u2019deki pay\u0131n\u0131 neredeyse iki kat\u0131na \u00e7\u0131kararak %15\u2019ten %23.6\u2019ya getirirken, T\u00fcrk yat\u0131r\u0131m \u00e7abalar\u0131 2000lerden beri a\u015fa\u011f\u0131 yukar\u0131 sabit kald\u0131.<\/li>\n<li>Maliye dengeleri ku\u015fkusuz bu iki <i>Latinos<\/i> hakk\u0131nda en \u00e7ok tart\u0131\u015f\u0131lan konuydu. T\u00fcrkiye 2008\/09 krizinin patlak vermesinden \u00f6nce mali a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 GSY\u0130H\u2019n\u0131n %10\u2019undan \u201cMaastricht seviyesine\u201d indirmekle b\u00fcy\u00fck bir ba\u015far\u0131ya imza att\u0131. Ayn\u0131 d\u00f6nemde, h\u0131zl\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fcme ve kontroll\u00fc mali harcamalar\u0131yla Arjantin yerel bor\u00e7lanma y\u00fck\u00fcn\u00fc %82.7\u2019den bunun yar\u0131s\u0131na azaltmay\u0131 ba\u015fard\u0131. T\u00fcrkiye GSY\u0130H\u2019nin %4,5\u2019i seviyesinde y\u00fcksek b\u00fct\u00e7e fazlal\u0131\u011f\u0131 tutmak pahas\u0131na borcunu g\u00f6receli olarak d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck tuttu.<\/li>\n<li>Arjantin kriz sonras\u0131 toparlanma s\u00fcrecinin en g\u00f6zle g\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcr ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131 2011 y\u0131l\u0131nda i\u015fsizlik oran\u0131n\u0131 %20\u2019lerden %7\u2019ye indirebilmi\u015f olmas\u0131d\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019de ise <i>i\u015fsiz b\u00fcy\u00fcme<\/i>\u015feklinde nitelendirilen modele uygun olarak i\u015fsizlikle beraber %10 seviyesinde b\u00fcy\u00fcme oran\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc.<\/li>\n<li>T\u00fcrkiye 31 milyar dolardan 2011\u2019de 125 milyar dolar seviyesine \u00e7\u0131kan h\u0131zl\u0131 ihracat\u0131yla beraber daha fazla yurt d\u0131\u015f\u0131na a\u00e7\u0131lma \u00e7abas\u0131 i\u00e7ine girdi. \u0130thalata artan ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131k T\u00fcrk d\u0131\u015f denge hesaplar\u0131n\u0131n en kritik taraf\u0131yd\u0131. Sonu\u00e7 olarak, T\u00fcrkiye cari i\u015flemler dengesinde kendi aleyhine b\u00fcy\u00fcyen bir a\u00e7\u0131kla kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya kald\u0131. Arjantin pozitif art\u0131 de\u011feri korurken, T\u00fcrk cari i\u015flemler a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131 GSY\u0130H\u2019nin %10\u2019una ula\u015ft\u0131. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla Arjantin d\u0131\u015f bor\u00e7lanmaya ba\u011fl\u0131 riskini azalt\u0131rken T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin toplam d\u0131\u015f borcu dolar \u00fczerinden hesaplan\u0131nca \u00fc\u00e7 kat artm\u0131\u015f oldu. GSY\u0130H\u2019ye oranlan\u0131rsa T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin bu d\u00f6nemde d\u0131\u015f bor\u00e7lanma oran\u0131n\u0131 y\u00fczde on azaltm\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131 ger\u00e7e\u011fi, yukar\u0131da bahsetti\u011fimiz GSY\u0130H\u2019nin dolar \u00fczerinden hesaplanmas\u0131yla ilintili olarak yerel para biriminin de\u011ferleni\u015fiyle a\u00e7\u0131klanabilir.<\/li>\n<li>\u0130ki \u00fclkede de enflasyonla sava\u015f performans\u0131 en tart\u0131\u015fmal\u0131 konudur. Arjantin resmi olarak enflasyonu %10 seviyesinde tutarken, T\u00fcrkiye enflasyonu hedeflenen %5 seviyesine indirmek i\u00e7in \u00e7aba g\u00f6stermektedir.<\/li>\n<li>Bu k\u0131sa a\u00e7\u0131klaman\u0131n giri\u015finde belirtildi\u011fi gibi Arjantin negatif reel faiz oranlar\u0131yla \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131rken T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin IMF tarz\u0131 kemer s\u0131kma programlar\u0131yla ko\u015fullanm\u0131\u015f kriz sonras\u0131 toparlanma s\u00fcrecinin ana dayana\u011f\u0131 sundu\u011fu y\u00fcksek reel arbitraj kazan\u0131m oranlar\u0131yd\u0131.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><b>Karar?<\/b><\/p>\n<p>Basit\u00e7e s\u00f6ylemek gerekirse, tek bir tarif yoktur; BAY(<i>ba\u015fka alternatif yok<\/i>)<\/p>\n<p>inan\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n s\u00f6ylemine kar\u015f\u0131 daha fazla <i>politika alan\u0131<\/i>na ihtiyac\u0131m\u0131z var.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><b>Profes\u00f6r Erin\u00e7 Yeldan, Dekan, \u0130ktisadi ve \u0130dari Bilimler Fak\u00fcltesi, Ya\u015far \u00dcniversitesi, \u0130zmir<\/b><\/p>\n<p>Makaleyi \u015fu \u015fekilde referans vererek kullanabilirsiniz:<\/p>\n<p>Yeldan, Erin\u00e7 (Nisan, 2013), \u201cKriz Sonras\u0131 Toparlanma S\u00fcrecinin \u0130ki \u00d6yk\u00fcs\u00fc: Arjantin ve T\u00fcrkiye\u201d, Cilt II, Say\u0131 2, s.22-24,\u00a0<em>T\u00fcrkiye Politika ve Ara\u015ft\u0131rma Merkezi (AnalizT\u00fcrkiye), Londra: AnalizT\u00fcrkiye<\/em><\/p>\n<p><!--:--><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Kriz Sonras\u0131 Toparlanma S\u00fcrecinin \u0130ki \u00d6yk\u00fcs\u00fc: Arjantin ve T\u00fcrkiye Giri\u015f \u0130ki Latin Amerika tarz\u0131 ekonomi, Arjantin ve T\u00fcrkiye, yak\u0131n zamana dek benzer bir tarihi payla\u015ft\u0131lar. Bu \u201cbenzerlik\u201d, uzun s\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015f bir ithalat ikameci sanayile\u015fme (\u0130\u0130S) tarihi ile i\u00e7e d\u00f6n\u00fck ve devlet taraf\u0131ndan y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclen kalk\u0131nma yollar\u0131n\u0131 da i\u00e7eriyor. \u0130ki ekonomi de kendi ithalat ikameci sanayile\u015fme s\u00fcre\u00e7lerinde y\u00fcksek [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":221,"featured_media":8734,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[280,301],"tags":[205,206,207],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7442"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/221"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7442"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7442\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8735,"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7442\/revisions\/8735"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8734"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7442"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7442"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7442"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}