{"id":7526,"date":"2012-06-18T21:42:30","date_gmt":"2012-06-18T18:42:30","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/the-present-and-future-of-the-g20-from-the-perspective-of-the-global-economy-and-turkey\/"},"modified":"2022-08-28T16:43:10","modified_gmt":"2022-08-28T13:43:10","slug":"the-present-and-future-of-the-g20-from-the-perspective-of-the-global-economy-and-turkey","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/the-present-and-future-of-the-g20-from-the-perspective-of-the-global-economy-and-turkey\/","title":{"rendered":"K\u00fcresel Ekonomi ve T\u00fcrkiye A\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan G20\u2019nin Bug\u00fcn\u00fc ve Gelece\u011fi"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><!--:en--><\/p>\n<p>2015 y\u0131l\u0131nda d\u00f6nem ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin \u00fcstlenmesi beklenen \u201c20\u2019ler Grubu\u201dnun (Group of Twenty, G20) liderleri 18-19 Haziran 2012\u2019de Meksika\u2019n\u0131n Los Cabos kentinde \u00a0(<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/g20mexico.org\/\">g20mexico.org<\/a>) bir araya gelecekler ve d\u00fcnya ekonomisindeki g\u00fcncel ve baz\u0131 uzun vadeli sorunlar\u0131, \u00f6nceki toplant\u0131lar\u0131n hedef ve sonu\u00e7lar\u0131na g\u00f6re belirlenen 2012 y\u0131l\u0131 g\u00fcndemi \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde tart\u0131\u015f\u0131p baz\u0131 \u00f6nemli kararlar almaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015facaklar. Normalde Eyl\u00fcl-Kas\u0131m aylar\u0131nda yap\u0131lmas\u0131 beklenen Meksika\u2019daki toplant\u0131n\u0131n, Fransa\u2019n\u0131n d\u00f6nem ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131nda (<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.g20-g8.com\/\">www.g20-g8.com<\/a>) ge\u00e7en y\u0131l 3-4 Kas\u0131m tarihlerinde yap\u0131lan Cannes zirvesinin \u00fczerinden sekiz ay bile ge\u00e7meden yap\u0131lacak olmas\u0131n\u0131n sebebi olarak, Meksika\u2019da Temmuz 2012\u2019de yap\u0131lacak se\u00e7imler g\u00f6steriliyor. Siyasi kayg\u0131larla d\u00f6rt ay kadar \u00f6ne al\u0131nan G20 liderler toplant\u0131s\u0131ndan sonra Meksika ev sahipli\u011findeki \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar asl\u0131nda bu y\u0131l Kas\u0131m ay\u0131na kadar s\u00fcrecek.<\/p>\n<div>\n<p>Peki ama, G20 \u00fclkeleri ne zamandan beri hangi g\u00fcndem konular\u0131 \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde aktif bi\u00e7imde bir araya gelmektedir? Yeterince etkili ve yararl\u0131 bir olu\u015fum mudur? 18-19 Haziran 2012\u2019de Meksika\u2019da bir araya gelecek G20 liderleri, ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 say\u0131labilecek bir nihai metin \u00fczerinde uzla\u015fabilecekler mi? Bu sonu\u00e7, nelere ba\u011fl\u0131d\u0131r? G20\u2019nin gelece\u011fi ad\u0131na karamsar veya iyimser olmam\u0131za yol a\u00e7acak hususlar neler olabilir? \u0130\u015fte bu de\u011ferlendirme notunda, bu sorular\u0131n cevaplar\u0131 k\u00fcresel ekonominin ve T\u00fcrkiye ekonomisinin bug\u00fcn\u00fc ve gelece\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan de\u011ferlendirilip tart\u0131\u015f\u0131lacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p><strong>G20 2012 Meksika G\u00fcndemi ve T\u00fcrkiye<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>1970\u2019lerdeki iki b\u00fcy\u00fck petrol krizinin aras\u0131nda, 1976\u2019da, Amerika Birle\u015fik Devletleri (ABD), Almanya, Japonya, Birle\u015fik Krall\u0131k, Fransa, \u0130talya ve Kanada taraf\u0131ndan olu\u015fturulan G7 Grubu, 1998\u2019de Rusya\u2019n\u0131n kat\u0131l\u0131m\u0131yla G8\u2019e, 1999\u2019da ise (G\u00fcneydo\u011fu Asya ve Rusya krizlerinin ard\u0131ndan) Arjantin, Avustralya, Brezilya, \u00c7in, Hindistan, Endonezya, Meksika, Suudi Arabistan, G\u00fcney Afrika, Kore Cumhuriyeti, T\u00fcrkiye ve Avrupa Birli\u011fi\u2019nin (AB) kat\u0131l\u0131m\u0131yla G20\u2019ye d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc. Bu ve benzeri di\u011fer \u00fclke grupla\u015fmalar\u0131, faaliyetlerini, \u00f6z\u00fcnde hep, k\u00fcresel \u00f6l\u00e7ekte ya\u015fanan ba\u015fl\u0131ca ekonomik ve\/veya siyasal sorunlara ortak \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm bulabilmek ve krizlerle m\u00fccadele edebilmek i\u00e7in \u00fcye \u00fclkeler aras\u0131nda politika koordinasyonunu sa\u011flayabilmek amac\u0131yla farkl\u0131 s\u0131kl\u0131k ve yo\u011funluklarla s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fcyorlar.<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn1\">[1]<\/a><\/p>\n<p>G20, 1999-2008 d\u00f6neminde yeterince faal ve etkili bir olu\u015fum g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fc sergile(ye)medi. Ancak, G20 \u00fclkelerinin etkinlikleri, 2008\u2019de, ABD\u2019den d\u00fcnyan\u0131n geri kalan (\u00f6zellikle geli\u015fmi\u015f) \u00fclkelerine do\u011fru h\u0131zla yay\u0131lmaya ba\u015flayan finansal ve ekonomik krizle ortak m\u00fccadele amac\u0131yla ve \u00f6zellikle ABD\u2019nin \u00f6nerisiyle giderek yo\u011funla\u015ft\u0131. G20 \u00fclkelerinin liderleri, 14-15 Kas\u0131m 2008\u2019de Washington\u2019da (ABD),<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn2\">[2]<\/a> 2 Nisan 2009\u2019da Londra\u2019da (\u0130ngiltere),<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn3\">[3]<\/a> 24-25 Eyl\u00fcl 2009\u2019da Pittsburgh\u2019da (ABD),<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn4\">[4]<\/a> 26-27 Haziran 20120\u2019da Toronto\u2019da (Kanada)<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn5\">[5]<\/a> bir araya geldiler ve platformun ileriki y\u0131llardaki \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma g\u00fcndem ve bi\u00e7imini b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde bi\u00e7imlendirdiler.<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn6\">[6]<\/a> G20 \u00fclkeleri, daha sonra, Kore Cumhuriyeti\u2019nin d\u00f6nem ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131nda 11-12 Kas\u0131m 2010\u2019da Seul\u2019de<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn7\">[7]<\/a> ve ard\u0131ndan, Fransa\u2019n\u0131n ev sahipli\u011finde 3-4 Kas\u0131m 2011\u2019de Cannes\u2019da<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn8\">[8]<\/a> topland\u0131lar.<\/p>\n<p>2012 y\u0131l\u0131 d\u00f6nem ba\u015fkan\u0131 Meksika\u2019n\u0131n organizat\u00f6rl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcnde 18-19 Haziran 2012\u2019de Los Cabos\u2019da yap\u0131lacak Liderler Zirvesi\u2019nde, \u00f6nceki y\u0131llarda olu\u015fturulan genel g\u00fcndem katalo\u011fundan Meksika\u2019n\u0131n tercih \u00f6nceliklerine g\u00f6re olu\u015fturulan g\u00fcndeme<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn9\">[9]<\/a> g\u00f6re, \u00f6zetle, (<em>1<\/em>)\u00a0iktisadi b\u00fcy\u00fcme ve istihdam\u0131n temelleri olarak ekonomik istikrar ve yap\u0131sal reformlar, (<em>2<\/em>)\u00a0iktisadi b\u00fcy\u00fcmeyi te\u015fvik i\u00e7in finansal sistemin g\u00fc\u00e7lendirilmesi ve finansal eri\u015fimin te\u015fviki, (<em>3<\/em>)\u00a0\u00fclke ekonomilerinin birbirine ba\u011fl\u0131 oldu\u011fu bir d\u00fcnyada uluslararas\u0131 finansal mimarinin iyile\u015ftirilmesi, (<em>4<\/em>)\u00a0g\u0131da g\u00fcvenli\u011finin g\u00fc\u00e7lendirilmesi ve emtia fiyatlar\u0131n\u0131n oynakl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n azalt\u0131lmas\u0131 ve (<em>5<\/em>)\u00a0s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir kalk\u0131nman\u0131n te\u015fviki, ye\u015fil b\u00fcy\u00fcme ve iklim de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fi ile m\u00fccadele konular\u0131 \u00fczerinde tart\u0131\u015f\u0131l\u0131p (Kas\u0131m 2011 \u2013 Haziran 2012 d\u00f6neminde yap\u0131lan \u00f6n haz\u0131rl\u0131k \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131na g\u00f6re) \u00f6nemli ortak kararlar al\u0131nmaya ve ulusal taahh\u00fctler ortaya koyulmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131lacak.<\/p>\n<p>Los CIOS\u2019taki toplant\u0131lara haz\u0131rlanmakta olan Hazine M\u00fcste\u015farl\u0131\u011f\u0131 koordinat\u00f6rl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcndeki T\u00fcrk ekibi, ge\u00e7mi\u015f aylarda \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde \u015fu konu gruplar\u0131na g\u00f6re \u015fekillendirmi\u015f g\u00f6z\u00fck\u00fcyor:<\/p>\n<p>(<em>1<\/em>)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 G\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc, S\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir ve Dengeli B\u00fcy\u00fcme \u00c7er\u00e7evesi,<\/p>\n<p>(<em>2<\/em>)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Uluslararas\u0131 Finansal Mimari,<\/p>\n<p>(<em>3<\/em>)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Finansal Sekt\u00f6r D\u00fczenlemeleri ve Finansal Tabana Yay\u0131lma,<\/p>\n<p>(<em>4<\/em>)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Enerji ve Emtia Piyasalar\u0131,<\/p>\n<p>(<em>5<\/em>)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Afet Riski Y\u00f6netimi,<\/p>\n<p>(<em>6<\/em>)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Uluslararas\u0131 Ticaret (Korumac\u0131l\u0131ktan Ka\u00e7\u0131nma ve Doha Kalk\u0131nma G\u00fcndemi M\u00fczakere S\u00fcrecinin Bitirilmesi),<\/p>\n<p>(7)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u0130stihdam ve K\u00fcreselle\u015fmenin Sosyal Boyutu,<\/p>\n<p>(8)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Yolsuzlukla M\u00fccadele,<\/p>\n<p>(9)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Kara Para Aklama ve Ter\u00f6rizmin Finansman\u0131 ile M\u00fccadele ve<\/p>\n<p>(10)\u00a0\u00a0 Kalk\u0131nma (G\u0131da G\u00fcvenli\u011fi, Altyap\u0131 ve Ye\u015fil B\u00fcy\u00fcme).<\/p>\n<p>Bu konular aras\u0131nda ilki, g\u00fcncel k\u00fcresel finansal-ekonomik krizin ABD-AB eksenli \u201c\u00e7ekirde\u011fi\u201d ba\u011flam\u0131nda daha \u00e7ok geli\u015fmi\u015f ekonomilerdeki finansal sorunlara ve b\u00fcy\u00fcyememe\u00a0\u2013\u00a0istihdam yaratamama meselelerine odaklanaca\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in, bu durum; geli\u015fmi\u015f ekonomi liderlerinin kendi \u201ci\u00e7 \u00e7eki\u015fmeleri\u201dne ve \u201cinatla\u015fmalar\u0131\u201dna (\u00f6zellikle ABD ve \u00c7in aras\u0131nda) sebep olup (muhtemelen g\u00fcncel Avro B\u00f6lgesi krizinin de Meksika\u2019daki g\u00fcndeme k\u0131sa vadeli olumsuz etkisiyle), ortaya beklenenden \u00e7ok daha zay\u0131f ve\/veya mu\u011flak sonu\u00e7lar\u0131n \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131na sebep olabilir.<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn10\">[10]<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Ulusal finansal mimarinin yenilenmesi ve finansal d\u00fczenleme reformunun ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilmesi y\u00f6n\u00fcnde bu kez de G20 \u00f6l\u00e7e\u011finde olumlu ad\u0131mlar at\u0131lamazsa, ortaya \u00e7\u0131kabilecek yeni k\u00fcresel finansal krizlerin (\u00f6nlenememesinin veya \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclememesinin) sorumlulu\u011fu, elbette ki, b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde, geli\u015fmi\u015f G20 \u00fclkelerinin y\u00f6neticilerinin omuzlar\u0131nda olacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p>Kalk\u0131nma veya daha a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7as\u0131 \u201cs\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir kalk\u0131nma i\u00e7in ye\u015fil b\u00fcy\u00fcme\u201d yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131 ve \u201cg\u0131da g\u00fcvenli\u011fi\u201d ile \u201cenerji fiyat\u0131 istikrars\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131\u201dn\u0131n etkile\u015fimi konular\u0131, kan\u0131mca gerek Los Cabos\u2019ta, gerekse \u00f6n\u00fcm\u00fczdeki y\u0131llar\u0131n G20 zirvelerinde g\u00fcndemi en \u00e7ok i\u015fgal etmesi gereken konular aras\u0131nda bulunmaktad\u0131r. Co\u011frafi konumu itibariyle k\u00fcresel \u0131s\u0131nma ve iklim de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011finin olumsuz sonu\u00e7lar\u0131ndan en \u00e7ok etkilenmesi beklenen \u00fclkelerden biri olarak T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin bu meselelere 2015\u2019teki d\u00f6nem ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 vesilesiyle de b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6nem verece\u011fini \u00fcmit ve tahmin ediyorum.<\/p>\n<p>K\u00fcresel krizle birlikte ba\u015flayan ticarette korumac\u0131l\u0131k kayg\u0131lar\u0131, krizin uluslararas\u0131 etkileri 2010 y\u0131l\u0131nda zay\u0131flamaya ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131nda biraz hafiflemi\u015f gibi g\u00f6z\u00fck\u00fcyordu. Ancak, <em>K\u00fcresel Ticaret Uyar\u0131<\/em> (Global Trade Alert, <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.globaltradealert.org\/\">www.globaltradealert.org<\/a>) Veribankas\u0131\u2019ndaki veriler kullan\u0131larak haz\u0131rlanan ve 14 Haziran 2012\u2019de yay\u0131mlanan Evenett (derl.) (2012) korumac\u0131l\u0131k raporunda da belirtildi\u011fi gibi, son zamanlarda, korumac\u0131 \u00f6nlemlerdeki art\u0131\u015ftan kaynaklanan (gerek kamusal gerekse \u00f6zel sekt\u00f6r kaynakl\u0131) \u015fik\u00e2yetler giderek artmaktad\u0131r. \u00dcstelik, rapora g\u00f6re, Kas\u0131m 2008\u2019den bu yana al\u0131nan korumac\u0131 \u00f6nlemlerin \u00e7ok b\u00fcy\u00fck bir b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcnden bizzat G20 \u00fclkeleri sorumludur. Bu nedenle, G20 \u00fclkelerinin, korumac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n geriletilmesi i\u00e7in (G20 d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki WTO \u00fcyelerinin ataca\u011f\u0131 ad\u0131mlar\u0131 kesinlikle beklemeden) acilen ortak kararlar almas\u0131 gerekti\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a ortadad\u0131r. Zira, k\u00fcresel \u00f6l\u00e7ekte s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir kalk\u0131nmaya giden yolda serbest ticaretin faydalar\u0131n\u0131 yads\u0131mam\u0131z\u0131 gerektirecek herhangi bir ampirik bulgu ortada bulunmamaktad\u0131r. Tam tersine, ekonomilerin d\u0131\u015far\u0131ya a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131n yarataca\u011f\u0131 bir seferlik refah art\u0131\u015f\u0131 yoksul \u00fclkelerin zenginle\u015febilmesi a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan yetersiz de olsa gerekli bir \u00f6n ko\u015fuldur. Nitekim, d\u0131\u015fa a\u00e7\u0131k ekonomilerde \u201ckurumlar\u0131n iyile\u015f(tiril)mesi\u201d ve \u201cteknolojinin ilerlemesi\u201dnin yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131 refah art\u0131\u015f\u0131 ve kalk\u0131nma etkisi y\u00f6n\u00fcnde iktisat literat\u00fcr\u00fcnde \u00e7ok g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bulgular mevcuttur.<\/p>\n<p>Afet riski y\u00f6netimi konusu ise, Meksika\u2019n\u0131n \u00f6zel tercihiyle g\u00fcndeme al\u0131nan ve T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin haz\u0131rlanan bir bilimsel raporla ulusal deneyimlerini di\u011fer \u00fclkelerle payla\u015fmas\u0131 beklenen bir g\u00fcndem maddesidir. Ancak, bu t\u00fcr konular\u0131n, tali \u00f6nemi nedeniyle, gelecek G20 toplant\u0131lar\u0131nda da g\u00fcndeme al\u0131nmas\u0131n\u0131 beklemek veya talep etmek \u00e7ok ger\u00e7ek\u00e7i g\u00f6r\u00fclmeyebilir veya hatta yerinde olmayabilir. Zira, G20\u2019nin genel g\u00fcndemi, pek \u00e7ok acil ve \u00f6nemli konuyla zaten yeterince yo\u011funla\u015fm\u0131\u015f durumdad\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p><strong>G20 2012 Meksika Zirvesiyle \u0130lgili Baz\u0131 (Muhtemel) Organizasyon Hatalar\u0131<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>G20 2012 Meksika zirvesiyle ilgili ilk dikkat \u00e7eken sorunlardan birisi, giri\u015fte de de\u011findi\u011fim \u00fczere, zirvenin tarihinin d\u00f6nem ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 \u00fcstlenen \u00fclkenin y\u00f6neticilerinin siyasi kayg\u0131lar\u0131yla 10-12 aydan \u00e7ok daha k\u0131sa tutulmu\u015f olmas\u0131d\u0131r. Kan\u0131mca, ileriki zirvelerin tarihlerinin belirlenmesinde bu t\u00fcr keyfiliklerden ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmas\u0131 gerekiyor. Aksi takdirde, G20\u2019nin gelecekteki etkilili\u011fi ve performans\u0131 bundan olumsuz y\u00f6nde etkilenecektir.<\/p>\n<p>\u0130kinci ve bence hi\u00e7 de k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fcmsenmemesi gereken bir organizasyon sorunu olarak, ge\u00e7mi\u015f zirvelerle ilgili baz\u0131 resm\u00ee web sitelerinin (2009 \u0130ngiltere ve 2010 Kore d\u00f6nem ba\u015fkanl\u0131klar\u0131nda oldu\u011fu gibi) sonradan kapat\u0131lm\u0131\u015f olmalar\u0131 dikkat \u00e7ekiyor. Her ne kadar site i\u00e7eriklerinin gelecek d\u00f6nem ba\u015fkanl\u0131klar\u0131na devredildi\u011fi ve G20 hakk\u0131ndaki ayr\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 belge ve bilgilerin genelde Toronto Enformasyon Merkezi\u2019nde (<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.g20.utoronto.ca\/\">www.g20.utoronto.ca<\/a>) ar\u015fivlendi\u011fi ileri s\u00fcr\u00fclse de, ev sahibi \u00fclkelerin \u00f6zg\u00fcn G20 web sitelerinin korunmas\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7ok kolay ve bir o kadar da yararl\u0131 olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcyorum.<\/p>\n<p>\u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc bir sorun, Haziran 2012\u2019nin, G20 toplant\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n bitiminden hemen sonra bir ba\u015fka \u00f6nemli toplant\u0131ya daha sahne olacak olmas\u0131yla ili\u015fkilidir. Rio de Janeiro\u2019da 13 Haziran 2012\u2019de ba\u015flayan \u00f6n toplant\u0131lar\u0131n ard\u0131ndan 193 \u00fclkenin (kamusal ve \u00f6zel sekt\u00f6r) temsilcileri ve liderleri 20-22 Haziran 2012\u2019de \u201cS\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir Kalk\u0131nma\u201d g\u00fcndemiyle \u201cRio+20 D\u00fcnya Zirvesi\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.uncsd2012.org\/\">www.uncsd2012.org<\/a>) i\u00e7in bir araya gelecekler. Bu zirve, Birle\u015fmi\u015f Milletler S\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir Kalk\u0131nma Konferans\u0131 (UNCSD) ba\u011flam\u0131nda, 1992\u2019de Rio\u2019da yap\u0131lan ilk toplant\u0131n\u0131n (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UNCED) bir devam\u0131 olarak, o \u00f6nc\u00fc toplant\u0131n\u0131n 20., 2002\u2019de Johannesburg\u2019da d\u00fczenlenen \u201cD\u00fcnya S\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir Kalk\u0131nma Toplant\u0131s\u0131\u201dn\u0131n (World Summit on Sustainable Development, WSSD) ise 10. y\u0131ld\u00f6n\u00fcm\u00fc dolay\u0131s\u0131yla d\u00fczenleniyor.<\/p>\n<p>Rio+20 D\u00fcnya Zirvesi\u2019nin ana hedefi, son 20 y\u0131ll\u0131k ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 \u00e7aba ve giri\u015fimlerden al\u0131nan cesaretle, d\u00fcnya ekonomisini \u201cs\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir kalk\u0131nma\u201d<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn11\">[11]<\/a> y\u00f6n\u00fcne do\u011fru daha g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir bi\u00e7imde \u201citebilmek\u201d olarak a\u00e7\u0131kland\u0131. Toplant\u0131da, h\u00fck\u00fcmetlerin, kalk\u0131nmay\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir k\u0131lacak berrak ve belirli hedeflere odaklanm\u0131\u015f pratik \u00f6nlemlerin uygulanmas\u0131n\u0131 benimsemeleri umut ediliyor. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc ancak bu ko\u015fullarda ekolojik sisteme zarar vermeden yoksullukla m\u00fccadele edebilmek m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olabilecektir. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Kalk\u0131nma Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131\u2019n\u0131n organizat\u00f6rl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcnde haz\u0131rland\u0131\u011f\u0131 Rio+20 zirvesinin taslak anla\u015fmas\u0131; \u00f6zellikle (<em>1<\/em>)\u00a0yoksul \u00fclkelerde enerji, su ve g\u0131da g\u00fcvenli\u011finin geli\u015ftirilmesini, (<em>2<\/em>)\u00a0fosil yak\u0131t s\u00fcbvansiyonlar\u0131n\u0131n a\u015famal\u0131 olarak azalt\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 ve (<em>3<\/em>)\u00a0okyanuslar\u0131n korunmas\u0131 i\u00e7in gerekli \u00f6nlemlerin art\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 hedefliyor. Ancak, BBC<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn12\">[12]<\/a> gibi baz\u0131 haber kaynaklar\u0131nda belirtildi\u011fi kadar\u0131yla, Rio\u2019daki haz\u0131rl\u0131k g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerinde 16 Haziran 2012 itibariyle hen\u00fcz anla\u015fma metni \u00fczerinde yeterince uzla\u015fma sa\u011flanabilmi\u015f ve belirsizlikler giderilebilmi\u015f de\u011fil.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cYe\u015fil b\u00fcy\u00fcme\u201d ve \u201cs\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir kalk\u0131nma\u201d konular\u0131 k\u0131smen de olsa G20 \u00fclkelerinin de g\u00fcndeminde. Bu bak\u0131mdan, iki zirve aras\u0131nda hi\u00e7 bo\u015f zaman b\u0131rak\u0131lmam\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131 ve Rio+20 zirvesinde yeni bir k\u00fcresel anla\u015fman\u0131n imzalanmas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6ncesinde \u00e7e\u015fitli anla\u015fmazl\u0131klar, gecikmeler ve diplomatik \u00e7eki\u015fmeler ya\u015fan\u0131yor olmas\u0131, G20 Zirvesi ad\u0131na da bir talihsizlik olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclebilir.<\/p>\n<p><strong>G20 Hakk\u0131nda \u0130ki \u00d6nemli Olgusal Ger\u00e7eklik<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>G20\u2019nin faaliyetleri, performans\u0131 ve gelece\u011fi de\u011ferlendirilirken, en az\u0131ndan \u015fu iki olgunun mutlaka g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcnde bulundurulmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fini d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcyorum:<\/p>\n<p>(<em>1<\/em>) G20 faaliyetleri; 2006\u2019dan bu yana d\u00fcnyan\u0131n kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya kald\u0131\u011f\u0131 olduk\u00e7a karma\u015f\u0131k ve e\u015fanl\u0131 bir finans, kamusal bor\u00e7, uluslararas\u0131 ticaret, ekoloji (k\u00fcresel \u0131s\u0131nma ve iklim de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fi), enerji, g\u0131da ve yoksulluk\/a\u00e7l\u0131k krizi ortam\u0131nda y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclmek zorunda.<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn13\">[13]<\/a> G20 grubunun 2008\u2019den bu yana h\u0131zla aktifle\u015fmesinin bir sebebi, asl\u0131nda zaten 2006-2007 y\u0131llar\u0131nda ABD\u2019de ba\u015flayan ve 2008\u2019de d\u00fcnyan\u0131n geri kalan k\u0131sm\u0131na bula\u015fan krizle ortak m\u00fccadele edebilme \u00e7abas\u0131na duyulan b\u00fcy\u00fck ihtiya\u00e7. Ancak, G20\u2019yi olu\u015fturan b\u00fcy\u00fck ekonomiler aras\u0131ndaki uluslararas\u0131 politika koordinasyonunu sa\u011flama ve k\u00fcresel \u201cB\u00fcy\u00fck Durgunluk\u201dla (Great Recession) m\u00fccadele \u00e7abas\u0131, kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya kal\u0131nan benzersiz karma\u015f\u0131k k\u00fcresel ekonomik kriz ortam\u0131n\u0131 yarat\u0131p besleyen etkenlerin \u00e7e\u015fitlili\u011fi nedeniyle, ister istemez, G20\u2019yi ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta planlanandan \u00e7ok daha fazla konuyu da bir b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fck i\u00e7inde ele\/g\u00fcndemine almak zorunda b\u0131rak\u0131yor. Bu ger\u00e7eklik, G20\u2019nin g\u00fcndemi \u00fczerinde belki de ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmaz bir bi\u00e7imde b\u00fcy\u00fck bir yo\u011funla\u015fma ve \u00e7e\u015fitlenme bask\u0131s\u0131 yarat\u0131yor.<\/p>\n<p>\u00dcstelik, k\u00fcresel ekonomideki g\u00fcncel (2006-2012) karma\u015f\u0131k kriz ortam\u0131, iktisat\u00e7\u0131lar aras\u0131nda \u201cyeni klasik\u201d (new classical) diye nitelenen ve \u201cyo\u011fun matematik-ekonometri kullan\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 adeta <em>ara\u00e7<\/em> olmaktan \u00e7\u0131kart\u0131p <em>ama\u00e7<\/em> haline getiren\u201d egemen iktisat anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n yerine \u201cyeni\u201d bir iktisat yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131 koyulmas\u0131 y\u00f6n\u00fcnde \u00e7ok g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc (ve acil) bir ihtiya\u00e7 yaratm\u0131\u015f durumda. G\u00fcncel kriz ortam\u0131n\u0131n da etkisiyle giderek y\u00fckselmekte olan ortodoks-heterodoks iktisat tart\u0131\u015fmas\u0131, hen\u00fcz \u00fcniversitelerin iktisat b\u00f6l\u00fcmlerindeki ders programlar\u0131na yeterince (olumlu) etkiler yaratarak yans\u0131m\u0131\u015f olmasa da, bug\u00fcn iktisatta art\u0131k (\u00e7ok daha) disiplinler-aras\u0131 bir yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n ge\u00e7erli olmas\u0131 ve \u201cyeni iktisat\u201d i\u00e7in \u201ckurumlar\u201d\u0131n, \u201cekolojik sistem\u201din ve \u201ctarih\u201din \u00fc\u00e7 \u00f6nemi yap\u0131ta\u015f\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015fturmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a anla\u015f\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r, diye \u00fcmit ediyorum.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/researchturkey.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/06\/tablo2.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter  wp-image-1380\" title=\"Tablo 1\" src=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856im_\/http:\/\/researchturkey.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/06\/tablo2.png\" sizes=\"(max-width: 617px) 100vw, 617px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856im_\/http:\/\/researchturkey.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/06\/tablo2.png 771w, https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856im_\/http:\/\/researchturkey.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/06\/tablo2-300x191.png 300w\" alt=\"\" width=\"617\" height=\"394\" \/><\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/researchturkey.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/06\/tablo2.png\">(<em>2<\/em>) \u00d6te yandan, G20\u2019nin bug\u00fcn\u00fc ve gelece\u011fiyle ilgili as\u0131l temel sorunlar, belki de G20 g\u00fcndem maddelerinin ve hedeflerinin e\u015fanl\u0131 olarak \u00e7ok say\u0131da ba\u015fka k\u00fcresel\/uluslararas\u0131 \u00f6rg\u00fct veya platformlar\u0131n g\u00fcncel faaliyet alanlar\u0131 ve hedefleriyle \u00f6rt\u00fc\u015f\u00fcyor olmas\u0131ndan kaynaklan\u0131yor olabilir. Bu durum, Tablo 1\u2019de se\u00e7ilmi\u015f g\u00fcndem maddeleri ve \u00f6rg\u00fctler yard\u0131m\u0131yla \u00f6zetlenmi\u015ftir. Tablonun sat\u0131rlar\u0131nda yer alan \u00f6rg\u00fct veya platformlar\u0131n temel ilgi alanlar\u0131yla, G20 \u00fclkelerinin 2008-2012 d\u00f6neminde \u00fczerinde \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131klar\u0131 g\u00fcndem konular\u0131 (s\u00fctunlar) aras\u0131ndaki \u00f6rt\u00fc\u015fmeler, ilgili kutucuklardaki \u201csiyah\u201d taral\u0131 alanlarla g\u00f6sterilmi\u015ftir. Tablo 1\u2019de sadece OECD i\u00e7in \u201cnispeten tali\u201d \u00f6neme sahip G20 g\u00fcndem konular\u0131 \u201cgri\u201d taral\u0131 kutucuklarla g\u00f6sterilmi\u015ftir. Ayn\u0131 y\u00f6ntemin di\u011fer \u00f6rg\u00fct ve platformlar i\u00e7in de uygulanacak olmas\u0131 durumunda tablodaki \u00f6rt\u00fc\u015fme alanlar\u0131n\u0131n say\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n (yo\u011funluk itibariyle olmasa da) daha da artaca\u011f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131r.<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/researchturkey.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/06\/tablo2.png\">Tablo 1, bir bak\u0131ma, G20\u2019nin \u00e7e\u015fitli uluslararas\u0131 \u00f6rg\u00fctler ve platformlardan \u201crol \u00e7alma\u201d karakteristi\u011fini g\u00f6stermektedir ve bu olgu, G20\u2019nin faaliyetlerinin yo\u011funla\u015faca\u011f\u0131 alanlar ve G20\u2019nin performans\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan \u00e7ok \u00f6nemli bir duruma dikkat \u00e7ekmektedir. Di\u011fer \u00f6rg\u00fctler ve platformlara g\u00f6re nispeten \u00e7ok daha az say\u0131daki \u00fclkeden olu\u015fan G20\u2019nin, g\u00f6rece daha geni\u015f kat\u0131l\u0131ml\u0131 \u00f6rg\u00fct ve platformlara g\u00f6re ortak temel sorun ve hedeflerle ilgili olarak daha kolay ve h\u0131zl\u0131 uzla\u015fma ve karar alma yetene\u011fine sahip olabilece\u011fi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fclebilir. Fakat, ayn\u0131 zamanda, bu olgu, G20 karar ve uygulamalar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7o\u011fu kez, ancak ayn\u0131 veya daha geni\u015f kat\u0131l\u0131ml\u0131 \u00f6rg\u00fct ve platformlarda da destek ve kabul g\u00f6rmesi durumunda bir de\u011fer ifade edebilece\u011fini de ima etmektedir. G20 g\u00fcndem konular\u0131n\u0131n belirlenmesi ve G20\u2019nin performans\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan bu iki-y\u00f6nl\u00fc olgu, b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6nem ta\u015f\u0131maktad\u0131r.<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/researchturkey.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/06\/tablo2.png\">G20 (2012 Meksika Zirvesi) Hakk\u0131nda Baz\u0131 Sorunlar ve Ku\u015fkular<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/researchturkey.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/06\/tablo2.png\">\u015eimdi, yukar\u0131da de\u011findi\u011fim organizasyon sorunlar\u0131n\u0131 bir kenara b\u0131rakarak ve belirtti\u011fim iki olgusal saptamay\u0131 akl\u0131m\u0131zda tutarak, G20\u2019nin i\u00e7inde bulundu\u011fu baz\u0131 sorun, zay\u0131fl\u0131k, belirsizlik veya potansiyel g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fckleri daha yak\u0131ndan ele alabiliriz.<\/a><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn14\">[14]<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong><em>G20 G\u00fcndeminin A\u015f\u0131r\u0131 Yo\u011funlu\u011fu, Da\u011f\u0131n\u0131kl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve Ger\u00e7ek\u00e7i Yakla\u015f\u0131mla Olu\u015fturulmam\u0131\u015f Olmas\u0131<\/em>. G20 zirvelerinde, ayn\u0131 anda birbirinden \u00e7ok farkl\u0131 konular\u0131n g\u00fcndeme al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve dolay\u0131s\u0131yla e\u015fanl\u0131 olarak \u00e7ok say\u0131daki g\u00fcndem maddesi \u00fczerinde ayr\u0131 ayr\u0131 yo\u011fun \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclmesi tercihinin, G20\u2019nin ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan olumsuz bir etkide bulundu\u011fu iddias\u0131 yabana at\u0131lamaz. G20 g\u00fcndem maddeleri belirlenirken (<em>1<\/em>)\u00a0konular\u0131n \u00f6nem derecesinin, (<em>2<\/em>)\u00a0aciliyetinin ve (<em>3<\/em>)\u00a0bu konularla ilgili \u00e7abuk veya ge\u00e7 sonu\u00e7 al\u0131nabilme beklentisinin birlikte etkili olaca\u011f\u0131, olmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131r. Bu nedenle, konu ve dolay\u0131s\u0131yla hedef se\u00e7iminde ger\u00e7ek\u00e7i bir yakla\u015f\u0131m sergilenerek, G20 \u00fclkeleri ve k\u00fcresel ekonomi a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan (<em>1<\/em>)\u00a0g\u00f6reli olarak daha d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck \u00f6neme sahip, (<em>2<\/em>)\u00a0g\u00f6reli olarak daha az acil olan ve (<em>3<\/em>)\u00a0g\u00f6rece daha zor veya ge\u00e7 sonu\u00e7 al\u0131nabilecek sorunlar\u0131n g\u00fcndeme al\u0131nmas\u0131ndan (olabildi\u011fince) ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fi ortadad\u0131r. Ancak, bug\u00fcne dek, G20\u2019nin bu a\u00e7\u0131lardan \u00e7ok ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 oldu\u011funu s\u00f6ylemek biraz g\u00fc\u00e7t\u00fcr.<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn15\">[15]<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong><em>Zirve G\u00fcndemini \u0130\u015fgal Eden G\u00fcncel Geli\u015fmeler<\/em>. G20 zirvelerinin hemen \u00f6ncesinde d\u00fcnya ekonomisinde veya b\u00f6lgesel \u00f6l\u00e7ekte \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131kan baz\u0131 \u00f6nemli geli\u015fmeler, \u00e7o\u011fu zaman G20 Zirvelerinin g\u00fcndemini i\u015fgal edip dikkatleri as\u0131l planl\u0131 ortak tart\u0131\u015fma konular\u0131ndan g\u00fcncel geli\u015fmelere do\u011fru kayd\u0131rabiliyor. \u00d6rne\u011fin, Toronto (2009) zirvesinin g\u00fcndemini \u201cgeli\u015fmi\u015f \u00fclkelerin mal\u00ee (fiscal) krizleri\u201dnin, Seul\u2019\u00fcnkini (2010) o d\u00f6nemdeki g\u00fcncel \u201ckur sava\u015flar\u0131\u201dn\u0131n (currency wars) ve Cannes\u2019\u0131nkini (2011) ise \u201cAvro B\u00f6lgesi bor\u00e7 krizi\u201dnin i\u015fgal etti\u011fi bariz bi\u00e7imde g\u00f6zlemlendi. Los Cabos\u2019taki (2012) g\u00fcndeme de, yine Avro B\u00f6lgesi sorunlar\u0131n\u0131n damgas\u0131n\u0131 vuraca\u011f\u0131 tahmin ediliyor. Zira Yunanistan\u2019da i\u00e7 siyasi krizle birbirlerini kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 besleyerek giderek derinle\u015fen bor\u00e7 krizini takiben, \u0130spanya\u2019da ge\u00e7ti\u011fimiz haftalarda patlak veren ve art\u0131k gizlenemeyen\/\u00f6telenmeyen finansal kriz ve \u0130talya\u2019da da yak\u0131nda a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131ndan endi\u015fe edilen bor\u00e7 krizi; 2012 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n ilk yar\u0131s\u0131 boyunca AB i\u00e7inde \u00f6nce <em>mal\u00ee birlik<\/em> (fiscal union), sonra <em>Avro B\u00f6lgesi Bankalar Birli\u011fi<\/em>(banking union) ve son olarak da <em>siyasi birlik<\/em> (political union) tart\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131 iyice alevlendirdi. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla, Meksika\u2019dan sonra Rusya,<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn16\">[16]<\/a> Avustralya ve T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin d\u00f6nem ba\u015fkanl\u0131klar\u0131 s\u0131ras\u0131nda da; bu t\u00fcrden ani geli\u015fmelerin g\u00fcndemi bozmas\u0131 ve sapt\u0131rmas\u0131na izin verilmemesi gerekece\u011fi ortada.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong><em>G\u00fcndem \u00d6nceliklerinin Belirlenmesinde D\u00f6nem Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Olan \u00dclkenin Etkisi S\u0131n\u0131rland\u0131r\u0131lmal\u0131 m\u0131?<\/em> G20 g\u00fcndem \u00f6nceliklerinin belirlenmesinin, b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde, ilgili y\u0131lda ev sahipli\u011fi g\u00f6revini \u00fcstlenecek \u00fclkenin (ve\/veya onun liderinin) inisiyatifine (veya ki\u015fisel tercihlerine) b\u0131rak\u0131lmas\u0131, bazen G20 b\u00fcnyesindeki eylemlerin ve karar s\u00fcre\u00e7lerinin s\u00fcreklili\u011fini bozabilir ve ana g\u00fcndem maddeleri \u00fczerinde odaklan\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 olumsuz y\u00f6nde etkileyebilir (\u00f6rnek: 2011\u2019deki Sarkozy Fransas\u0131). 2012 y\u0131l\u0131 boyunca 7-9 kadar G20 \u00fclkesinde se\u00e7imler yap\u0131l\u0131yor\/yap\u0131lacak olmas\u0131 durumunun da ima etti\u011fi gibi, \u00fclkelerin liderlerinin de\u011fi\u015fmesi de, belli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fclerde de olsa, benzer y\u00f6nde olumsuz etkiler yaratabilir. Bu husus G20\u2019nin s\u00fcreklili\u011fi ve uzun vadedeki mevcudiyeti ve \u00f6nemlili\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fcmsenmemesi gereken bir konudur.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong><em>G20\u2019nin Y\u00fcz Y\u00fcze Oldu\u011fu Baz\u0131 Do\u011fal S\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131l\u0131klar<\/em>. G20 g\u00fcndem maddelerinden baz\u0131lar\u0131 hakk\u0131nda ilgili \u00fcye \u00fclkeler G20 platformunda kendi aralar\u0131nda anla\u015fabilseler bile, k\u00fcresel d\u00fczeyde ortaya beklenen sonu\u00e7lar \u00e7\u0131kart\u0131lamayabilir. Bunun belki de en iyi \u00f6rne\u011fi, gerek G20 gerekse D\u00fcnya Ticaret \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc\u2019n\u00fcn (WTO) ilgi alan\u0131na giren \u201culuslararas\u0131 mal ve hizmet ticareti\u201d konular\u0131nda G20 zirvelerinde al\u0131nabilecek kararlard\u0131r. Bu t\u00fcr kararlar, WTO d\u00fczleminde bir nihai karar\u0131 da gerektirdi\u011fi \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde, G20 \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde bu konular\u0131n g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fcl\u00fcp karara ba\u011flanm\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131 sonu\u00e7ta pek anlaml\u0131 olmayacakt\u0131r, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc WTO g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerinde al\u0131nacak kararlar \u00fcye \u00fclkeler aras\u0131nda \u201coybirli\u011fi\u201d sa\u011flanmas\u0131n\u0131 gerektirmektedir.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong><em>K\u00fcresel \u201cB\u00fcy\u00fck Durgunluk\u201d (Great Recession) Hafifledik\u00e7e, Geli\u015fmi\u015f ve Geli\u015fmekte Olan G20 \u00dclkeleri Aras\u0131nda \u00c7\u0131kar Farkl\u0131la\u015fmas\u0131 Do\u011fmas\u0131<\/em>. Washington (Kas\u0131m 2008) ve Londra (Nisan 2009) toplant\u0131lar\u0131nda (<em>1<\/em>) ortak parasal ve mal\u00ee geni\u015fleme, (<em>2<\/em>) IMF\u2019ye ek fonlar temini, (<em>3<\/em>) finansal kurumlar i\u00e7in yeni kurallar getirilmesi konular\u0131nda do\u011fru ve zamanl\u0131 kararlar al\u0131narak G20\u2019nin ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta k\u00fcresel krize kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7abuk ve ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 bir bi\u00e7imde cevap verdi\u011fi genelde pek \u00e7ok iktisat\u00e7\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan kabul ediliyor. Ancak, k\u00fcresel krizin etkileri hafifledik\u00e7e, geli\u015fmi\u015f ve geli\u015fmekte olan G20 \u00fclkeleri aras\u0131nda \u00e7\u0131kar farkl\u0131la\u015fmas\u0131 do\u011fdu\u011fu ve bu durumun, G20\u2019nin etkilili\u011fini azaltmaya ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 da pek \u00e7ok g\u00f6zlemci taraf\u0131ndan s\u0131k\u00e7a dile getiriliyor. Bu \u015fevk kayb\u0131 ve ortak payda buharla\u015fmas\u0131, e\u011fer ger\u00e7ekse, 2013-2015\u2019te d\u00f6nem ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 yapmaya haz\u0131rlanan \u00fclkeler ba\u015fta olmak \u00fczere G20 grupla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131n b\u00fct\u00fcn\u00fc i\u00e7in ciddi bir mevcudiyet ve \u00f6nemsizle\u015fme krizi yaratabilir. Bu bak\u0131mdan, yukar\u0131da da de\u011findi\u011fim gibi, G20\u2019nin ilgi alanlar\u0131n\u0131 b\u00fct\u00fcn \u00fcyelerin katk\u0131da bulunmay\u0131 istemeye devam edece\u011fi bir bi\u00e7imde olu\u015fturabilmek, \u00e7ok b\u00fcy\u00fck bir \u00f6nem ta\u015f\u0131yor. Aksi takdirde, G20, en az\u0131ndan bir sonraki b\u00fcy\u00fck k\u00fcresel krize kadar at\u0131l kalmaya mahk\u00fbm edilebilir.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong><em>G20\u2019nin Organizasyon Yap\u0131s\u0131 De\u011fi\u015ftirilmeli mi? <\/em>Bu soru, belki de yukar\u0131da de\u011finilen sorunlar\u0131n do\u011fal bir sonucu olarak \u00e7\u0131k\u0131yor kar\u015f\u0131m\u0131za ve G20\u2019nin (mesela GATT\u2019\u0131n WTO\u2019ya d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr\u00fclmesinde oldu\u011fu gibi) art\u0131k sabit bir sekretaryas\u0131 olup olmamas\u0131 gerekti\u011fi sorusunu ima ediyor. Ancak, b\u00f6yle bir olas\u0131l\u0131k, rakip \u00f6rg\u00fct ve platformlardan \u201crol \u00e7alma\u201d ve do\u011fabilecek \u201cb\u00fcrokratik atalet\u201d riskleri nedeniyle G20 \u00fcyeleri taraf\u0131ndan pek dikkate al\u0131nmayacakm\u0131\u015f gibi g\u00f6z\u00fck\u00fcyor.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong><em>G20 \u00dclkelerinin Taahh\u00fctleri ve Bunlar\u0131 Yerine Getirip Getirmediklerinin \u0130zlenmesi<\/em>. G20 zirvelerinde al\u0131nan kararlar do\u011frultusunda \u00fclkelerin verdikleri taahh\u00fctlerin say\u0131s\u0131ndan \u00e7ok, bunlar\u0131n ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131 ne kadar s\u00fcrede uygulamaya koyduklar\u0131 elbette ki daha \u00f6nemli.<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn17\">[17]<\/a> Zira G20\u2019nin performans\u0131 ve d\u0131\u015f d\u00fcnyada \u00f6nemsenmesi a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan bu husus hayati bir \u00f6neme sahip. Verilen ulusal taahh\u00fctlerin uygulanmas\u0131yla ilgili geli\u015fmeler izlenerek \u201chesap verilebilirlik mekanizmas\u0131\u201d \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde periyodik de\u011ferlendirme raporlar\u0131 haz\u0131rlanacak olmas\u0131, taahh\u00fctlerini yerine getir(e)meyen \u00fclkelere (en az\u0131ndan \u015fimdilik) bir \u201cyapt\u0131r\u0131m\u201d uygulanamayacak olsa da, G20\u2019nin gelece\u011fi ad\u0131na olumlu bir d\u00fczenleme olarak kabul edilebilir.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong><em>G20 \u0130\u00e7inde Lider \u00dclke Eksikli\u011fi Bir Sorun Mudur? <\/em>K\u00fcresel ekonomik g\u00fcc\u00fcn ABD\u2019den \u00c7in ve Hindistan gibi \u00fclkelere do\u011fru kaymakta oldu\u011fu uzun zamand\u0131r \u00f6zellikle iktisat\u00e7\u0131lar, siyaset bilimciler ve tarih\u00e7iler taraf\u0131ndan ileri s\u00fcr\u00fclen ve gerek\u00e7elendirilmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131lan \u00f6nemli bir iddia. \u00d6yle ki, Pew Ara\u015ft\u0131rma Merkezi (<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/pewresearch.org\/\">pewresearch.org<\/a>) taraf\u0131ndan 2008\u2019den bu yana 14 \u00fclkede telefonla veya y\u00fcz y\u00fcze g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme yoluyla yap\u0131lan bir anketin sonu\u00e7lar\u0131na g\u00f6re, 2012 y\u0131l\u0131 itibariyle art\u0131k (k\u00fcresel) kamuoyunda ABD\u2019nin de\u011fil \u00c7in\u2019in \u201cd\u00fcnyan\u0131n lider ekonomik g\u00fcc\u00fc\u201d oldu\u011fu <em>alg\u0131s\u0131<\/em> egemen (Rampell, 2012). Dahas\u0131, The Economist Online\u2019\u0131n (2011) tahminine g\u00f6re, \u00c7in ABD\u2019yi Gayrisafi Yurti\u00e7i Has\u0131la bak\u0131m\u0131ndan ger\u00e7ekten de 2018-2021 gibi \u00e7ok yak\u0131n bir gelecekte yakalay\u0131p ge\u00e7ebilir. Fakat, bu e\u011filimin aksine, ne ABD, ne \u00c7in ne de di\u011fer bir g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc \u00fclke, G20 platformunda, genelde ge\u00e7mi\u015f ony\u0131llarda g\u00f6zlemledimi\u011fiz gibi, bir \u201cliderlik\u201d g\u00f6revi \u00fcstlen(e)bilmi\u015f de\u011fil. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla, iktisat\u00e7\u0131 <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/pages.stern.nyu.edu\/~nroubini\/\">Nouriel Roubini<\/a> ve siyaset bilimci <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.ianbremmer.com\/\">Ian Bremmer<\/a> \u00f6zellikle 2011 y\u0131l\u0131 ba\u015f\u0131ndan bu yana, kar\u015f\u0131m\u0131zdaki bu yeni uluslararas\u0131 siyaset ve ekonomik y\u00f6neti\u015fim ortam\u0131n\u0131 \u201cLidersiz D\u00fcnya\u201d (G-Zero World) platformu olarak nitelendiriyorlar.<a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftn18\">[18]<\/a> \u201cGe\u00e7ici\u201d olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnd\u00fckleri bu s\u00fcre\u00e7te, \u00fclke say\u0131s\u0131 artt\u0131k\u00e7a ve \u00e7\u0131karlar farkl\u0131la\u015ft\u0131k\u00e7a G20\u2019nin \u201c\u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u201d yerine, \u201clidersiz\u201d bir \u201cuzla\u015fmazl\u0131k\u201d platformu haline gelebilece\u011fi tehlikesine dikkat \u00e7ekiyorlar. Onlara g\u00f6re, \u201ci\u015fbirli\u011fi liderli\u011fi\u201d (cooperation leadership) a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan var olan bu eksiklik veya bo\u015fluk, k\u00fcresel ekonomik sorunlar\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclebilmesini geciktiriyor ve\/veya \u00e7ok g\u00fc\u00e7le\u015ftiriyor. Dahas\u0131, yazarlara g\u00f6re, d\u00fcnyan\u0131n farkl\u0131 b\u00f6lgelerindeki ekonomik akt\u00f6rler (\u00f6zellikle b\u00fcy\u00fck \u015firketler) bu politik ve ekonomik belirsizlik (d\u00f6neminin ge\u00e7ici oldu\u011funu hissettikleri i\u00e7in) bitmesini bekliyorlar. Onlar ne kadar uzun s\u00fcre \u201cbeklerlerse\u201d (\u00f6rne\u011fin yeni\/ek yat\u0131r\u0131mlar yapmaks\u0131z\u0131n), bu yeni (ge\u00e7ici) d\u00fczenin k\u00fcresel ekonomi a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan sonu\u00e7lar\u0131 da o denli b\u00fcy\u00fck\/a\u011f\u0131r olabilecek.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Meksika\u2019da 18-19 Haziran 2012\u2019de bir araya gelecek G20 liderlerinin, aralar\u0131ndaki bu \u201ci\u015fbirli\u011fi liderli\u011fi\u201d sorununun \u00fcstesinden gelebilmeleri beklenmiyor. \u00dcstelik, bu eksiklik gelecek d\u00f6nemlerdeki G20 zirvelerine de etkide bulunacakm\u0131\u015f gibi g\u00f6z\u00fck\u00fcyor.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Sonu\u00e7 D\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnceleri<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Mevcut karma\u015f\u0131k k\u00fcresel ekonomik ve siyasi ortamda, G20 olu\u015fumunun i\u015fi, en az\u0131ndan bu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmada \u00f6zetlenen sorun ve kayg\u0131lar bir arada dikkate al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131nda olduk\u00e7a g\u00fc\u00e7m\u00fc\u015f gibi g\u00f6z\u00fckmektedir. Ancak yine de, G20 \u00fclkeleri, mevcut sorunlar\u0131n \u00fcst\u00fcne gidip kendi aralar\u0131nda politika koordinasyonu sa\u011flayarak, di\u011fer uluslararas\u0131 \u00f6rg\u00fct ve platformlar\u0131n da faaliyet alanlar\u0131na giren baz\u0131 \u00f6nemli ve acil konularda, sorunlar\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesi veya en az\u0131ndan hafifletilmesine y\u00f6nelik somut ad\u0131mlar atma g\u00f6revini \u00fcstlenebilirler.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>T\u00fcrkiye, G20 olu\u015fumuna siyasi olarak b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6nem veriyor. Bu nedenle, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin G20 i\u00e7inde di\u011fer pek \u00e7ok \u00fclkeden daha aktif oldu\u011funu s\u00f6yleyebiliriz. Bu siyasi ilginin ve isteklili\u011fin bir sonucu olarak T\u00fcrkiye 2015 y\u0131l\u0131nda G20 haz\u0131rl\u0131k toplant\u0131lar\u0131na ve nihayetinde liderler zirvesine ev sahipli\u011fi yapacak. D\u00f6nem ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131na haz\u0131rlan\u0131rken, t\u0131pk\u0131 Rusya ve Avustralya gibi T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin de, bu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmada dikkat \u00e7ekilen b\u00fct\u00fcn hususlar\u0131 mutlaka g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcnde bulundurmas\u0131 gerekiyor. B\u00f6ylelikle, son bir-iki y\u0131lda \u00f6zellikle d\u00f6nemler-aras\u0131 s\u00fcreklilik, aciliyet, \u00f6nemlilik ve se\u00e7icilik k\u0131staslar\u0131na g\u00f6re ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 g\u00fcndem olu\u015fturul(a)mamas\u0131ndan ve baz\u0131 \u00fclkelerin\/liderlerin \u00fcstlerine d\u00fc\u015fen g\u00f6revleri yerine getir(e)memelerinden kaynaklanan hatalardan do\u011fru y\u00f6nde dersler \u00e7\u0131kart\u0131labilmi\u015f olacakt\u0131r. 2015 zirvesinin haz\u0131rl\u0131klar\u0131na erken ba\u015flamak, g\u00fcndem belirlemede titiz, ger\u00e7ek\u00e7i ve se\u00e7ici olmak, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019deki zirvenin ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6nem ta\u015f\u0131maktad\u0131r.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Bu s\u00fcre\u00e7te T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin, k\u00fcresel ve ulusal a\u00e7\u0131dan uzun vadeli bir yakla\u015f\u0131mla, \u201cekolojik a\u00e7\u0131dan s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir bir kalk\u0131nma i\u00e7in ye\u015fil b\u00fcy\u00fcme\u201d konusuna g\u00fcndemde b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6nem vermesi \u00e7ok uygun olacakt\u0131r. K\u00fcresel mal ve hizmet \u00fcretimi ve ticareti ile d\u00fcnya n\u00fcfusu i\u00e7inde \u00e7ok b\u00fcy\u00fck bir paya sahip olan G20 \u00fclkelerinin bu konularda atacaklar\u0131 ortak ad\u0131mlar, k\u00fcresel enerji sistemindeki ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmaz d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcm s\u00fcrecinde, k\u00fcresel \u0131s\u0131nmayla m\u00fccadelede ve k\u00fcresel \u00f6l\u00e7ekte yoksulluk ve a\u00e7l\u0131\u011f\u0131n giderilmesinde \u00e7ok \u00f6nemli katk\u0131larda bulunabilecektir.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Ancak, \u015fimdiden belirtmek gerekir ki, \u015fu an i\u00e7in asl\u0131nda di\u011fer konulara k\u0131yasla daha \u00e7abuk sonu\u00e7 al\u0131nabilirmi\u015f\/al\u0131nmal\u0131ym\u0131\u015f gibi g\u00f6z\u00fcken \u201cyeni finansal mimari\u201d ve \u201cfinansal d\u00fczenlemeler reformu\u201d konular\u0131 e\u011fer Meksika, Rusya ve Avustralya d\u00f6nem ba\u015fkanl\u0131klar\u0131 s\u0131ras\u0131nda da somut bir bi\u00e7imde \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcme kavu\u015fturulamayacak olursa, 2015\u2019te bile G20 g\u00fcndemini i\u015fgal edebilirler. Bu bak\u0131mdan, finansal konularda Meksika\u2019da at\u0131lacak b\u00fcy\u00fck ad\u0131mlara b\u00fcy\u00fck ihtiya\u00e7 oldu\u011fu ortadad\u0131r.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Prof. Dr. Aykut Kibrit\u00e7io\u011flu, Ankara \u00dcniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fak\u00fcltesi \u0130ktisat B\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc \u0130ktisadi Geli\u015fme ve Uluslararas\u0131 \u0130ktisat Anabilim Dal\u0131\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Bu makaleyi \u015fu \u015fekilde referans vererek kullanabilirsiniz:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Kibrit\u00e7io\u011flu, Aykut (Haziran, 2012), \u201cK\u00fcresel Ekonomi ve T\u00fcrkiye A\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan G20\u2019nin Bug\u00fcn\u00fc ve Gelece\u011fi\u201d, Cilt I, Say\u0131 4, s. 26-34, <em>T\u00fcrkiye Politika ve Ara\u015ft\u0131rma Merkezi (AnalizT\u00fcrkiye), <\/em>Londra: AnalizT\u00fcrkiye (http:\/\/researchturkey.org\/?p=1379&amp;lang=tr)<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Bu makaleyi PDF dosyas\u0131 olarak g\u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcleyebilir ve(ya) bilgisayar\u0131n\u0131za indirebilirsiniz\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/researchturkey.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/06\/AnalizTurkiye_K%C3%BCresel-Ekonomi-ve-T%C3%BCrkiye-A%C3%A7%C4%B1s%C4%B1ndan-G20%E2%80%99nin-Bug%C3%BCn%C3%BC-ve-Gelece%C4%9Fi_Prof.Dr_.Aykut-Kibritcioglu.pdf\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone  wp-image-1395\" title=\"pdf-icon2\" src=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856im_\/http:\/\/researchturkey.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/06\/pdf-icon2.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"46\" height=\"46\" \/><\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/researchturkey.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/06\/AnalizTurkiye_K%C3%BCresel-Ekonomi-ve-T%C3%BCrkiye-A%C3%A7%C4%B1s%C4%B1ndan-G20%E2%80%99nin-Bug%C3%BCn%C3%BC-ve-Gelece%C4%9Fi_Prof.Dr_.Aykut-Kibritcioglu.pdf\">Kaynak\u00e7a<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/researchturkey.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2012\/06\/AnalizTurkiye_K%C3%BCresel-Ekonomi-ve-T%C3%BCrkiye-A%C3%A7%C4%B1s%C4%B1ndan-G20%E2%80%99nin-Bug%C3%BCn%C3%BC-ve-Gelece%C4%9Fi_Prof.Dr_.Aykut-Kibritcioglu.pdf\">Bijian, Zheng (2011): \u201c<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/doi\/10.1111\/npqu.2011.28.issue-2\/issuetoc\">Toward a Global Convergence of Interests<\/a>\u201d, <em>New Perspectives Quarterly<\/em>, 28(2): 15\u201317.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Bremmer, Ian (2012): <em><a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.ianbremmer.com\/book\/every-nation-itself-winners-and-losers-g-zero-world\">Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World<\/a><\/em>. Portfolio (Penguin).<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Bremmer, Ian, ve Nouriel Roubini (2011): \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/articles\/67339\/ian-bremmer-and-nouriel-roubini\/a-g-zero-world\">A G-Zero World: The New Economic Club Will Produce Conflict, Not Cooperation<\/a>\u201d, <em>Foreign Affairs<\/em>, 90(2): 2\u20137.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Dadush, Uri ve Kati Suominen (2012): \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/ideas.repec.org\/s\/bpj\/globdv.html\">Is There Life for the G20 Beyond the Global Financial Crisis?<\/a>\u201d, <em>Journal of Globalization and Development<\/em>, 2(2): Article 7.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Eichengreen, Barry, ve Richard Baldwin (derl.) (2008): <em><a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.voxeu.org\/reports\/G20_Summit.pdf\">What G20 Leaders Must Do To Stabilise Our Economy and Fix the Financial System<\/a><\/em>. Londra: Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) &amp; VoxEU.org.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Evenett, Simon J. (derl.) (2012): <em><a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.globaltradealert.org\/11th_GTA_report\">D\u00e9b\u00e2cle: The 11th GTA Report on Protectionism<\/a><\/em>. Londra: Centre for Economic Policy Research.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Kibrit\u00e7io\u011flu, Aykut (2011a): \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de\/33515\/1\/MPRA_paper_33515.pdf\">2006-2011 K\u00fcresel Ekonomik Krizinin Bile\u015fenleri ve Karma\u015f\u0131kl\u0131\u011f\u0131<\/a>\u201d, <em>\u0130ktisat ve Toplum Dergisi<\/em>, Say\u0131 9 (Temmuz): 30\u201334.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Kibrit\u00e7io\u011flu, Aykut (2011b): \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de\/33528\/1\/MPRA_paper_33528.pdf\">Avro B\u00f6lgesi \u00dclkelerindeki G\u00fcncel \u2018Bor\u00e7 Krizi\u2019<\/a>\u201d, <em>\u0130ktisat ve Toplum Dergisi<\/em>, Say\u0131 10 (A\u011fustos): 30\u201341.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Larionova, Marina (2010), \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.g20.utoronto.ca\/events\/111107-larionova.pdf\">Assessing G8 and G20 Effectiveness in Global Governance So Far<\/a>\u201d, <em>International Organisations Research Journal<\/em>, 5(31): 99\u2013120. G\u00fcncelle\u015ftirilmi\u015f versiyonu (2011): <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.g20.utoronto.ca\/events\/111107-larionova.pdf\">www.g20.utoronto.ca\/events\/111107-larionova.pdf<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Moyo, Dambisa (2011): \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/doi\/10.1111\/npqu.2011.28.issue-2\/issuetoc\">How to Get America Back on Track<\/a>\u201d, <em>New Perspectives Quarterly<\/em>, 28(2): 31\u201333.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Rampell, Catherine (2012): \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/economix.blogs.nytimes.com\/2012\/06\/15\/putting-chinas-economic-power-in-perspective\/\">Putting China\u2019s Economic Power in Perspective<\/a>\u201d, <em>The New York Times<\/em> (<em>EconoMix<\/em>), 15 Haziran.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Roubini, Nouriel (2011): \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/doi\/10.1111\/npqu.2011.28.issue-2\/issuetoc\">It Is a G-Zero, Not a G-20, World<\/a>\u201d, <em>New Perspectives Quarterly<\/em>, 28(2): 27\u201330.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Qureshi, Z. (2010): \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/iorj.hse.ru\/en\/2010--5\/27488463.html\">G20: Global Growth and Development Agenda<\/a>\u201d, <em>International Organisations Research Journal<\/em>, 5(31): 25\u201330.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Spence, Michael (2011): \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/doi\/10.1111\/npqu.2011.28.issue-2\/issuetoc\">The Middle Income Transition in China and America\u2019s Need for Structural Change<\/a>\u201d, <em>New Perspectives Quarterly<\/em>, 28(2): 21\u201326.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Stiglitz, Joe (2011): \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/onlinelibrary.wiley.com\/doi\/10.1111\/npqu.2011.28.issue-2\/issuetoc\">Where the G-20 Stands<\/a>\u201d, <em>New Perspectives Quarterly<\/em>, 28(2): 18\u201321.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The Economist Online (2011): \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.economist.com\/blogs\/dailychart\/2010\/12\/save_date\">The Dating Game<\/a>\u201d, 27 Aral\u0131k.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Truman, Edwin M. (2012): \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.foreignpolicy.com\/articles\/2012\/04\/12\/the_g_20_is_failing?page=full\">The G-20 Is Failing<\/a>\u201d, Op-ed in <em>Foreign Policy<\/em>, 14 Nisan.<\/strong><\/p>\n<div><strong>Sonnotlar<\/strong><\/div>\n<hr align=\"left\" size=\"1\" width=\"33%\" \/>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref1\">[1]<\/a> \u00a0 Larionova (2011)\u2019e g\u00f6re, G8 ile G20 aras\u0131nda, toplant\u0131larda tart\u0131\u015f\u0131lan ve \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm aranan sorunlar a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan bir \u00e7e\u015fit \u201ci\u015fb\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc\u201d ger\u00e7ekle\u015fti\u011fi s\u00f6ylenebilir. Buna g\u00f6re, G8 g\u00fcndemlerinde daha \u00e7ok kalk\u0131nma, siyasi meseleler, enerji, g\u00fcvenlik ve enerji\/\u00e7evre konular\u0131 yer al\u0131rken, G20 g\u00fcndemlerinde daha \u00e7ok finans, ekonomi, kalk\u0131nma, ticaret ve enerji konular\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00f6ylenebilir.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref2\">[2]<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 2008 toplant\u0131s\u0131nda kararla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lan \u201cReform \u0130lkelerinin Uygulanmas\u0131 \u0130\u00e7in Eylem Plan\u0131\u201dna <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.g20.utoronto.ca\/2008\/2008declaration1115.html\">www.g20.utoronto.ca\/2008\/2008declaration1115.html<\/a> adresinden ula\u015f\u0131labilir.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref3\">[3]<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 2009\u2019da \u0130ngiltere\u2019nin tercih etti\u011fi g\u00fcndem \u00f6nceliklerine <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2009_G-20_London_Summit\">en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2009_G-20_London_Summit<\/a>, liderler zirvesi taahh\u00fctlerine ise <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.g20.utoronto.ca\/analysis\/commitments-09-london.html\">www.g20.utoronto.ca\/analysis\/commitments-09-london.html<\/a> adresinden ula\u015f\u0131labilir.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref4\">[4]<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 Pittsburgh 2009 Liderler Zirvesi taahh\u00fctlerine <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.g20.utoronto.ca\/analysis\/commitments-09-pittsburgh.html\">www.g20.utoronto.ca\/analysis\/commitments-09-pittsburgh.html<\/a> adresinden eri\u015filebilir.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref5\">[5]<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 2010 Toronto Liderler Zirvesi taahh\u00fctleri <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.g20.utoronto.ca\/analysis\/commitments-10-toronto.html\">www.g20.utoronto.ca\/analysis\/commitments-10-toronto.html<\/a> adresinde okunabilir.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref6\">[6]<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 G20 etkinlikleri genelde; d\u00f6nem ba\u015fkan\u0131 \u00fclkenin \u00f6nceliklerine g\u00f6re y\u0131ll\u0131k bir <em>g\u00fcndem olu\u015fturulmas\u0131<\/em>yla ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve bu \u00e7er\u00e7evede, zamana yay\u0131lan ve \u00e7ok ayr\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 <em>\u00f6n haz\u0131rl\u0131k \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 ve toplant\u0131lar\u0131<\/em>n\u0131n ard\u0131ndan bir <em>liderler<\/em> <em>zirvesi<\/em> d\u00fczenlendi\u011fi, zirvede al\u0131nan ortak kararlara g\u00f6re \u00fclkelerin baz\u0131 ulusal <em>taahh\u00fctler<\/em> verdikleri, daha sonra bu taahh\u00fctlere ulusal uyum ve uygulama s\u00fcre\u00e7lerinin i\u015fletildi\u011fi ve o s\u0131rada uyum geli\u015fmelerinin izlendi\u011fi ve de\u011ferlendirildi\u011fi g\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcyor.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref7\">[7]<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 2010 Seul g\u00fcndem \u00f6nceliklerine <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2010_G-20_Seoul_summit\">en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/2010_G-20_Seoul_summit<\/a>, Liderler Zirvesi taahh\u00fctleri ve eylem plan\u0131na ise <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.g20.utoronto.ca\/2010\/g20seoul-doc.html\">www.g20.utoronto.ca\/2010\/g20seoul-doc.html<\/a> adresinden ula\u015f\u0131labilir.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref8\">[8]<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 2011 Cannes g\u00fcndemi \u00f6ncelikleri <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.g20-g8.com\/g8-g20\/g20\/english\/priorities-for-france\/the-priorities-of-the-french-presidency\/the-priorities-of-the-french-presidency.75.html\">www.g20-g8.com\/g8-g20\/g20\/english\/priorities-for-france\/the-priorities-of-the-french-presidency\/the-priorities-of-the-french-presidency.75.html<\/a>, Liderler Zirvesi Taahh\u00fctleri ise <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.g20.utoronto.ca\/summits\/2011cannes.html\">www.g20.utoronto.ca\/summits\/2011cannes.html<\/a> adresinde yer almaktad\u0131r.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref9\">[9]<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 Bkz. <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/g20mexico.org\/index.php\/en\/mexican-presidency-of-the-g20\">g20mexico.org\/index.php\/en\/mexican-presidency-of-the-g20<\/a> ve\/veya <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.g20.org\/images\/pdfs\/disceng.pdf\">www.g20.org\/images\/pdfs\/disceng.pdf<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref10\">[10]<\/a> Bu madde ba\u011flam\u0131nda s\u00f6z\u00fc edilen \u201cs\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir b\u00fcy\u00fcme\u201d hedefinin, finansal-ekonomik krizden \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f (veya yeniden krize girilmesini \u00f6nlemek) i\u00e7in daha \u00e7ok <em>geli\u015fmi\u015f \u00fclkelerdeki<\/em> talebin ve istihdam\u0131n art\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131na y\u00f6nelik oldu\u011funa ve uygun maliye ve para politikalar\u0131n\u0131n belirlenmesi ve koordinasyonu \u00fczerinde odaklad\u0131\u011f\u0131na dikkat edilmelidir. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc, ilk g\u00fcndem maddesindeki bu \u201cs\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir b\u00fcy\u00fcme\u201d kavram\u0131, di\u011fer maddelerde s\u00f6z\u00fc edilen ve k\u00fcresel ekolojik sistemin sa\u011fl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve mevcudiyetini korumas\u0131n\u0131 fazlas\u0131yla \u00f6nemseyen \u201cs\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir kalk\u0131nma\u201d ve \u201cye\u015fil b\u00fcy\u00fcme\u201d\u00a0 kavramlar\u0131ndan b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde farkl\u0131d\u0131r.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref11\">[11]<\/a> UNCSD ba\u011flam\u0131nda, <em>s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir kalk\u0131nma<\/em>, \u201cgelecek ku\u015faklar\u0131n ihtiya\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131layabilme olana\u011f\u0131ndan \u00f6d\u00fcn vermeksizin g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fcz ku\u015faklar\u0131n\u0131n ihtiya\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131layabilecek bir kalk\u0131nma modeli\u201d olarak tan\u0131mlan\u0131yor. \u00d6te yandan, Kalk\u0131nma Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131\u2019n\u0131n <em>S\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir Kalk\u0131nma Portal\u0131<\/em>\u2019nda da (<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.surdurulebilirkalkinma.gov.tr\/Rio+20.portal\">www.surdurulebilirkalkinma.gov.tr<\/a>) belirtildi\u011fi \u00fczere, OECD ve UNEP gibi uluslararas\u0131 \u00f6rg\u00fct ve platformlar, <em>ye\u015fil b\u00fcy\u00fcme<\/em> veya <em>ye\u015fil ekonomi<\/em> kavram\u0131n\u0131, \u201c\u00e7evresel iyile\u015ftirmelere katk\u0131 sa\u011flayan mal ve hizmetlerin yat\u0131r\u0131m ve t\u00fcketimini \u00f6nceliklendiren bir anlay\u0131\u015f\u201d olarak tan\u0131mlamaktalar.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref12\">[12]<\/a> Kaynak: <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/turkce\/haberler\/2012\/06\/120530_rio-20.shtml\">www.bbc.co.uk\/turkce\/haberler\/2012\/06\/120530_rio-20.shtml<\/a> ve <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/news\/science-environment-18455947\">www.bbc.co.uk\/news\/science-environment-18455947<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref13\">[13]<\/a> G\u00fcncel k\u00fcresel ekonomik krizin bile\u015fenleri hakk\u0131nda ayr\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 bir a\u00e7\u0131klama i\u00e7in Kibrit\u00e7io\u011flu (2011a ve 2011b)\u2019ye bak\u0131labilir. Bu iki \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmada; g\u00fcncel k\u00fcresel ekonomik sorunlar\u0131n, ni\u00e7in sadece ABD-AB kaynakl\u0131 finansal krizlere indirgenemeyece\u011fi ve krizin bunlar\u0131n \u00f6tesinde \u00e7ok daha karma\u015f\u0131k ve \u00e7ok boyutlu bir do\u011faya sahip oldu\u011fu ileri s\u00fcr\u00fclmekte ve tart\u0131\u015f\u0131lmaktad\u0131r.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref14\">[14]<\/a> G20 olu\u015fumu, etkinlikleri ve gelece\u011fi hakk\u0131nda ayr\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 de\u011ferlendirme, ele\u015ftiri ve tart\u0131\u015fmalar i\u00e7in Eichengreen ve Baldwin (derl.) (2008), Qureshi (2010), Larionova (2011), Bijian (2011), Stiglitz (2011), Spence (2011), Roubini (2011), Moyo (2011), Bremmer ve Roubini (2011), Bremmer (2012) ile Dadusch ve Suominen (2012)\u2019ye bak\u0131labilir.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref15\">[15]<\/a> \u00d6zellikle, ulusal d\u00fczeydeki politika kararlar\u0131 ve uygulamalar\u0131yla <em>zaten \u00f6nlenebilecek nitelikte olan<\/em> veya \u00fclkelerin kendi ulusal politikalar\u0131yla <em>\u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesi zaten elzem olan<\/em>(\u201cyolsuzlukla m\u00fccadele\u201d veya \u201cistihdam\u0131n geli\u015ftirilmesi\u201d gibi) baz\u0131 konular\u0131n G20 g\u00fcndeminde (geni\u015f) yer i\u015fgal etmesi g\u00fcndem kalabal\u0131kl\u0131\u011f\u0131na yol a\u00e7maktad\u0131r. ILO kurallar\u0131na (yeterince) uymayan baz\u0131 yeni-geli\u015fen \u00fclkelerin T\u00fcrk firmalar\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131 haks\u0131z rekabet sorununun G20 \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde g\u00fcndeme getirilmesi \u00f6rne\u011finde oldu\u011fu gibi, bazen ilk bak\u0131\u015fta hakl\u0131 bir \u00e7abaym\u0131\u015f gibi g\u00f6z\u00fcken bu t\u00fcr g\u00fcndem geni\u015fletme giri\u015fimleri, asl\u0131nda G20 \u00fczerinden (yani <em>dolayl\u0131<\/em> yoldan) de\u011fil, <em>dolays\u0131z<\/em> bi\u00e7imde (yani bu \u00f6rnekte ILO platformunda) yap\u0131lsa, hem G20 g\u00fcndemi rahatlat\u0131lm\u0131\u015f, hem de ilgili \u00f6rg\u00fctten (burada: ILO) \u201crol \u00e7al\u0131nmam\u0131\u015f\u201d olabilir.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref16\">[16]<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/http:\/\/in.reuters.com\/article\/2012\/06\/15\/russia-g20-sherpa-idINDEE85E0ED20120615\">Reuters<\/a>\u2019in verdi\u011fi bir habere (15.06.2012) g\u00f6re, G20 Rusya 2013 Liderler Zirvesi\u2019nin 5 Eyl\u00fcl\u2019de St. Petersburg\u2019da d\u00fczenlenmesi planlan\u0131yor. Ayn\u0131 haberde, d\u00f6nem ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u0131ras\u0131nda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n, \u00f6zellikle b\u00fct\u00e7e a\u00e7\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n daralt\u0131lmas\u0131, bor\u00e7lar\u0131n d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fclmesi ve IMF\u2019deki oylama kurallar\u0131nda reforma gidilmesi gibi baz\u0131 temel konularda G20 \u00fcyelerinin ba\u015ftan beri verdikleri taahh\u00fctleri ne \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde yerine getirdiklerinin de\u011ferlendirilmesine b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6nem vermeyi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc belirtiliyor.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref17\">[17]<\/a> Bu konudaki ayr\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 bir kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131rmal\u0131 kantitatif analiz i\u00e7in Larionova (2011)\u2019e bak\u0131labilir.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><a title=\"\" href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20180117053856\/file:\/\/\/C:\/Users\/onurtoy\/Downloads\/AnalizTurkiye_Aykut-Kibritcioglu_G20_20120618%20(1).doc#_ftnref18\">[18]<\/a> Bkz. Bremmer ve Roubini (2011), Roubini (2011) ve Bremmer (2012).<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<\/div>\n<p><!--:--><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>2015 y\u0131l\u0131nda d\u00f6nem ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin \u00fcstlenmesi beklenen \u201c20\u2019ler Grubu\u201dnun (Group of Twenty, G20) liderleri 18-19 Haziran 2012\u2019de Meksika\u2019n\u0131n Los Cabos kentinde \u00a0(g20mexico.org) bir araya gelecekler ve d\u00fcnya ekonomisindeki g\u00fcncel ve baz\u0131 uzun vadeli sorunlar\u0131, \u00f6nceki toplant\u0131lar\u0131n hedef ve sonu\u00e7lar\u0131na g\u00f6re belirlenen 2012 y\u0131l\u0131 g\u00fcndemi \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde tart\u0131\u015f\u0131p baz\u0131 \u00f6nemli kararlar almaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015facaklar. Normalde Eyl\u00fcl-Kas\u0131m aylar\u0131nda yap\u0131lmas\u0131 [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":201,"featured_media":7754,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[238],"tags":[205,206,207,208,209],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7526"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/201"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7526"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7526\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9505,"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7526\/revisions\/9505"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7754"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7526"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7526"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7526"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}