<\/p>\n
\u00d6zet<\/b><\/p>\n
T\u00fcrkiye, stratejik co\u011frafi konumu sayesinde, Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011finde \u00e7ok \u00f6nemli bir oyuncu durumundad\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin bu f\u0131rsat\u0131 kullanarak bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi haline gelmek gibi el \u00fcst\u00fcnde tutulan bir iste\u011fi vard\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye, bu amaca ula\u015fmak i\u00e7in, herhangi bir boru hatt\u0131n\u0131n kendi topraklar\u0131ndan ge\u00e7mesine izin vermeye a\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131r. Bu ama\u00e7la T\u00fcrkiye sadece kendi enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flama almay\u0131 ve bir ge\u00e7i\u015f \u00fclkesi olarak boru hatt\u0131 projelerinden gelir elde etmeyi ama\u00e7lamaz, ayn\u0131 zamanda bu tarz bir stratejinin, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Avrupa Birli\u011fi (AB) m\u00fczakerelerinde bir enerji fasl\u0131 a\u00e7mas\u0131na olanak sa\u011flayaca\u011f\u0131 ve AB\u2019ye kat\u0131l\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 h\u0131zland\u0131raca\u011f\u0131 varsay\u0131labilir. Bununla birlikte, T\u00fcrkiye taraf\u0131ndan desteklenen rakip boru hatlar\u0131, Hazar Denizi b\u00f6lgesi, G\u00fcney Kafkasya ve Orta Do\u011fu\u2019daki siyasal istikrars\u0131zl\u0131k ve Rusya ve \u0130ran gibi b\u00fcy\u00fck g\u00fc\u00e7lerin \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6nemi gibi ger\u00e7ekler nedeniyle, T\u00fcrkiye sadece kendi kaynaklar\u0131na g\u00fcvenmemeli, ayn\u0131 zamanda, di\u011fer baz\u0131 fakt\u00f6rleri de dikkate almal\u0131d\u0131r. B\u00fct\u00fcn bu fakt\u00f6rler g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcnde bulunduruldu\u011funda, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin yak\u0131n gelecekte bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi olmas\u0131 kesin de\u011fildir.<\/p>\n
Giri\u015f<\/b><\/p>\n
T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Avrupa, Orta Asya ve de Hazar Denizi\u2019ne bir k\u00f6pr\u00fc \u015feklindeki elveri\u015fli co\u011frafi konumu, \u00f6nceden T\u00fcrkiye\u2019yi bat\u0131ya ta\u015f\u0131nan mallar i\u00e7in bir ge\u00e7it denet\u00e7isi haline getirdi\u011finden T\u00fcrkiye i\u00e7in tarih boyunca avantajl\u0131 bir durum olu\u015fturmu\u015ftur. Bug\u00fcn durum \u00f6zellikle T\u00fcrkiye i\u00e7in ayn\u0131, artan ekonomik ve politik g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fcn yan\u0131 s\u0131ra merkezi konumuyla T\u00fcrkiye, hidrokarbon al\u0131c\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n ve tedarik\u00e7ilerinin ortas\u0131nda yer ald\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan Orta Do\u011fu, Hazar Denizi, Orta Asya ve Rusya\u2019dan enerji a\u00e7\u0131 Avrupa Birli\u011fi\u2019ne (AB) giden petrol ve gaz i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir enerji ge\u00e7i\u015f \u00fclkesidir.<\/p>\n
Bu ba\u011flamda, T\u00fcrkiye, bu b\u00f6lgeler \u00fczerindeki d\u0131\u015f politika ama\u00e7lar\u0131na ula\u015fmak i\u00e7in bir enerji stratejisi kullanabilir. Bu nedenle, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin bir enerji ge\u00e7i\u015f \u00fclkesi olarak jeopolitik konumu, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019den ge\u00e7en olas\u0131 bir boru hatt\u0131 projesini, \u00f6zellikle de kendi b\u00f6lgesini Avrupal\u0131 al\u0131c\u0131lara ba\u011flayan projeleri, destekleyerek d\u0131\u015f politika ama\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 geli\u015ftirmek i\u00e7in bir ara\u00e7 olarak kullan\u0131labilir. Bug\u00fcn, enerji i\u00e7in jeopolitik rekabette, boru g\u00fczerg\u00e2hlar\u0131n\u0131n bask\u0131 ve ekonomik avantaj sa\u011flayan bir temel fakt\u00f6r haline geldi\u011fi g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcnde tutulursa, bu ba\u011flamda, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin jeo-stratejik konumu ona b\u00fcy\u00fck bir f\u0131rsat sunmaktad\u0131r (Co\u015fkun, Carlson, 2010). T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin kendi enerji kaynaklar\u0131 olmasa da, \u201cenerji aktar\u0131m koridorlar\u0131 \u00fczerinde kontrol sahibi olmak, enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n kendisi \u00fczerinde kontrol sahibi olmak kadar \u00f6nemlidir\u201d (Tekin, Walterova, 2007: 84). Bu y\u00fczden, kendisine ait enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n eksikli\u011fiyle birlikte, T\u00fcrkiye, politik ve ekonomik bak\u0131mdan enerji zengini \u00fclkeler kadar \u00f6nemli olabilmektedir.<\/p>\n
Arka Plan <\/b><\/p>\n
T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Enerji Stratejisi\u2019ne g\u00f6re, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin temel hedefi kendi enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011fini geli\u015ftirmektir. Bu ama\u00e7la, T\u00fcrkiye, enerji tedariki g\u00fczerg\u00e2hlar\u0131n\u0131, kaynak \u00fclkeleri \u00e7e\u015fitlendirmek ve Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011fine katk\u0131da bulunmak ama\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 benimsemelidir. D\u0131\u015f politika ama\u00e7lar\u0131yla birlikte bu ama\u00e7lar\u0131 benimsemek T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Avrupa Birli\u011fi\u2019ne bir enerji ge\u00e7idi haline gelme amac\u0131n\u0131 temin etmi\u015ftir. Ankara, bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi olma amac\u0131n\u0131 desteklemek i\u00e7in kendi topraklar\u0131nda boru hatlar\u0131 ve destekleyici altyap\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n in\u015faat\u0131na izin vermi\u015ftir. Ankara, transit tarifelerinden gelir ve bu enerji g\u00fczerg\u00e2hlar\u0131n\u0131n kontrol\u00fc arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla b\u00f6lgesel n\u00fcfuz elde etti\u011finden, bu boru hatlar\u0131 T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin enerji stratejisinin b\u00fct\u00fcnleyici par\u00e7alar\u0131d\u0131r (Hill, 2004: 213).<\/p>\n
Do\u011fu-Bat\u0131 Enerji Koridorunun ana bile\u015feni, Azeri-\u00c7\u0131rak-G\u00fcne\u015fli (A\u00c7G) sahas\u0131ndan ba\u015flayarak, Azerbaycan ve G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinden Ceyhan terminaline uzanan ham petrol boru hatt\u0131 sistemi olan Bak\u00fc-Tiflis-Ceyhan (BTC) boru hatt\u0131d\u0131r. 2006\u2019dan beri faaliyettedir ve 1 milyon varil\/g\u00fcn kapasiteye sahip olup, 1760 kilometre ile d\u00fcnyadaki ikinci en uzun boru hatt\u0131d\u0131r. 15 Ekim 2012\u2019den itibaren, 1,5 milyar varilden fazla Azeri petrol\u00fc Ceyhan\u2019dan tankerlere y\u00fcklenerek Avrupa pazarlar\u0131na sevk edilmi\u015ftir (T.C.\u00a0 D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131, 2012). Do\u011fu-Bat\u0131 Enerji Koridorunun ikinci bile\u015feni, 2007\u2019den beri faaliyet g\u00f6steren ve Hazar Denizi\u2019nin Azerbaycan\u2019a ait kesiminde yer alan \u015eahdeniz sahas\u0131ndan \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lan gaz\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinden T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye ta\u015f\u0131yan G\u00fcney Kafkasya do\u011fal gaz boru hatt\u0131d\u0131r. Bu boru hatt\u0131 6,6 bcm gaz kapasitesine sahiptir. T\u00fcrkiye, T\u00fcrk topraklar\u0131 \u00fczerinden ge\u00e7en b\u00fct\u00fcn G\u00fcney Gaz Koridoru projelerini desteklemektedir. 2009\u2019da Ankara\u2019da, T\u00fcrkiye, Bulgaristan, Macaristan, Romanya ve Avusturya aras\u0131nda h\u00fck\u00fcmetler-aras\u0131 bir anla\u015fma imzalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu anla\u015fmaya g\u00f6re, do\u011fal gaz, tasarlanm\u0131\u015f Nabucco boru hatt\u0131 kanal\u0131yla ta\u015f\u0131nmak durumundayd\u0131. Bu, AB\u2019nin Rusya\u2019ya olan enerji ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 azaltmaya y\u00f6nelik \u00f6nemli bir ad\u0131md\u0131. Boru hatt\u0131, Azeri, T\u00fcrkmen, Irak ve M\u0131s\u0131r gaz\u0131n\u0131 T\u00fcrkiye \u00fczerinden Avrupa\u2019ya ta\u015f\u0131yacakt\u0131; ancak, ortaklar aras\u0131nda finanse ve tarife konular\u0131nda anla\u015fma sa\u011flanamad\u0131. Mehmet Sheflek\u2019e (2009) g\u00f6re,\u00a0 2009\u2019da Nabucco projesini ba\u015flatmak, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019yi stratejik bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m noktas\u0131na d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrmek i\u00e7in kayda de\u011fer bir ad\u0131md\u0131.<\/p>\n
2009\u2019da Rusya, Nabucco\u2019ya rakip olan Kuzey Ak\u0131m adl\u0131 boru hatt\u0131n\u0131 T\u00fcrk kara sular\u0131ndan ge\u00e7irmek i\u00e7in T\u00fcrkiye\u2019yle bir protokol imzalad\u0131. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Ukrayna\u2019yla sorunlar\u0131 oldu\u011fu i\u00e7in boru hatt\u0131n\u0131n T\u00fcrkiye \u00fczerinden ve Karadeniz\u2019den ge\u00e7mesi gerekiyordu. Ancak, boru hatt\u0131n\u0131n T\u00fcrk topraklar\u0131ndan ge\u00e7mesine izin verdi\u011finden, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Rusya\u2019ya deste\u011fi ve G\u00fcney Ak\u0131m, Nabucco\u2019ya rakip oldu\u011fu i\u00e7in T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Nabucco\u2019ya ba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 konular\u0131nda tart\u0131\u015fmalar vard\u0131. Bu durum T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin amac\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a g\u00f6sterir, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc Ankara kendi topraklar\u0131ndan ge\u00e7en her boru hatt\u0131 projesini desteklemektedir. Ayr\u0131ca, 28 Haziran 2012, her iki h\u00fck\u00fcmet de Trans-Anadolu Boru Hatt\u0131\u2019n\u0131n (TANAP) hayata ge\u00e7irilmesi i\u00e7in bir konsorsiyum olu\u015fturma amac\u0131yla nihai anla\u015fmay\u0131 imzalad\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan, Azerbaycan ve T\u00fcrkiye i\u00e7in bir d\u00f6n\u00fcm noktas\u0131 olmu\u015ftur. Bu durum, arzu edilen\u00a0 \u201cG\u00fcney Gaz Koridoru\u201d nu AB \u00fclkelerine resmen a\u00e7arak, Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n oldu\u011fu gibi iki \u00fclkenin de enerji tarihinde gerekli ko\u015fullar\u0131 haz\u0131rlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Tahmini maliyeti 7 milyar dolar olan boru hatt\u0131 Azerbaycan\u2019dan y\u0131ll\u0131k 16 bcm gaz\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinden T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye ta\u015f\u0131yacak ve gaz\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck bir b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc Avrupa\u2019ya sevk edilecektir. Bu boru hatt\u0131yla Nabucco, Nabucco Bat\u0131\u2019yla de\u011fi\u015ftirilmi\u015f ve TAP (Trans-Adriyatik Boru Hatt\u0131) adl\u0131 bir ba\u015fka aktar\u0131m g\u00fczerg\u00e2h\u0131, Azeri gaz\u0131n\u0131 Avrupa\u2019ya ta\u015f\u0131mak i\u00e7in TANAP\u2019a kat\u0131lacak bir proje olarak teklif edilmi\u015ftir.\u00a0 28 Haziran 2013\u2019te \u015eahdeniz Konsorsiyumu, T\u00fcrkiye \u00fczerinden Avrupa\u2019ya bir enerji g\u00fczerg\u00e2h\u0131 olarak Nabucco Bat\u0131 yerine TAP\u2019\u0131 se\u00e7ti. Bu boru hatt\u0131 projeleri, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi olmak i\u00e7in \u00e7abalad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6sterir.<\/p>\n
T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin gelecekte bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi olma hayalini ortaya koyan pek \u00e7ok kaynak vard\u0131r, ama bu makale T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi haline gelmesinin m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olup olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015facakt\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi haline gelme amac\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcnde engeller var m\u0131d\u0131r? Buna ek olarak, makale, AB\u2019ye kat\u0131l\u0131m m\u00fczakerelerinin bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olarak T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin enerji stratejisi gibi farkl\u0131 y\u00f6nlerden konuya yakla\u015facakt\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin enerji politikas\u0131, onun Avrupa Birli\u011fi ile olan m\u00fczakerelerini nas\u0131l etkileyebilir?<\/p>\n
Neden T\u00fcrkiye bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi haline gelmek istiyor? Bunun sebebi hem i\u00e7 meseleler hem de d\u0131\u015f politika ama\u00e7lar\u0131na ula\u015fmakt\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin enerji stratejisi, kendi enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flama amac\u0131n\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye enerji-fakiri bir \u00fclke ve bunun yan\u0131 s\u0131ra enerji talebi h\u0131zla art\u0131yor. Bug\u00fcn, T\u00fcrkiye, kulland\u0131\u011f\u0131 petrol ve gaz\u0131n %70\u2019ini ithal etmektedir ve Rusya ve \u0130ran T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin ba\u015fl\u0131ca tedarik\u00e7ileri konumundad\u0131r. ABD Enerji Enformasyon \u0130daresi\u2019ne (2013) g\u00f6re, son iki y\u0131lda, T\u00fcrkiye OECD \u00fclkeleri i\u00e7inde, enerji talebinde en h\u0131zl\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fcmeyi ge\u00e7irdi. Ayr\u0131ca, gelecek 10 y\u0131l i\u00e7inde T\u00fcrkiye\u2019de enerji kullan\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n ikiye katlanmas\u0131 beklenmektedir. Bu nedenle T\u00fcrkiye, yurt i\u00e7inde bir enerji tedariki temin etmek ve bu boru hatlar\u0131ndan gelir elde etmenin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7e\u015fitlendirmek i\u00e7in kendi topraklar\u0131ndan ge\u00e7ecek her boru hatt\u0131na a\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131r.\u00a0 Bu i\u00e7 meselelerle birlikte, d\u0131\u015f politika ama\u00e7lar\u0131 da bulunmaktad\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye, enerjiyi bir ara\u00e7 olarak kullanarak etkin bir b\u00f6lgesel akt\u00f6r olmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n
T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Enerji Stratejisi ile AB\u2019ye Kat\u0131lma Amac\u0131 Aras\u0131nda Bir Ba\u011flant\u0131 Var m\u0131d\u0131r?<\/b><\/p>\n
1923\u2019te bir cumhuriyet olduktan sonra T\u00fcrkiye bat\u0131 yanl\u0131s\u0131 bir d\u0131\u015f politika izlemeye ba\u015flad\u0131. T\u00fcrkiye, AB\u2019ye ortak \u00fcye oldu ve 2000\u2019den itibaren Avrupa Birli\u011fi\u2019ne tam \u00fcye olabilmek i\u00e7in siyasi ve ekonomik reformlar d\u00fczenledi. Bu \u201cAvrupal\u0131la\u015fma\u201d s\u00fcreci T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131 \u00fczerinde b\u00fcy\u00fck bir etkiye sahip oldu. Bu bak\u0131mdan, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Asya, Orta Do\u011fu ve Avrupa aras\u0131nda bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi olma amac\u0131 do\u011fuya do\u011fru bir y\u00f6nelmeyi ifade etmez; bunun yerine T\u00fcrkiye bir AB \u00fcyesi olmaya do\u011fru m\u00fczakere kozlar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmek amac\u0131yla, AB\u2019ye enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011fi ve enerji \u00e7e\u015fitlili\u011fi sa\u011flamak istemektedir (Dimitros, Eleni, 2010). T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin enerji stratejisine g\u00f6re \u201cT\u00fcrkiye, enerji fasl\u0131n\u0131n a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131n T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Enerji Toplulu\u011fu\u2019na \u00fcyeli\u011fi konusunda AB\u2019yle m\u00fczakerelerin \u00f6n\u00fcn\u00fc a\u00e7aca\u011f\u0131na inanmaktad\u0131r\u201d (T.C. D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131, 2012). T\u00fcrkiye, kendisini ABD ve AB i\u00e7in g\u00fcvenilir ve cazip bir ortak olarak kan\u0131tlamak i\u00e7in b\u00f6lgedeki etkisini art\u0131rarak Bat\u0131daki pozisyonunu geli\u015ftirmektedir. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin kabul etti\u011fi t\u00fcm boru hatlar\u0131 Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flamaktad\u0131r. Bu ba\u011flamda, T.C. D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131\u2019na g\u00f6re (2009: 6), \u201cT\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin amac\u0131 Norve\u00e7, Rusya ve Cezayir\u2019den sonra Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n enerji tedarikinin, T\u00fcrkiye ve AB aras\u0131nda i\u015fbirli\u011fi i\u00e7in yeni bir yol a\u00e7acak d\u00f6rd\u00fcnc\u00fc ana arteri olmakt\u0131r\u201d.<\/p>\n
AB i\u00e7 talebini kar\u015f\u0131lamak i\u00e7in d\u0131\u015f hidrokarbon kaynaklar\u0131na y\u00fcksek oranda ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 durumdad\u0131r. AB Komisyonu\u2019nun hesaplamalar\u0131na g\u00f6re (2010: 13), AB\u2019nin 2007\u2019de ithalata ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 petrolde 82.6% ve do\u011fal gazda 60.3% t\u00fcr. 2030\u2019a kadar AB\u2019de do\u011fal gaz talebinin 14%-23% oran\u0131nda artaca\u011f\u0131 ve gaz ithalat\u0131na ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n yakla\u015f\u0131k olarak 70% olaca\u011f\u0131 hesaplanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r (Eurogas 2010: 2, 9). Bu nedenle, Br\u00fcksel, enerji politikas\u0131na, gaz tedariki g\u00fcvenli\u011fi konusunu d\u00e2hil etmi\u015ftir. AB gaz\u0131 a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131kl\u0131 olarak Rusya\u2019dan ithal etmektedir, ancak Rusya\u2019n\u0131n enerjiyi AB \u00fczerinde siyasi bir bask\u0131 \u201csilah\u0131\u201d olarak kullanmas\u0131, Rusya\u2019y\u0131 AB i\u00e7in g\u00fcvenilmez bir ortak yapmakta ve AB\u2019yi Azerbaycan, T\u00fcrkmenistan ve Orta Do\u011fu gibi di\u011fer do\u011fal gaz kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131 ara\u015ft\u0131rmaya y\u00f6neltmektedir.\u00a0 Ancak, bu \u00fclkelerden ba\u015flayan g\u00fczerg\u00e2hlar s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131d\u0131r; b\u00fct\u00fcn g\u00fczerg\u00e2hlar T\u00fcrkiye topraklar\u0131ndan ge\u00e7mektedir. Bu \u00e7er\u00e7evede, T\u00fcrkiye, AB\u2019nin enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011finde \u00f6nemli bir rol oynamaktad\u0131r. Ayr\u0131ca, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Karadeniz ve Akdeniz\u2019 e eri\u015fimi ona \u0130stanbul Bo\u011faz\u0131 ve \u00c7anakkale Bo\u011faz\u0131\u2019ndan ge\u00e7i\u015fi kontrol etme f\u0131rsat\u0131 vermektedir. Buna ek olarak, Rusya ve Ukrayna aras\u0131ndaki son d\u00f6nemdeki anla\u015fmazl\u0131k, Rusya\u2019y\u0131 T\u00fcrkiye\u2019de kendi boru hatlar\u0131n\u0131 in\u015fa etmeye zorlad\u0131. Bu nedenle T\u00fcrkiye; Azerbaycan, T\u00fcrkmenistan, \u0130ran, Irak ve Rusya\u2019dan \u00fclkeye giren gaz\u0131 kontrol ederek enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi rol\u00fcn\u00fc almak i\u00e7in enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n transit koridoru \u015feklindeki avantajl\u0131 konumunu kullanabilir. Bu ba\u011flamda, AB 2004 \u0130lerleme Raporu\u2019nda T\u00fcrkiye konusunda resmen belirtmi\u015ftir ki: \u201cT\u00fcrkiye, kom\u015fu \u00fclkelerden AB\u2019ye petrol ve gaz transiti i\u00e7in kaynak ve g\u00fczerg\u00e2h \u00e7e\u015fitlendirmesinde \u00f6nemli rol oynayacakt\u0131r\u201d (Avrupa Komisyonu, 2004: 116)<\/p>\n
T\u00fcrkiye, kendi topraklar\u0131ndan ge\u00e7en boru hatlar\u0131n\u0131n,\u00a0 kendi lehine olan di\u011fer konular\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmek i\u00e7in AB\u2019yle olan ili\u015fkileri bak\u0131m\u0131ndan kendisini ayr\u0131cal\u0131kl\u0131 bir konuma getirece\u011fine inanmaktad\u0131r. Bu anlamda, \u2018T\u00fcrkiye, Eyl\u00fcl 2010\u2019da, AB\u2019yle T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Enerji Toplulu\u011fu\u2019na \u00fcyeli\u011fi konusunda da g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelere ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r\u2019 \u015feklinde resmen ifade edilmi\u015ftir (D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131, 2011: 4). Ankara, enerji fasl\u0131n\u0131n a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131n \u201cT\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Enerji Toplulu\u011fu\u2019na \u00fcyeli\u011fi konusunda AB\u2019yle g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerin \u00f6n\u00fcn\u00fc a\u00e7aca\u011f\u0131\u201dna inanmaktad\u0131r (D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131, 2011: 4). Nabucco g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeleri s\u0131ras\u0131nda h\u00fck\u00fcmet, enerji fasl\u0131 s\u00fcreci AB kat\u0131l\u0131m m\u00fczakerelerinde yer ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00fcrece projeye kat\u0131laca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a belirtmi\u015ftir (Krauer, 2011). Bu ba\u011flamda, Ba\u015fbakan Erdo\u011fan 2009\u2019da \u201cenerji fasl\u0131n\u0131n engellendi\u011fi bir durumla kar\u015f\u0131la\u015f\u0131rsak, tabii ki [Nabucco konusunda] durumumuzu tekrar g\u00f6zden ge\u00e7irece\u011fiz\u201d \u015feklinde konu\u015fmu\u015ftur (Vucheva, 2009). Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla, enerji ve T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin AB\u2019ye kat\u0131lma d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131 aras\u0131nda bir ba\u011f bulunmaktad\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye, AB\u2019yle olan ili\u015fkilerinde siyasal n\u00fcfuz kazanmak i\u00e7in enerjiyi bir ara\u00e7 gibi kullanabilme beklentisi i\u00e7indedir.<\/p>\n
T\u00fcrkiye Bir Enerji Da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m Merkezi Olabilir mi? \u0130\u00e7 ve D\u0131\u015f Zorluklar<\/b><\/p>\n
Literat\u00fcr, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin bir enerji ge\u00e7idi olma olas\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 konusunda olumlu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fler sunsa da, bunun kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda baz\u0131 zorluklar var. \u00d6rneklerden baz\u0131lar\u0131, T\u00fcrkiye taraf\u0131ndan desteklenen farkl\u0131 boru hatlar\u0131 aras\u0131ndaki rekabet, b\u00f6lgedeki siyasi istikrars\u0131zl\u0131klar ve \u00fclke i\u00e7indeki istikrars\u0131zl\u0131k ve sorunlar. Bu engellerle birlikte di\u011fer jeopolitik dinamikler ve di\u011fer b\u00f6lgesel akt\u00f6rlerin stratejik hesaplamalar\u0131 s\u00fcrece engel olu\u015fturabilir.<\/p>\n
\u00d6ncelikle, T\u00fcrkiye taraf\u0131ndan desteklenen boru hatlar\u0131, Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flamak i\u00e7in yeterince iyi, ancak, bu boru hatlar\u0131 birbiriyle rekabet i\u00e7inde ve bu boru hatlar\u0131n\u0131n tamam\u0131 olmaks\u0131z\u0131n T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi olma amac\u0131na ula\u015fmas\u0131 olduk\u00e7a g\u00fc\u00e7. Bu boru hatlar\u0131n\u0131n dikkat \u00e7eken \u00f6rnekleri Nabucco (sonradan Nabucco Bat\u0131 olarak adland\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r) ve G\u00fcney Ak\u0131m\u2019d\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin de\u011fi\u015fken politikas\u0131 ve ortaklar aras\u0131ndaki di\u011fer baz\u0131 anla\u015fmazl\u0131klar nedeniyle Nabucco boru hatt\u0131 projesi ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilemedi ve TANAP projesi \u015fimdilik sadece Azeri gaz\u0131n\u0131 Avrupa\u2019ya ta\u015f\u0131yabilen Nabucco Bat\u0131\u2019yla de\u011fi\u015ftirildi, ancak, Azerbaycan tek ba\u015f\u0131na Avrupa\u2019ya ihra\u00e7 edilecek yeterli miktarda gaza sahip de\u011fildir. Nabucco, Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n enerji talebini kar\u015f\u0131layabilmesi ve Rus gaz\u0131na olan ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 azaltmas\u0131 i\u00e7in en \u00f6nemli boru hatt\u0131 projesi olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen art\u0131k ge\u00e7erli bir boru hatt\u0131 plan\u0131 de\u011fil. Ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7taki Nabucco olmaks\u0131z\u0131n T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi olmas\u0131 m\u00fcmk\u00fcn g\u00f6r\u00fcnm\u00fcyor. Carlson\u2019a g\u00f6re (2010): \u201cH\u00fck\u00fcmet, AB kat\u0131l\u0131m m\u00fczakerelerini h\u0131zland\u0131rmak, Azeri gaz\u0131 i\u00e7in d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck bir fiyat kararla\u015ft\u0131rmak ve Rusya\u2019yla iyi ili\u015fkileri s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmek gibi k\u0131sa vadeli ama\u00e7larla ilgilendi\u011finden, T\u00fcrkiye taraf\u0131nda tutarl\u0131 bir strateji eksikli\u011fi var\u201d.<\/p>\n
T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin i\u00e7 enerji t\u00fcketimi, yukar\u0131da da g\u00f6sterildi\u011fi gibi, s\u00fcrekli olarak artmaktad\u0131r. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla, i\u00e7 talebi kar\u015f\u0131lamak ve petrol ve gaz\u0131 Avrupa\u2019ya yeniden ihra\u00e7 etmek i\u00e7in, T\u00fcrkiye i\u00e7inde, Hazar ve Orta Do\u011fu gaz\u0131n\u0131 Avrupa\u2019ya ta\u015f\u0131yabilecek yeterli boru hatt\u0131 kapasitesi olmal\u0131d\u0131r. Bu nedenle, rakip boru hatlar\u0131 aras\u0131ndaki tutars\u0131z enerji politikas\u0131 bu s\u00fcreci g\u00fc\u00e7le\u015ftirmektedir. \u00d6rne\u011fin, TANAP sadece 16 bcm gaz ta\u015f\u0131yabilecek ve 6 bcm T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin i\u00e7 talebini kar\u015f\u0131lamak i\u00e7in kullan\u0131lacak ve geri kalan\u0131 TAP kanal\u0131yla Avrupa\u2019ya gidecek. 10 milyar\u00a0 Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n talebini kar\u015f\u0131lamak i\u00e7in yeterli de\u011fildir.<\/p>\n
Bir di\u011fer i\u00e7 sorun, g\u00fcneydo\u011fudaki K\u00fcrt b\u00f6lgesinde petrol ve gaz aktar\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 aksatan siyasal istikrars\u0131zl\u0131k olu\u015fabilecek olmas\u0131d\u0131r. \u00d6rne\u011fin, 1996\u2019da K\u00fcrdistan \u0130\u015f\u00e7i Partisi (PKK) lideri Abdullah \u00d6calan, \u201cHazar\u2019dan gelen hi\u00e7bir boru hatt\u0131n\u0131n K\u00fcrt b\u00f6lgesinden ge\u00e7mesine izin vermeyeceklerini\u201d ifade etmi\u015ftir (Hill, 2004: 231). Bunun bir kan\u0131t\u0131 olarak neredeyse bir ay boyunca boru hatt\u0131n\u0131n kapat\u0131lmas\u0131na neden olmu\u015f olan BTC\u2019nin bombalanmas\u0131 ve yine BTC boru hatt\u0131nda ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen ve 1.5 milyar dolar i\u015fletim kayb\u0131na yol a\u00e7t\u0131\u011f\u0131 hesaplanan iki patlama verilebilir (Eissler, 2012), ayr\u0131ca, son 10 y\u0131l i\u00e7inde Kerk\u00fck-Ceyhan boru hatt\u0131nda ter\u00f6rizm ve sabotaj sahnededir. En \u00f6nemli boru hatlar\u0131 PKK\u2019n\u0131n aktif oldu\u011fu b\u00f6lgelerden ge\u00e7ti\u011finden Avrupa\u2019ya gaz aktar\u0131m\u0131 i\u00e7in g\u00fcvenilir bir g\u00fczerg\u00e2h de\u011fildir. PKK ve h\u00fck\u00fcmet aras\u0131nda bar\u0131\u015fa do\u011fru yeni geli\u015fmeler olsa da kuzey \u015fehri Kerk\u00fck\u2019ten T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Akdeniz liman\u0131 Ceyhan\u2019a Irak ham petrol\u00fc ta\u015f\u0131yan Kerk\u00fck-Ceyhan boru hatt\u0131n\u0131n bir b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc kimli\u011fi belirsiz militanlar taraf\u0131ndan bombalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r (Press TV, 2013). Devam etmekte olan bar\u0131\u015f s\u00fcreciyle b\u00f6lgede ne olaca\u011f\u0131 \u015fu anda belirsiz olsa da b\u00f6lgenin potansiyel bir hedef ve de\u011fi\u015fken bir alan oldu\u011fu g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir.<\/p>\n
D\u0131\u015f zorluklar, Hazar b\u00f6lgesi ve Orta Do\u011fu\u2019nun da istikrars\u0131z olmas\u0131d\u0131r. Bunlar, Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n enerji g\u00fczerg\u00e2h\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7e\u015fitlendirebilecek tek enerji kaynaklar\u0131d\u0131r. Bununla birlikte, devam eden Karaba\u011f anla\u015fmazl\u0131\u011f\u0131 Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 riskli bir yat\u0131r\u0131m haline getirmektedir, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc boru hatlar\u0131 Ermenistan s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n yak\u0131n\u0131ndad\u0131r ve e\u011fer iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda bir sava\u015f \u00e7\u0131karsa, boru hatlar\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcvenli\u011fi tehlikeye d\u00fc\u015fecektir. Dahas\u0131, Abhazya ve G\u00fcney Osetya anla\u015fmazl\u0131klar\u0131, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019dan ge\u00e7en boru hatlar\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcvenli\u011fini tehdit eden birer fakt\u00f6rd\u00fcr. Durum, b\u00f6lgede pek \u00e7ok siyasal istikrars\u0131zl\u0131k oldu\u011fu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcl\u00fcrse, \u00f6zellikle Suriye\u2019de olmakla birlikte Orta Do\u011fu\u2019da da ayn\u0131d\u0131r. Orta Do\u011fu\u2019daki olas\u0131 rejim de\u011fi\u015fiklikleri, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin bu b\u00f6lgeyle olan dostane ili\u015fkilerini de etkileyecektir. Bu y\u00fczden, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin g\u00fcvendi\u011fi ve Avrupa\u2019ya aktar\u0131mda kullanmay\u0131 istedi\u011fi enerji kaynaklar\u0131 siyasal a\u00e7\u0131dan istikrars\u0131zd\u0131r. Buna ek olarak, \u0130srail, son d\u00f6nemlerde, b\u00fcy\u00fck miktarda gaz rezervlerine sahip oldu\u011funu ve gaz\u0131n aktar\u0131m\u0131 konusunda T\u00fcrkiye\u2019yle i\u015fbirli\u011fi yapmak istedi\u011fini iddia etti, fakat b\u00f6yle bir boru hatt\u0131 K\u0131br\u0131s topraklar\u0131ndan ge\u00e7mek durumunda oldu\u011fundan ve T\u00fcrkiye, K\u0131br\u0131s\u2019\u0131 tan\u0131mad\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan, b\u00f6yle bir projenin ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmesi m\u00fcmk\u00fcn g\u00f6r\u00fcnm\u00fcyor.<\/p>\n
Kafkasya ve Orta Do\u011fu\u2019daki bir di\u011fer d\u0131\u015f zorluk, \u00f6zellikle Rusya ve \u0130ran gibi, g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc akt\u00f6rlerin de bu b\u00f6lgelerde \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 olmas\u0131d\u0131r. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Kazakistan ve T\u00fcrkmenistan \u00fczerinde siyasal bask\u0131s\u0131 vard\u0131r, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc Hazar gaz\u0131n\u0131n Avrupa\u2019ya ula\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nlemek i\u00e7in bu devletlerden enerji almaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131yor. Siyasal bask\u0131s\u0131 sadece Hazar Denizi\u2019nin do\u011fu k\u0131sm\u0131nda yer ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in Azerbaycan \u00fczerinde daha az, ama Azerbaycan tek ba\u015f\u0131na Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flayamaz. Nabucco\u2019nun ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilememi\u015f olmas\u0131n\u0131n nedenlerinden biri T\u00fcrkmen gaz\u0131n\u0131 Trans-Hazar boru hatt\u0131 kanal\u0131yla ta\u015f\u0131yacak olmas\u0131yd\u0131; ancak, Hazar Denizi\u2019nin yasal stat\u00fcs\u00fc hen\u00fcz \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlenmedi\u011finden \u0130ran ve Rusya Hazar\u2019da deniz dibi boru hatt\u0131 in\u015faat\u0131na izin vermedi. Ayr\u0131ca, \u0130ran, kendi topraklar\u0131 \u00fczerinden bu b\u00f6lgenin enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131 uluslararas\u0131 pazarlara ta\u015f\u0131yarak Orta Asya\u2019daki durumunu g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmeyi ama\u00e7lamaktad\u0131r. \u0130ran, Hazar petrol\u00fcn\u00fcn d\u00fcnya pazarlar\u0131na ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131 i\u00e7in en rekabet\u00e7i aktar\u0131m g\u00fczerg\u00e2h\u0131n\u0131 sundu\u011fundan, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi olma amac\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 bir tehdit olu\u015fturuyor (Hill, 2004: 232). \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 sahneye \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, \u0130ran Hazar Denizi\u2019nde gaz boru hatt\u0131 planlar\u0131ndan daha fazla avantaja sahip oldu\u011fu i\u00e7in, T\u00fcrkiye manevra bak\u0131m\u0131ndan zay\u0131f konumda kal\u0131yor. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin stratejik konumu ve kaynaklar\u0131 pek \u00e7ok boru hatt\u0131 projesini ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmek i\u00e7in yeterli de\u011fildir, bununla birlikte, b\u00f6lgesel akt\u00f6rlerin \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 da dikkate al\u0131nmas\u0131 gereken \u00f6nemli bir konudur.<\/p>\n
\u00c7at\u0131\u015fan Boru Hatlar\u0131 ve \u0130\u00e7 Ter\u00f6rizm: Zorlu Bir Yol<\/b><\/p>\n
T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin co\u011frafi konumu, kendi enerji kaynaklar\u0131 olmasa da, ona Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flama ayr\u0131cal\u0131\u011f\u0131 verir. Bu ba\u011flamda, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin kat\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 yukarda bahsedilen kendi topraklar\u0131ndan ge\u00e7en boru hatt\u0131 projeleri, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin amac\u0131n\u0131n bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi olmak oldu\u011funu g\u00f6sterir. Bu enerji stratejisinin ard\u0131nda yatan nedenler \u00e7ok boyutludur. Bu enerjiyi Avrupa\u2019ya ta\u015f\u0131maktan gelir elde etmesinin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra, T\u00fcrkiye enerjiyi bir ara\u00e7 haline getirerek b\u00f6lgede daha aktif hale gelmek istemektedir, ama daha \u00f6nemli olan bir fakt\u00f6r, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin AB\u2019yle g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerinde bir enerji fasl\u0131 a\u00e7arak, AB\u2019ye kat\u0131l\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 h\u0131zland\u0131r\u0131p h\u0131zland\u0131ramayaca\u011f\u0131d\u0131r. Bu ko\u015ful, Nabucco m\u00fczakerelerinde \u00f6ne s\u00fcr\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr.\u00a0 Bununla birlikte, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin enerji stratejisi hem i\u00e7 hem de d\u0131\u015f ciddi sorunlarla kar\u015f\u0131la\u015fabilir, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin enerji stratejisi, rakip boru hatlar\u0131n\u0131 destekledi\u011finden ve i\u00e7 enerji talebi artmakta oldu\u011fundan, tutarl\u0131 de\u011fildir. Ayr\u0131ca, PKK\u2019yla var olan siyasal sorunlar ve K\u0131br\u0131s sorunu da enerji stratejisinin zorluklar\u0131ndand\u0131r. D\u0131\u015fsal olarak, T\u00fcrkiye, siyasi istikrars\u0131zl\u0131k i\u00e7indeki b\u00f6lgelerden, yani etnik \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n ve siyasi karga\u015fan\u0131n yer ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 Hazar ve Orta Do\u011fu, gelen boru hatlar\u0131n\u0131 desteklemektedir. Bunun yan\u0131 s\u0131ra, Rusya ve \u0130ran gibi b\u00f6lgesel akt\u00f6rlerin \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131, bu devletler Hazar \u00fczerinde g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir etkiye sahip oldu\u011fundan ve bu etki T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi olma amac\u0131n\u0131 tehlikeye soktu\u011fundan, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin amac\u0131yla \u00f6rt\u00fc\u015fmemektedir. Bununla beraber, T\u00fcrkiye, enerji stratejisinde, sadece kendi kaynaklar\u0131na g\u00fcvenmeden, jeopolitik dinamikleri ve Rusya ve \u0130ran gibi di\u011ferlerinin \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 da hesaplamal\u0131d\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Narmin Jarchalova, Azebaycan Diplomasi Akademisi<\/b><\/p>\n
Makaleyi \u015fu \u015fekilde referans vererek kullanabilirsiniz:<\/span> KAYNAK\u00c7A<\/b><\/p>\n Avrupa Komisyonu \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 (2004), \u201c<\/span>2004 Regular Report on Turkey\u2019s Progress towards Accession<\/i>\u201d, \u2039http:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/enlargement\/archives\/pdf\/key_docu<\/a> ments\/2004\/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf\u203a. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Bir Enerji Da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m Merkezi Olmaya Y\u00f6nelik Enerji Politikas\u0131: \u0130\u00e7 ve D\u0131\u015f Zorluklar \u00d6zet T\u00fcrkiye, stratejik co\u011frafi konumu sayesinde, Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011finde \u00e7ok \u00f6nemli bir oyuncu durumundad\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin bu f\u0131rsat\u0131 kullanarak bir enerji da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m merkezi haline gelmek gibi el \u00fcst\u00fcnde tutulan bir iste\u011fi vard\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye, bu amaca ula\u015fmak i\u00e7in, herhangi bir boru hatt\u0131n\u0131n kendi topraklar\u0131ndan […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":242,"featured_media":7272,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[204],"tags":[205,206,207,208,209],"class_list":["post-7317","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-sectoral-analysis-tr","tag-article-2-tr","tag-dual-language-2-tr","tag-latests-tr","tag-main-page-tr","tag-slider-entry-tr"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7317","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/242"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7317"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7317\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7590,"href":"https:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7317\/revisions\/7590"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/7272"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7317"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7317"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.researchturkey.org\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7317"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\nJarchalova, Narmin (Eyl\u00fcl, 2013), \u201cT\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Bir Enerji Da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m Merkezi Olmaya Y\u00f6nelik Enerji Politikas\u0131: \u0130\u00e7 ve D\u0131\u015f Zorluklar\u201d, Cilt II, Say\u0131 7, s.15-22,\u00a0T\u00fcrkiye Politika ve Ara\u015ft\u0131rma Merkezi (AnalizT\u00fcrkiye), Londra: Analiz T\u00fcrkiye\u00a0<\/em>(http:\/\/researchturkey.org\/dev\/?p=4073&lang=tr)<\/p>\n
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\nPress TV, \u201cAttack on Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline halts flow\u201d (May 13, 2013),<\/i> http:\/\/www.presstv.ir\/detail\/2013\/05\/13\/303350\/iraqturkey-oil-pipeline-bombed<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"