[1]Between the 18^th and 19^th June 2012, the leaders of G20 summit will meet in Los Cabos, Mexico. Turkey has been nominated for presidency of the summit in the term beginning in 2015.  After discussing a variety of current and long-term problems based on the agenda of 2012 which was determined with respect to the objectives and conclusions of the previous summits, the leaders will try to take important decisions concerning the current situation. The summit, which was expected to take place between September and November is taking place less than eight months later than the last summit under French presidency which took place on the 3^rd and 4^th November in Cannes. It has been so scheduled to avoid clashing with Mexico’s general elections, due to take place in July 2012. After the summit, which is taking place four months ahead due to political concerns, the work under Mexican presidency will continue until November.

The questions that should be asked here are: since when and on which issues have the G20 countries started to hold summits? Is it an efficient and effective formation? Will the G20 leaders meeting on the 18^th and 19^th June 2012 be able to compromise on a successful conclusion? What does this successful conclusion depend on? What are the particular concerns that might make us pessimistic or optimistic about the future of the G20? In this evaluation, the answers of these questions will be addressed and discussed with respect to the present and future of world economy and Turkish economy. [2]

G-20 2012 Mexico Summit Agenda and Turkey

The original G7 group was formed in 1976 by the United States of America in the midst of the two major oil crises in the 1970s, and comprised Germany, Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy and Canada. Upon Russia’s entry to the group in 1998, it became the G8, and in 1999 (following the crises in far-eastern Asia and Russia) Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and the European Union joined, transforming it to the G20. Such international institutions have always come together for the essential purpose of finding joint solutions to worldwide economic and/or political problems. They meet at a variety of different settings and at varying frequencies, using political coordination between their member countries to weather international crises.

The G20 group failed to serve as a sufficient and active organization in the years between 1999 and 2008. However, in 2008 the members of the group began to form a tighter coalition, following the financial and economic crisis which started in the U.S. and swiftly spread to other countries of the developed world. The U.S. in particular encouraged an increasing frequency of meetings between member countries. The G20 countries met in Washington (the USA)[3] from 14-15^th November 2008, in London (UK)[4] on 2^nd April 2009, from 24-25^th September 2009 in Pittsburgh (the USA)[5],  and in Toronto (Canada)[6] from 26-27^th June 2012. During these meetings, they determined the structure and the content of the agenda for the following years.[7] Following these meetings, the G20 countries also met in the Seoul[8]  from 11-12^th November 2010 during South Korea’s presidency, and then in Cannes[9]  on 3-4^th November 2011 under France’s leadership.

During the summit of 18-19^th June 2012 in Los Cabos, under Mexico’s presidency, the current agenda[10] ,as determined in previous years, will be pursued according to Mexico’s own prioritization. This agenda, in summary covers the topics such as; 1) economic stability and structural reforms as fundamentals of economic growth and employment 2) strengthening the financial system to promote economic growth and promoting financial access, 3) improving the structure of international financial systems in a world where world economies are interconnected, 4) strengthening the food security and reducing the fluctuation in commodity prices, 5) the promotion of sustainable development, ‘green’ growth and ways of dealing with climate change. These key points will be discussed according to the prior preparations made in the course of November 2011 to June 2011, and the group will try to reach important joint decisions and make national targets for them.

The Secretariat of the Treasury, who is in preparation for the summit at Los Cabos, has grouped its activities under the following categories:

(1)   Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth

(2)   International Financial Structure

(3)   Reforms to the Financial Sector and Spread to the Financial Substructure

(4)   Energy and Commodity Markets

(5)   Governance of Disaster Risk

(6)   International Trade (Refraining from Economic Protection and the Conclusion to Negotiations Regarding Doha Development Agenda)

(7)   The Social Impact of Employment and Globalization

(8)   Fighting Corruption

(9)   Money Laundering and Fighting the Funding of Terrorism

(10) Development (Food Security, Infrastructure and Green Growth)

Since the first of these areas will focus on the financial problems and the inability to create growth and employment in the developed economies (resulting from the fact that current global financial-economic crisis is stemming from a United States and European Union core), this situation might lead to internal struggles of the leaders of the developed economies, as well as a general lack of negotiation (esprcially considering the short-term negative impact of current Eurozone crisis on the agenda in Mexico), particularly between the US and China. Therefore, it is possible that the outcome will be far weaker and more vague than expected. [11]

If decisive steps are not taken at the G20 conference with regards to reforming the international financial structure and overhauling economic organization, then the responsibility for future international financial crises- for failing to prevent or predict them- will, of course, lie mainly on the shoulders of the leaders of the G20 countries.

As for the issues of development, or rather for the “green growth for sustainable development” and “food security”, as well as for the “instability in energy prices”, these in my opinion must be discussed at Los Cabos, and if necessary must be among the most important topics up for discussion at future G20 summits. Due to its geographical location, Turkey is one of the countries likely to be most affected by the negative consequences of global warming and climate change, and so I predict that Turkey will, during its presidency in 2015, put particular emphasis on these issues.

When the international crisis eased off a little in 2010, it seemed that the concomitant anxieties regarding international trade protection also decreased. Yet as the Evenett protection report, which was published on 14 June 2012 using the data of Global Trade Alert (www.globaltradealert.org) Databank, shows, complaints arising from the intensification of protectionist measures in trade (both in public and private sectors) have actually increased. Furthermore, according to the report, G20 countries are responsible for most of the protectionist measures starting from November 2008. For this reason, the G20 countries clearly need to make joint decisions as soon as possible in order to reduce the protectionism, and to do this without waiting for action from the WTO member- countries outside of G20. Because, there is no empirical evidence understating the benefits of free trade on the path to international sustainable development. On the contrary, the one-off increase in prosperity which will arise from opening up the world’s economies is a precondition for the increase in the wealth of poorer countries, insufficient though it may be. In fact, there are strong findings in the economics literature showing that the improvement of institutions and development in technology in open economies will increase prosperity and development.

As for the governance of risk disaster, which has been brought to forefront by Mexico’s own preference, Turkey is expected to share its own experiences with other countries based on a scientific report. The problem is that it may not be realistic to expect or request the discussion of such issues at G20 conferences in the future due to their secondary nature.  This is because the G20’s contemporary agenda is already significantly occupied by many urgent and important matters.

A Few (Likely) Organizational Problems at the G20 Summit

One of the first problems which come to attention about the G20 summit in Mexico, and one which I touched upon earlier, is the fact that the president country has held its presidency for significantly less than the usual 10-12 month period, thanks to the political concerns of politicians in the president country. I personally believe that such arbitrary decisions should be avoided at future summits. This random approach is likely to have a negative effect on the future effectiveness and activity of the G20.

A second organizational issue, which ought not to be downplayed, is the fact that some of the official websites detailing previous summits (as happened to the websites of Britain’s presidency in 2009 and South Korea’s presidency in 2010) have later been taken offline. Although it is claimed that the contents of these websites were transferred to the next-term presidencies and most details of the G20 are generally available on the Toronto Information Centre’s website anyway (www.g20.utoronto.ca), I still believe that websites set up by the president countries should be protected as both a simple and useful means of accessing information.

A third problem concerns the fact that there are plans for another important meeting immediately following the G20 summit in June 2012.  Following the preliminary meetings that begin on the 13^th June 2012 in Rio de Janeiro, leaders and representatives of 193 countries from the public and private sector will be meeting on the 20-22^nd June 2012 at the “Rio+20 Worldwide Summit” (www.uncsd2012.org)  to discuss “Sustainable Development”. This summit is a continuation of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development UNCED which was first set up in 1992, and is a 20-year anniversary of this first meeting. The 10-year anniversary was observed in the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 in Johannesburg.

The main aim of the Rio+20 Worldwide Summit is “to push” the world economy to the path of “sustainable development”[12], following the successful efforts and developments in this field over the last 20 years. It is hoped that at the meeting the governments will come up with practical preventative measures based on clear and fixed objectives in order to ensure sustainable development. It is only through this way we can fight poverty without damaging the environment. Turkey’s Ministry of Development has prepared a draft agenda to be pursued at the Rio+20 summit. This includes (1) Development of energy, food and nutrition security in poor countries (2) The gradual decrease of fossil fuel subsidies and (3) Increasing the measures required to protect oceans. However according to the BBC[13]  and other news sources, it seems that there is no firm consensus on the details of the agreement emerging from the preparatory meetings in Rio as of 16^th June 2012.

Yet the issues of “Green Development” and “Sustainable Development” remain part of the agenda for the G20 countries, if in reduced form. The fact that there is no real break between the two summits, and the existence of various disagreements, delays and lengthy diplomatic negotiations prior to signing a new international agreement at the Rio+20 summit can be seen as a bad luck for G20 Summit.

Two Factual Facts About G20

I believe that at least these two facts should be kept in mind while evaluating the activities, performance and the future of G20:

(1) The G20’s activities must be conducted in an environment of complex and simultaneous financial, public debt, international trade, ecology (global warming and climate change), energy, food and poverty/hunger crisis since 2006. [14]

The reason why G20 has become more active starting from 2008 is the need to form a force against the financial crisis that started in the US in the years 2006-2007 and spread to the rest of the world in 2008. However, the attempts to create a political coordination among countries and to fight the Great Recession force G20 to take a larger number of issues to the agenda than normally planned due to the complex variety of factors which create and nurture the global economic crisis environment.  This fact is creating an inevitable concentration and diversification pressure on the G20 agenda.

Furthermore, the current crisis environment in the global economy created a need among economists to replace the dominant “new classical” approach which Furthermore, the complex worldwide financial crisis of the years 2006-2012 has created a strong and urgent need for a new economic approach to replace traditional “new classical” approach, which made “the use of complex mathematics and econometrics an objective rather than a tool”

The debate between orthodox and heterodox economics which is gaining popularity thanks to the contemporary financial crisis has not yet had a sufficient (positive) impact on the curricula of the economics departments in universities. However, I hope it is acknowledged that there is a need to apply interdisciplinary approach to economics in which institutions, ecological system and history will be three fundamental cornerstones.

Table 1: G20 Agenda (2008-2012) and Major Interest/Action Topics of International Organizations and Platforms – Source: The author

(2) On the other hand, it may be the case that the main issues regarding the G20’s present and future actually stem from the fact that agenda of the G20 summit span the aims of a variety of different worldwide/international groups and platforms. This situation has been summarized with the help of selected major topics from the agenda and organizations in Table 1. The overlap between the main interest areas of organizations and platforms detailed in the rows of the table and the contemporary agenda worked on by the G20 between 2008-12 has been demonstrated in the “black” boxes. Only the G20 issues considered “relatively minor” by the OECD have been shown in “grey” boxes in the Table. If the same method were applied to other organizations and platforms, the areas of overlap in the table would also increase.

Table 1 demonstrates the degree to which the G20 is engaged in “role stealing” from a variety of international organizations and platforms, and this highlights an important point with respect to the performance of the G20. It may be thought that because the G20 consists of relatively fewer countries than the other organizations and platforms, it can take decisions about its main concerns and aims in a straightforward and swift manner compared to the other broader organizations. But this phenomenon also implies that the decisions and actions taken by the G20 will be meaningful if only they are supported and accepted by organizations and platforms with a broader participatory base. This two-way reality has a great significance with regard to the determination of the G20’s agenda and the organization’s performance.

Some Issues and Flaws about the G20 Meeting 2012, Mexico

Now, we can put aside the organizational issues which I touched upon earlier and, bearing in mind the two factual proofs I outlined, we can look more closely at the various issues, weaknesses, uncertainties or potential strengths within the G20 organization.[15]

The excessive complexity and lack of consistency and realistic approach within the G20, At the G20 summits, a wide variety of issues are discussed simultaneously through a number of concentrated discussions of the agenda. It is therefore not an unlikely conjecture that this diversity and complexity will have a negative effect on the G20’s success rate. When determining the G20’s contemporary agenda, the following issues need to be taken into account. (1) The importance of the issues (2) their urgency and (3) the expectancy of reaching to a conclusion in a short or long time. Therefore, it is important to have a realistic approach to the summit’s goals, and to avoid the following topics for the good of the G20 countries and the worldwide economy, namely (1) Issues which appear to be of less importance (2) Issues which appear to be less urgent and (3) Issues which can only be resolved with difficulty and over a longer period of time. Yet it is rather difficult to agree that the G20 has been successful in these areas to date. [16]

Contemporary issues invading the agenda of the summit. It is often the case that a number of important developments in the world economy or in regional politics has a tendency to infiltrate the agenda of the G20 Summits and shift the discussions which were planned earlier towards contemporary developments. For example, at the summit in Toronto (2009), the main issue under discussion was “the fiscal crises of developed countries”, in Seoul (2010) it was that period’s “currency wars” and in Cannes (2011) it was “the Eurozone crisis”. It is predicted that the Eurozone issues will also make their mark on the agenda at Los Cabos (2012). The debt crisis, which deepened with the internal political conflict in Greece, the financial crisis which could not be postponed/avoided any more in Spain and the expectancy of a new debt crisis in Italy led to the arguments concerning a fiscal union, banking union and political union within the EU throughout the first half of 2012 It is clear that such sudden developments should not spoil the agenda during the presidency of Russia[17], Australia and Turkey following that of Mexico.

Should the president country’s influence on the priorities of the summit be limited? The fact that the president country and the initiative of its leaders are primarily responsible for the determination of the summit’s priorities can sometimes disrupt the continuity of the G20’s structural tendencies and the time it takes to come to decisions (for example, France under Sarkozy). As the fact that 7-9 of the G20 countries are having or are about to hold elections during 2012 implies, the changes in country leadership may also have negative effects on the summit- even if they are only minor. This point must not be allowed to limit the long-term presence and significance of the G20.

Some of the natural limitations faced by the G20. Even if the countries of the G20 can agree among themselves about some of the contemporary agenda, they still may not be able to come up with worldwide solutions to them. The best example of this might be the decisions which can be taken at the G20 summits about “the international trade of goods and services”, a topic which falls into the remit of the World Trade Organization. Such decisions require the final say from the WTO, and there is little real point in discussing and reaching conclusions about such topics at the G20, as decisions made at WTO meetings require unanimous approval from member countries.

As the worldwide Great Recession resides, there will be a greater disparity in the mutual interests of the developed and developing countries in the G20. It is generally accepted by many economists that swift and successful responses to the international crisis were made at the Washington (November 2008) and London (April 2009) meetings. This was done through the discussion of (1) Joint financial and fiscal development (2) The provision of extra funds to the IMF and (3) The creation of new laws for the financial sector. The problem is that as the effects of the global financial crisis ease off, there will increasingly be a disparity in the interests of the developed and developing countries of the G20. Many observers have frequently suggested that these changes will reduce the effectiveness of the G20. This loss of enthusiasm and disintegration of shared interests, if it does happen, may create a crisis of presence and significance of the entire G20 group, especially in the view of the countries which are about to take the presidency of the G20. From this point of view, as I touched upon before, it is of paramount importance that all the member countries continue to desire to make a significant contribution to the interests of the G20. If not, the G20 may be condemned to staying idle until the next major global crisis.

Should the structural organization of the G20 be changed? This question arises perhaps as a natural result of the issues touched upon above, and may beg the question as to whether the G20 requires a fixed secretariat, like the one which was formed when the GATT was transformed into the WTO. However, this possibility will not be considered by the G20 members probably because of the risks of “role stealing” from other organizations and platforms, as well as of “bureaucratic inertia”.

The commitments of the G20 countries and the observation of their fulfilment, or lack of it. As far as the decisions made at the G20 summits are concerned, the number of commitments made by the member countries is far less important than how many of them are fulfilled, and in which timescale.[18]This point is of vital importance with regards to both the performance of the G20 and the way it is perceived from the outside. Although there are periodic reports prepared to hold the G20 countries accountable to their national commitments, yet there is (for now) no institution in place for those countries who fail to uphold their commitments, and this might be a useful change for the future of the G20.

Is the lack of a leader country in the G20 a problem? It is a contention commonly made and is trying to be proved by economists, political theorists and historians that the worldwide economic power is shifting from the U.S. to countries like China and India. According to polls conducted in 14 countries by telephone or face-to-face by the Pew Research Centre (pewresearch.org) in 2008, the dominant belief is that China is the “leading economic force in the world” (Rampell, 2012). Furthermore, according to the estimate of The Economist Online (2011), China may indeed overtake the U.S. in terms of its Gross Domestic Product in the very near future, possibly 2018-2021. But in contrast to this tendency neither the U.S., nor China or any other powerful country has been able to undertake the responsibilities of “leadership” in the past as they have been expected to do so. As a result of this, the economist Nouriel Roubini and the political theorist Ian Bremmer have been referring to this international political and economic governance as “G-Zero World” since the beginning of 2011. [19] They believe that during this period – which they think will be “temporary”-, the G20 will- as a result of a greater number of countries being admitted, and their interests becoming increasingly diverse- become a leaderless platform for “lack of compromise”, instead of one for solutions. They contend that this deficit or lack of “cooperation leadership” is postponing and making more difficult to solve the global economic problems. Furthermore, according to the writers, the economic actors around the world (especially large companies) are waiting for this political and economic uncertainty to be over,while hoping that it is temporary. However the longer they “wait” (for example before making new or additional investments), the deeper and bigger will be the impacts of this new (temporary) order on the global economy.

There is no expectation that the G20 leaders who will come together from 18-19 June 2012 in Mexico will be able to solve this issue of “cooperation leadership”. In fact, it seems that this issue will continue to effect G20 summits in the future.

Concluding Remarks

In the existing complex global economic and political atmosphere, it seems that the G20 organisation’s job is rather a difficult one, especially when one considers the questions and problems detailed in this report. Yet the fact remains that the G20 countries can take some steps towards solving or at least lightening some important and urgent issues that may concern the activities of other international organisations and platforms.

Turkey puts an important political emphasis on the G20 group. For this reason, we may contend that Turkey is a more active participant in the G20 than many other of its member countries. As a result of its political interest and willingness, Turkey will be the host country of the preparatory meetings of the G20 in 2015 and, ultimately, will host the leaders’ summit. As it prepares for its presidential term, Turkey, like Russia and Australia, should bear in mind all the points that have been drawn to our attention in this paper. In this way, Turkey may be able to learn some lessons from the mistakes of the inability to create a succesful agenda with respect to continuity, urgency, importance and selectiveness between terms as well as of inability of some countries/leaders in fulfilling their tasks. It is of great importance for Turkey to start preparations for the 2015 summit early, to be careful, realistic and selective when determining the summit’s agenda in order to maintain a successful summit.

During this term it will also be most suitable for Turkey to give a primary importance to the issue of “green growth for sustainable development from an environmental perspective” with a long-term approach on national and global levels. If the G20 countries, who have a big share on production and trade of international goods and services, decide to work together, this will have a huge positive impact on the inevitable transformation process in the global energy system, the fight against global warming, poverty and hunger

But it is important to make one thing clear, namely that if the issues of “a new financial structure” and “the reform of financial organisations” (which seem to be solvable more quickly compared to other topics), are not brought to a concrete solution during the presidencies of Mexico, Russia and Australia, they may even infiltrate the agenda of the G20 in 2015. In this respect, it is clear that big steps on financial issues are needed to be taken in Mexico.

This paper examines a unique dimension in contemporary Turkish foreign policy: “Turkish exceptionalism” in the Middle East. “Turkish exceptionalism” is the coupling of political altruism, embedded in Prime Minister Erdoğan’s personal international agenda, with Turkish “soft power” in the Muslim world to assist failed states. With Such policies simultaneously advance Turkey’s national interests and objectives that further its international power and prestige.  By demonstrating this relationship in statecraft vis-à-vis Turkey’s involvement in rebuilding and stabilising Somalia, this “new” aspect of its foreign policy can be decrypted. This paper also argues that while Turkey’s intention to be a responsible power in Somalia is genuine, the wider geo-politics of Turkey advancing its raison d’etat is coupled within this paradigm. As Turkey’s latent power grows, it will seek out similar opportunities to use its soft power via international autism to achieve its wide-ranging national interests of becoming a regional and global power.

Introduction

On August 10, 2011, while addressing his Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) Expanded Provincial Leaders Convention, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suddenly and surprisingly announced that he and his family would soon go to Mogadishu as part of Turkey’s humanitarian relief effort in Somalia.[1] During his trip, Erdoğan stated that he would deliver approximately $115 million (USD-2011) in humanitarian assistance that the Turkish public had raised for Turkish Red Crescent operations, while also fostering awareness of the devastating effects of Somalia’s on-going famine and decades old civil-war.[2]  Nine days later, on August 19, Erdoğan made his unprecedented journey to Mogadishu that made him the first leader from outside Africa to officially visit Somalia in almost 20 years.[3] Although this seminal event was often overshadowed by the events unfolding concurrently unfolding in Libya and the Middle East, the success and context of Erdoğan’s mission to Mogadishu showcased Turkey’s first independent international engagement (under Erdoğan’s AKP)  that had an objective of extending its global reach.  Turkey’s Somali Adventure also demonstrated Turkish desire to become a more autonomous and engaging regional and global actor.

The case of Somalia is a significant event in Turkish foreign policy, as it highlights its engagement and leadership in an area that the international community has been unable to solve and unwilling to fully commit its resources to since the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993.[4] Somalia can also be regarded as an instance of “Turkish exceptionalism” in the Middle East, in which Turkish “soft power” was sturdy enough to “influence outcomes” in an place where other states could not obtain similar results. Additionally, Turkey was able to influence politics in Somalia without incurring external or internal punishment for their actions.[5]  Thus, Somalia represents both Turkey’s desire to become a global leader and an example of how Turkish statecraft has managed to incorporate elements of Erdoğan’s international “altruism” (soft power) in order to advance Turkey’s own raison d’etat

In order to demonstrate why the Somali case allows Ankara to become globally influential via soft power (Erdogan’s international altruism), I begin by providing background information regarding Somalia’s plight to illustrate that Turkish engagement is both altruist but also self-severing. I subsequently outline the international benefits that Turkey has reaped by “opening up” Somalia. Finally, I discuss the importance of regional recognition and soft power as a key component in Turkey’s Somali Adventure, and demonstrate that Turkey desires to be internationally recognized as an autonomous and important state in world affairs can be understood as a combination of these two threads.

Background:

Before delving into the political objectives of Turkey, it is first important to contextualize the region and risk associated with Turkish engagement in Somalia.  During the last two decades, Somalia has been without a formal government that controls its mandated borders. In fact, although Somalia is a recognized as a single, unitary state by the international community, it is perhaps better described as three states with distinct populations and national visions: (i) In North Somalia, the Puntland people have set up an informal quasi-autonomous state (akin to Kurdistan  in Northern Iraq), (ii) in the North-West of the country, ‘Somaliland’ was proclaimed as an independent state; and (iii) Mogadishu and South Somalia are theoretically under the control of the Transitional Federal Government (Dowladda Federaalka Kumeelgaarka), thoughthere is widespread lawlessness and anarchy, as well as the continued threat from al-Shabaab.[6] The fall of Siad Barre’s dictatorship in 1991 marked the onset of Somalia’s downward spiral towards immense instability, political and social turmoil, and human suffering, in which no governing entity was able to provide basic services to its citizenry. This state of anarchy is accompanied by a constant state of civil war along ethnic and sectarian lines. In many ways, this state that straddles the eastern most edge of “the horn of Africa” has become a modern day example of what Thomas Hobbes theorized as the “war of all against all”; with the absence of a centralized authority (Leviathan), life has become “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” for almost all Somali’s.[7]  Its internal turmoil has also caused great external trepidation throughout the international community, due to the continued threat of piracy upon international commerce, al–Shabaab, which until recently controlled most of Somalia’s southern territory.[8]  Unfortunately, the observation by Anna Husarska of the International Rescue Committee that Somalia is in a state of “endless hell” accurately depicts its condition during the 1990s and 2000s.[9]

From the early 1990s onwards, the international community has tried in vain to stabilize Somalia and bring about a resolution of this on-going conflict; however, the fallout from the now infamous 1993 “Black Hawk Down” incident, which prompted the pullout of United Nations and United States forces in March of 1995, made future peacekeeping action in Somalia both risky and limited during the subsequent decade.[10]  Throughout this time, Somalia was mostly ignored by the international community; even after the attacks on September 11, 2001 and U.S. President’s George W. Bush’s declaration of a “war on terrorism”, this place of endless hell was virtually forgotten and consigned into the dustbin of history.  Often the weighted risks and costs for stabilizing Somali have been considered very high given the continuous anarchic nature throughout the country, and the failure of previous peacekeeping and aide missions.  However, Somalia finally started receiving attention by international media outlets and states in 2008, when the Saudi Aramco super tanker Sirius Star was hijacked by pirates, and al-Shabaab made inroads in taking control of Mogadishu. Later that year, the international community declared Somalia a “frontline” state on the war on terrorism.[11]

During the next three years, multi-national African Union forces (especially the Ethiopian army) conducted a plethora of cross-border incursions with the mission of stabilising and assisting the beleaguered Transitional Federal Government from insurgents.  Although this process seemed minimal, there was a renewed effort to stabilise Somalia’s political landscape and give the transitional government time to organise security. However, most of these attempts failed; even as recently as the week before Erdoğan’s visit al-Shabaab controlled vast territory deep into Mogadishu and virtually all of south Somalia.  In later October 2011, a joint task force consisting of the Somali, Kenyan, and Ethiopian militaries (and other Western Powers such as Denmark and France as military advisers) launched Operation Linda Nchi, which successfully crushed al-Shabaab, but did not effectively ended the Somali Civil War (the primary objective- although the security situation has greatly improved).[12]

Somalia has long been a failed state and problematic for the international community, which has poured many resources into stabilising the country; this aid is meant to in ensure that the access point to the Red Sea remains open and shipping routes are protected.  However, the international community has not been able to penetrate internal Somalia to provide humanitarian assistance, as the security situation has been too grave and humanitarian workers have been targeted for either helping the “wrong clan or group” or are seen as an attempt of the re-colonization of Somalia by Western powers.[13]  In providing humanitarian assistance, Turkey has been received by Somalis with considerably less hostility than other states; the Turkish Red Crescent has already “distributed 5,000 tons of humanitarian aid in Somalia since August 2011” and has reportedly been welcomed and well-received by most of the people.[14]

Erdoğan has opened the door for Somalia to become a functioning state; however, it would be mistaken to interpret his emphasis on development of Somalia as an attempt to contain external security threats—a myopic outlook which has undermined previous stabilisation efforts.  His long time plan that was outlined in his well-received return briefing entailed “The Tears of Somalia”, in which Erdoğan announced that Turkey would help the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and other institutions in Somalia:

…. Include[s] lending political support in the fields of health, education, and transportation, and envisages the provision of a 400-bed hospital, garbage trucks for the streets of Mogadishu, a waste-disposal facility, metalling of the main highway between Mogadishu and its airport, renovation of the parliamentary and other government buildings, sinking of water wells, and development of agriculture and animal husbandry. These works will be coordinated from Turkey’s proposed embassy in Mogadishu.[15]

If Turkey is successful in turning around Somalia and stabilising the internal politics of this perpetually anarchic country, it will not only become a quasi-benefactor state, but will also demonstrate the vast and wide-ranging influence of Turkey in the Muslim world. Most importantly, Turkey’s efforts would bring about international legitimacy that might allow it to become involved in the decision-making processes of other pressing geo-political issues and crises.

Opening Somalia:

Shortly after Erdoğan’s journey to Mogadishu, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that one major objective of the trip was to break down the perception “that nobody can go to Mogadishu”; ergo, “if we came, many others can come”.[16] Knowing that leadership by example is the cornerstone for soft power success, Erdoğan’s personal journey to Mogadishu was aimed to be the event that would assist Somalia in re-entering the community of nations through example; however, it would also show that Turkey has far-reaching power to accomplish this seemingly impossible task. Three months after Erdoğan landed in Mogadishu, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon also visited on a fact-finding and humanitarian tour.[17]  Afterwards, British Foreign Secretary William Hague made the trek out to Mogadishu, and for the first time in twenty-years “the world’s most failed state” was showing signs of success and strong international engagement.[18] Erdoğan’s trip to Somalia was just the first of many strategically calculated moves to demonstrate the reach of Turkish influence and soft power.

Adding to the opening of Somalia, a Turkish Airlines Boeing 737-800 landed on the tarmac of Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport on March 6, 2012.  On board this flight were many high-ranking Turkish officials, including Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ, Somali President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Minister of Defence Hussein Arab Isse, and other prominent members of the Transitional Federal Government gathered on the tarmac.[19]  Normally, such an event is routine and customary throughout the world. But as discussed previously, Somalia is not a normal case and this event became yet another unique and promising gathering to showcase an improving Somalia, commemorating Turkish Airlines’ new twice weekly Istanbul- Khartoum- Mogadishu route. The Somali Foreign Minister Abdullahi Haji announced at the gathering that he hopes the new route will “make it easier for the Somali diaspora to come home. It will bring us closer together.”[20] As Somalia is being reopened to the world, it is the Turks who are playing an essential role in not only moving people, but also taking the risk to engage in a very turbulent and unsure place.

Similar to U.S. President Richard Nixon’s trip that “opened” China in 1972 and showed the world that the People’s Republic could be a responsible and non-revisionist power, Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia has given leaders a renewed energy and focus that this war-ravaged country can become a stable member of the international political system.  This is no minor accomplishment, given the political turmoil that has plagued Somalia over the last two decades. With the momentum of recent successes against al-Shabaab and the growing sense of stability in Somalia, the British hosted a meeting on Somalia and invited many world leaders to pledge increased support for measures to fight piracy and terrorism, and bring about political stability in Somalia by substantially increasing international funding for the African Union military operation in the country.[21] In his speech to the conference, David Cameron, the British Prime Minster, stated that:

Despite the huge challenges still ahead, when the British Foreign Secretary visited Mogadishu he saw a growing confidence returning to the streets. Shops re-opening, homes being rebuilt, a city beginning to get back on its feet again…That fatalism has failed Somalia. And it has failed the international community too. Today we have an unprecedented opportunity to change that. There is a real momentum right now. International aid has pulled Somalia back from the brink of the humanitarian crisis.[22]

With a renewed commitment by the international community, Somalia seems to be turning a page in a long and dark chapter of its long history.  Although the Western engagement in Somalia is proliferating in recent months, and there is a sense that there is a unique opportunity to achieve a measureable about of stability and development. Turkey has already won its foreign policy victory and has achieved wide-ranging geo-political support, coupled with boasting its soft power and international recognition.

The outlying success of this case has shown that the Turkish government knows how to utilize its soft power influence, but also understands that it requires leading by example. Joseph Nye, in particular stresses this point in soft power deployment when he wrote: “in the business world, smart executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands, but also involves leading by example and attracting others to do what you want”. [23]  Similar too most political leaders, Erdoğan understands that soft power comes from a state’s “ability to establish preferences…[which] tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority.  If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead”.[24]  Therefore, the opening of Somalia was not only about raison d’etat, but also represents Erdoğan’s own view of global leadership that is supported domestically as well as internationally; yet the uniqueness of this case have been Turkey’s ability to still accomplish several important international objectives.

Subsequently, an understanding of why Turkey wanted to engage in Somalia starts to crystallize when one looks beyond just the notion of altruism and mulls over other geo-political objectives that are within the framework of raison d’etat. This does not say that Erdoğan is not altruist in nature; that he took his entire family to a very dangerous place shows a certain personal belief or commitment to humanitarian relief. However, what makes Turkish foreign policy unique is that it can take an altruist tone or mission, yet its presence in a place such as Somalia is less tremulous that those of Western powers, given its lineage as a non-colonial power and a Muslim country. Turkish exceptionalism in this case adds to a rational choice of engaging in Somalia, because the payoffs over the long run are very lucrative: it enhances Turkish soft power while building its regional status as an emerging world power.

Turkish Objectives:

As mentioned previously, Turkish foreign policy in regards to Somalia has linked Erdoğan’s altruist predisposition and worldview of how Turkey should behave in the international system, while strategically implementing a policy that positively moves forward Turkish national interests.  In doing so, the outcome in Somalia has given Turkey a strategic advantage in North Africa (a foothold into the continent), but also has increased Turkish soft power that will further propagate further cases of Turkish exceptionalism, which is currently unravelling in regards to the Civil War in Syria.

Soft Power

Ankara for the latter part of the last decade has been on a quest to solidify its regional standing and influence by enhancing its soft power throughout the Middle East. Soft Power as defined in Nye as: the utilization of a state’s culture, language, and media “to obtain what one wants through co-option and attraction”.[25]  By moving away from emulating the United States or Europe (Kemalist/Military/ Özal’s foreign policy) and trying to forge its own independent foreign policy, Turkey has redefined its “strategic depth” by not shunning the Arab and Muslim world and fully engaging those states on its periphery.  By boasting its soft power to demonstrate it has increased its own importance and fortunes in the Middle East, Turkey has successfully used its cultural and religious heritage as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, and its recent emergence of a regional power, as a tool to achieve its geopolitical objectives, while maintaining Erdoğan’s own view of Turkey being a responsible (altruist) power.

In the foreign policy arena, Erdoğan also scored high marks. A Pew Research poll just before the elections in June illustrated that “about six-in-ten (62%) Turks have a great deal of or some confidence he to do the right thing in world affairs.”[26]  The same poll indicated that people believed that: “under Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey has played a more assertive role in international affairs and most Turks give the prime minister positive marks on foreign policy.”[27]  Furthermore, since Prime Minister Erdoğan’s now infamous “walk out” at the 2009 Davos conference, he became the most popular figure in the Middle East almost overnight.[28] This trend has led to immense benefits in seeking cooperation with “post” Arab Awaking states such as Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt, whose populations and governments have embraced parts of the “Turkish Model”.[29]

Even the United States and Europe have came under the “spell” of Turkey’s soft power, as those states tout Turkey to be a model for the Islamic World and have been (2002-2005 and 2010-present) staunch supporters of the ruling government: “[the AKP’s] coming to power comprises an asset for the Turkish model, as it demonstrates both the evolution of the Islamist movement in Turkey, and the potential for reconciling democracy and Islam.”[30] With support from Western governments and a deep support and gratitude from the Somali government towards Erdoğan, Turkey has uniquely positioned itself as the custodian of Somalia and gateway into that region.  Speaking to this point, the Somali ambassador to Turkey, Nur Sheikh Hamud Mursal, has stated that Somalia regrets having discovered Turkey very late and that the relationship blossoming between the two countries, while he has categorized that:

“[t]he Somali people see Turkey as a savior sent by God to Somalia. Somali people are looking at Turkey not as a foreign country but as their real brother. Turkey did lots of things in a short time and it is really amazing. Turkey is helping us in many fields: education, health, construction.”[31]

In the Somalia case Turkish soft power has also translated into results for its wider geo-political objectives of achieving regional power by demonstrating Turkey’s ability to influence its desired outcomes. Currently, as Turkey’s power grows, it is only logical that it would want to establish itself more independently from any other great power(s).However, given Turkey’s unique geographical location, (bordered by the European Union, Russia, Iran, and the wider Middle East), it has vast potential to maximize its both hard power (as Turkey’s military remains the second largest armed forces in NATO) and soft power. The economic growth has resulted in a renewed confidence in Turkey that continues to underpin these two threads. All of these factors have created a new relationship between domestic and international outlooks and a new domestic audience.  First, soft power plays to the AKP’s base; to the party can play the “neo-Ottoman” card domestically while bringing their Muslim neighbours closer through a sharing of heritage. Second, internationally, the benefits are two-fold as Turkish soft power offers a different cultural perspective to Middle Eastern states, which then in turn makes engagement with those states easier, as it creates payoffs through increased trade and economic cooperation.

International Recognition:

Over the last five years, Turkey’s international power has increased, as its economy has been performing exceptionally well, with high-growth and relatively low-inflation;. This growth has been accompanied by its political system gradually stabilising, hence reducing the prospects of military interventions. With a growing economy and a gradual improvement in its democratic credentials, Turkey has been hailed by the West as a model state for the Middle East and a model for democracy given its ability to reconcile Islam and democratic principles.  Also, given the recent events in the Middle East, Turkey is also touted as a source of stability in region that is constantly in flux. This has elevated Turkey’s international profile and geostrategic importance to not only the United States and the West, but also with Russia, and Iran, which all have look for a friendship in the Turkish Republic.

This has given Turkey a seat at the table to be a leading state in some important international issues.  Having a seat for some states is a matter of national honour and for others is prestigious; however, it also has an important utility given that states engaged in a process are usually provided with fruitful results or payoffs.  This is especially true for states that are global powers or have aligned interests with the strongest power, such as those in the UNSC or G-20. Turkey has been increasingly active in a plethora of issues world-wide; such as the ongoing Arab Spring, the Syrian Civil-War, the NATO missile shield, an actor of interest in mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict, and now the patriarch of Somalia. The courting of Turkey to assist in international issues is only matched by its eagerness to be involved.  Currently, with Erdoğan being the most popular leader in the Middle East for several years, Turkey represents an ideal country to help decide global issues in the Middle East.[32]

Although they now have a seat at the table, the Turks have learned an important lesson about being subjugated to another power’s foreign policy, which Kenneth Waltz in his seminal work A Theory of International Relations refers to as bangwagoning.[33]  For example, during the Cold War and again during Gulf War I, Turkey kowtowed to American policy to achieve payoffs for widespread cooperation and standing behind the U.S.   Then-President Turgut Özal assumed that by cooperating with the United States and allowing the U.S. to use Turkish airspace to attack targets in Iraq and Kuwait and also use its territory to establish a second front in Northern Iraq, Turkey in return would receive high levels of economic assistance from the U.S and other Gulf and coalition members. Although a $4.2 billion defence fund was set up for Turkey, the embargo imposed on Iraq after the war and the effects of the war itself ravaged the Turkish economy due to “the loss of income [from the] Iraq-Turkey pipeline, large scale disruption of bilateral trade as well as the border trade and the unemployment that this caused in south-eastern region, [and] Iraq’s non-payment of its debts to Turkey.”[34]

As a result of the deep economic losses incurred by Turkey’s support of the First Gulf War, it appealed to the United Nations and evoked Article 50 of its Charter, which stipulates:

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.[35]

However, unlike the Jordanians, who did not participate in the coalition that invaded Iraq and stood close to Saddam Hussein during the war (most likely in a bid to appease the Palestinian demographic of its population), Turkey could not persuade the U.S to support them in the United Nations Security Council.  And unlike the Jordanians, who received compensation under Article 50, they did not receive any compensation for their losses during the aftermath of the war.[36]

It was these events at the end of the Cold War and during the first Gulf War that would remain at the forefront of policy makers’ minds; they who came to realize that “cooperation with the U.S in a crisis was a natural consequence of the convergence of Turkey’s interests with America’s. However, this had to be weighed against Turkey’s losses and Turkey’s cooperation with Iraq on the Kurdish questions over many years.”[37]Turkey would not forget the events that happened at the tail end of the Cold War and the Gulf War I, and decided to become self-reliant an autonomous actor when possible.

Thus, when Turkey felt confident enough to take action in Somalia, it decided to do it alone and to establish itself as the principal power to engage in that area, by first opening it up to the West and others by demonstrating it had the reach and soft power to do as such.  Domestically, many Turks have embraced the concept of an engaged and proactive Turkey as a strong and independent Turkey. This approach not only opens up new markets but also shows a stronger and more powerful state internationally.[38]   As Turkey becomes a more proactive member of the international community and demonstrates its ability to influence outcomes that achieves international security and peace, its recognition as a global power starts to crystallize through its engagement its efforts in Somalia and Syria. Also, as the United States disengages from the Middle East to focus more intently on Asia, Turkey has position itself to fill in the void that will occur concurrently with American disengagement.

The Somalia advantage thus makes decent geo-political sense as Turkey relied heavily on votes from Africa when it won a seat as a non-permanent member on the UN Security Council in 2009.  Ankara is hoping to repeat this feat in 2015 (as well as becoming a permanent member when/if the UNSC reforms itself) and maintain its current status as a responsible global power and its enhances its soft power to continuing its influential position in the international political system.

Conclusion 

The growing influence of the Turkish Republic stems from a unique mixture of taking Prime Minister Erdoğan’s worldview of what constitutes being a “responsible power” and coupling it with advancing its raison d’etat vis-à-vis soft power that achieves greater global recognition and thus political power to a status as an active global actor.  By looking beyond the notion of altruism (yet not discounting) or pure political realism, this paper has demonstrated that both threads working in tandem constitutes a new approach in the implementation of Turkish statecraft.It also provides an explanation for why Turkey was both risking and willing to engage in Somalia as a mechanism to accomplish wide-ranging geo-political goals. Turkey’s engagement in Somalia illustrates some of the many changing aspect in Turkish foreign policy, and is a “tipping of their hand” event, as it sends a clear message of its national interests and objectives in the short to medium term.

Given the success and payoffs received by Turkey for their efforts in Somalia, Turkey has been tipped by the West to be the prime actor in finding a solution for the Civil War taking place in Syria and as a leading state in the Middle East and Muslim world. Furthermore, Turkey’s Somalia adventure might be a model for continued behaviour in Turkish foreign policy: to engage neighbouring failed states and implement a development and stabilising mission to bring those states back as function and contributing states of the international community.  Although, Turkey has received much attention over its role in the Arab Awaking, its mission to Somalia an example of Turkey’s new statecraft when its independent to act under its own accord.

Matthew T. Gullo

Please cite this article as follows:

Gullo, T. Matthew (June, 2012), “Turkey’s Somalia Adventure: The Quest for Soft Power and Regional Recognition”, Vol. I, Issue 4, pp. 6-18, Centre for Policy and Research on Turkey (ResearchTurkey), London: ResearchTurkey (http://researchturkey.org/?p=1226)

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